Russia now has the ability to provide close air support to its ground combat forces without facing significant problems from troubled Ukrainian air defenses, which means that the evolution of military operations is tilted in its favor.
“Missiles of air defense systems are running out in Ukraine, according to Western experts. NATO officially states that it is considering new deliveries of air defense systems to the Kiev regime. What kind of systems can we talk about and why they will in no way save Ukraine from Russian missile attacks? The special military operation made the importance of air defense clearer than ever.
The Russian air defense, saturated with modern radar stations (RLS), anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM) and fighters, copes perfectly with its task, unlike the Ukrainian one, which suffered huge losses in the first days of the war.
For now, it ceased to exist precisely as a system and turned into focal air defense. To date, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have several dozen obsolete medium- and short-range air defense systems, a large number of MANPADS, and MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets armed with short-range missiles.
In the West, there are already active voices that missiles for air defense systems in Ukraine are running out. NATO’s Secretary General says the alliance is studying the possibility of supplying Ukraine with new air defense systems. In other words, what we have before us is actually the official recognition by the enemy of the fact that Ukraine’s air defense is in bad shape.
Many Russian Su-30 and Su-35 fighters flying combat patrols carry air-to-air missiles, as well as the Kh-31P anti-radar missile of various modifications.
The latter can be suddenly applied against any air defense system or radar station. In such a situation, Ukrainian MiG-29s and Su-27s try to avoid close proximity with Russian fighters, and air defense systems are forced to constantly maneuver and act as backups.
There has been no continuous radar coverage over Ukraine since February. The absence of a continuous radar field does not allow the use of an automatic control system (ACS) for air defense.
Sometimes you can hear that reconnaissance aircraft constantly fly over neighboring countries and Ukraine and provide the Ukrainian air defense with information about the situation in the air. However, of all these aircraft, only the Boeing E-3 Sentry AWACS can detect aerial targets.
Such a reconnaissance aircraft as the RC-135 performs electronic reconnaissance with a detection range of radars and air defense systems up to 800 km. It is able to detect the departure of our aircraft from airfields by radio interception, but only to determine the fact of departure without identifying a target by any means.
The most powerful radar is in E3. It can detect a large aircraft at a distance of up to 600 km, a cruise missile up to 360 km. However, the actual tracking depth of the launch of Russian cruise missiles on the territory of Ukraine is about 200-250 km from the airspace of Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. It is even less over the Black Sea, since they have to fly around the Crimea. Given the above, US AWACS aircraft can do little to help Ukrainian air defenses. It only sees the western part of the country.
This makes it possible to refute the opinion that Starlink terminals are of great help to Ukrainian air defense. They help, but the information goes through them anyway from AWACS. In such an environment, the Ukrainians constantly demand from the West the supply of equipment to combat our cruise missiles and drones.
But what kind of air defense systems can the West ultimately offer, at least in theory, to Ukraine? Nowhere in the world is there such a school of design of air defense and radar systems, such an integrated approach to the construction of air defense, as a system of elements interconnected into a single whole, as happened in the USSR and continues now in Russia.
What can they give to Ukraine?
To date, the Patriot PAC-3 complex is the only ground-based medium-range air defense system in Western countries. There are no long-range air defense systems at all (like, for example, the Russian S-400 system).
THAAD is not worth thinking about. It is designed to deal with ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), SLBM (Submarine Ballistic Missiles) and IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) warheads. Aerody namic targets are too difficult for this.
This determines what the Western allies can offer Ukraine. When someone raises the issue of providing the Patriot PAC3 air defense system, there is an awkward pause, since the results show that this air defense system is far from the best.
The United States will not risk its reputation, since we would be interested in destroying such advertised equipment. Therefore, Ukrainians should not dream of it. Thus, only short-range anti-aircraft systems remain for them.
Here is what is finally available for the Armed Forces of Ukraine:
- SAM Hawk (“Hawk”) Phase III MIM-23B. The range is 40 km, the maximum height of hitting targets is 18 km. The first modification entered service in the 1960s. The most combative American air defense system, produced in more than 40,000 units. In Ukraine it can be delivered from Spain. The fundamental disadvantage is weak capabilities for low-altitude targets, low maximum target speed, and the backlight radar is ineffective for small targets. The Soviet analogue is the obsolete S-125 complex.
- SAM Crotal-NG (“Rattlesnake”) , the most modern modification with a range of 10 km and a height of 6 km. According to the characteristics, it is slightly inferior to our “Thor”. There are no combat achievements behind him. The French claim they are reliable, but in 2020, this air defense system, along with the Patriot PAC-3, in Saudi Arabia, failed to repel a drone attack by Yemen’s Houthi rebels on oil operations.
- The MIM-104 Patriot PAC3 air defense system is the pride of the US military-industrial complex, having a range of 80 km, a height of 24 km. Everyone calls it an anti-missile defense system (missile defense), not air defense, and it was actually developed to protect troops in the theater of operations from operational-tactical missiles. These are, for example, Iskander ballistic missiles. But the destruction range of their MIM-104В/С/D missiles is only 20 km! With such a distant border of the affected area, it is possible to cover a small object (for example, an airbase), but not such a large city as Kyiv. Another disadvantage is that firing at ballistic targets requires the use of target identification from the satellite. Without it, it has little chance of detecting such a target in time. Of the four modifications of the MIM-104 missile, only “A” is designed for firing at aerodynamic targets
- SAM Skyguard-Aspide. Range 12 km, height 6 km. There are two variants of air defense systems, the Italian Spada and the Swiss Skyguard-Sparrow. The Swiss are unlikely to give it. “Aspid” is the name of the actual anti-aircraft guided missile (SAM). Developed by Selenia based on the more than 60-year-old American AIM-7 Sparrow (“Sparrow”) anti-aircraft missile. All RVV air-to-air missiles used by ground launchers lose significantly in range from their prototypes used by fighter aircraft, while not participating in hostilities.
- SAM M1097 Avenger (“Avenger”). Range 5.5 km, height 3.8 km. The Humvee is equipped with four Stinger MANPADS missile-launching and carrying boxes, as well as optical and infrared detection equipment, a laser range finder, and a friend-or-foe identification system. The capabilities of the complex to destroy aircraft are the same as those of the basic MANPADS, but it has additional means of detection and determination of the range to targets can reduce their failures associated with erroneous launches on aircraft and helicopters.
- The Mk.12 identification system will apparently be withdrawn before delivery, and its supply to non-NATO countries is prohibited.
- ZRK SLM IRIS-T. Range 40 km, height 20 km. According to the manufacturer’s descriptions, it is a very dangerous SAM. Either way, his missile is dangerous. It is capable of maneuvering with an overload of 60 units. This, apparently, is the only missile defense system in the world that has a deflected engine thrust vector. The developer claims that the combination of command guidance and infrared descent provides high protection against electronic warfare and heat traps. The Giraffe-4A radar is capable of tracking up to 150 targets and is capable of launching and guiding all 24 missiles simultaneously.
- SAM NASAMS-2. The main feature of this air defense system is its suitability for network-centric warfare. It has an open software architecture and communication channels with NATO standards. All this is transferred to the command center of the array. A lot has been done to be able to integrate the complex with different types of missiles and radars. The NASAMS-2 array includes 12 launchers. A completely different ideology for building air defense systems than ours. The complex is unnecessarily complex. Ukrainian air defense system crews will have to be retrained for a long time. Moreover, on those machines that have already been delivered to the Armed Forces of Ukraine, crews from NATO countries are probably working, and the officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the best case, stand behind them.
Little chance of survival
These are all short and medium range air defense systems. Something has already been delivered, something promises to be delivered next year, like for example, IRIS-T SLM, most of NASAMS-2.
But even if all these systems were currently deployed in Ukraine, this would not change the situation much. Catastrophic damage has already been done to Ukraine’s infrastructure, which the NATO Secretary General admitted on Tuesday, as they are unable to cover any significant number of facilities.
The main weakness of all these systems is their short range. It is impossible to build a country’s air defense system using such equipment. Only focal air defense can be organized.
If air defense systems are installed without mutual coverage being organized beforehand, then they will be destroyed relatively quickly. However, we must not forget that those air defense systems still operating in Ukraine still pose a significant threat to Russian manned fighter aircraft.
This is why the Russian aerospace forces are increasingly using unmanned systems, (drones) and cruise missiles. Ukraine has no protection against them now, and will not in the future, with the hypothetical procurement of Western air defense systems.”
Conclusions
From the above it is clear that the Ukrainian air defense can be effective in individual areas of the country’s territory, since it lacks a unified air defense system since February.
Also, the existing Ukrainian air defense is unable to counter Russian UCAVs, KAMIKAZE DRONES, cruise missiles, which gives Russia a significant starting advantage. Finally, the deployment of the above air defense systems from the West to Ukraine, it is a given that it will significantly increase the ability of the Ukrainian forces in the area in question, but to such an extent that it will not tip the scales in their favor.
Russia now has the ability to provide close air support to its ground combat forces, which means that the evolution of military operations is tilted in its favor.
