In 1281 AD the Mongol emperor Kublai Khan was preparing to invade Japan with a fleet of 3,500 ships. A powerful hurricane scattered the enemy fleet. Emperor Komei, in gratitude to the wind god Ise, mentions the event as the “Wind God” or otherwise “kamikaze”.
In 1944, seven centuries later, the Japanese people face a greater danger than the US Navy. The “divine wind”, no matter how powerful it was, could not disintegrate the enemy behemoths.
Operations in the Pacific battlefield resulted in the decimation of the Japanese Air Force. According to statistics, in air battles and during operations on naval targets, the Japanese lose from 40% to 80% of their strength, but nothing similar happens in the Allied camp.
Despite all the honorable efforts of the judges, they could not overturn the supremacy of the Americans.
In mid-October 1944 an event occurred that showed the Japanese leadership the possible solution and raised a great moral question.
The protagonist of the project was Rear Admiral Mazabumi Arima, Commander of the 26th Fleet of the 1st Air Fleet of the Navy.
On 15 October, Arima convened an emergency council at the fleet base at Clark Airfield, Philippines, where he requested the Army command to grant him air power to organize an operation to strike the US Naval Task Group 38.
The request is accepted by the military leadership and Arima decides that the operation will be conducted in two waves.
The first wave is launched without effect, while the second wave will be attacked by 13 Yokosuka D4Y Suisei bombers, 16 Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen fighters and 70 military-provided fighters of various types, awaiting a signal to take off.
Rear Admiral Arima is put in charge of the second wave. Against the regulations, he dons the operator’s uniform and climbs into one of the 13 Suisei.
At midday the aircraft take off in such a formation that the Zero-Sens fly lower than the bombers to provide them with cover.
Army chasers follow further behind in swarms. The Japanese force is quickly noticed by the American forces, and in no time the Hellcats are taking off from the carriers.
The current situation is a proper hell for the Japanese. They lose one aircraft after another, to the powerful Hellcats and the anti-aircraft defenses of the ships.
The Suisei bombers are all mowed down and shot down, except for Rear Admiral Arima, who is hiding in a cloud trying to surprise the carrier Franklin.
Finding the right opportunity, he charges with all his cargo and crashes into the bridge of the aircraft carrier.
The fire that followed from the explosion of the aircraft’s bombs and tanks caused severe damage to the aircraft carrier, as a result of which it became dangerously inclined and remained for some time in the repair base, away from the battlefields.
Similar isolated incidents of fanatical pilots, who became holocausts on American targets, occurred from the first months of the war in the Pacific. What Arima managed, however, was to confirm the words of the exponent of the Kamikaze idea, Captain Eikiro Jo.
After the defeat of the Marianas with terrible losses to the Imperial Navy, the commander of the aircraft carrier Kiyoda, Eikiro Jo, sends a letter to the High Command stating: “It is no longer time to hope to destroy by conventional means the numerically vast superior enemy aircraft carriers. Therefore, I am asking that the fastest, special air corps be formed, whose pilots will be thrown directly at the enemy ships. I wish to take over the administration of this body.”
Rear Admiral Arima learned the contents of Captain Eikiro’s letter and, seeing the needless death of his subordinate colleagues, put aside all hesitation and decided to convince the High Command in his own way.
The establishment of the first special air suicide corps
Although the feat of Arima, who ignited the flame of self-sacrifice to save his country as a young samurai, was discussed in awe among the pilots of the Imperial Navy, none of the higher-ups in the Supreme Command dared to implement a strategy based on at the beginning of compulsory death.
On the other hand, American forces hammered the Philippines more and more, knowing that it was perhaps the most important source of raw materials for Japanese industry. The Japanese knew that if the Philippines were lost, Japan would be lost. The High Command decides to defend the Philippines by all means by implementing Plan Sho-go (plan of victory). Even at this critical point, the Imperial leadership plans air operations in a conventional manner.
On October 17, two days after Rear Admiral Arima’s heroic suicide, a large American force is assembled in Leyte Gulf. Your Plan goes into effect. Large naval forces are sent to the area. At the same time, Vice Admiral Takjiro Onishi arrives in Manila and takes command of the 1st Fleet.
On October 19, he meets with 201st Squadron Vice Commander Asaiki Tamai, 1st Air Fleet Vice Commander Rikihei Inoguki and squadron commanders Yokoyama and Ibusuki.
He explains to them the gravity of the situation and the possible failure of Plan Shaw, informing them that the only way to stop the enemy’s advance is to form elite air units to crash into the targets. Tamai and Ibusuki agree with Onishi and ask him to assign the 201st Squadron to create the first special mission team.
The special unit, which would operate only once, with the aim of pinning down American aircraft on the aircraft carriers, was called “Kamikaze” and was made up of 26 aircraft, of which 13 were equipped with 250 lb bombs and were assigned to crash. It was divided into 4 sections named “Shikishima”, “Yamato”, “Asahi” and “Yamazakura”.
The operators were all volunteers, genuine children of Japan, who considered it a supreme honor to sacrifice their lives for Japan and the emperor. It is worth mentioning that the volunteers were many more than the number needed for the formation of the special body.
Kamikaze action and missions
The first Kamikaze operation takes place on October 23 from the Cebu base without success because they did not find the enemy. On October 25th at 7:30 a.m. they make a new sortie, and 40 miles from Siargao Island the Yamato Squadron locates the American force “Taffy Group 1”, consisting of 4 escort carriers and 7 destroyers.
One of the 6 Yamato Zero-Sens charges against the aircraft carrier Santee and crashes into the forward part of the bridge causing massive damage.
“Santee” was out of business for some time due to heavy losses. Another Zero-sen charges against ‘Petrov-Bey’, but is hit by ‘Suwanne’s fire. The pilot brings the aircraft back and crashes into the ‘Suwanee’, which follows the fate of the ‘Santee’.
The remaining four aircraft of the “Yamato” division heroically fell on the battlefield, without causing any significant damage to the enemy.
The Shikishima division locates US naval force Taffy Group 3 off Leyte. The Japanese are quickly spotted by enemy radar and 40 Hellcats take off to intercept them. Yakuhito Seki, head of the division, locates the American aircraft carriers and orders a “chimaku” (vertical suicide charge).
The first Zero-Sen charges at Kitkun Bay, but misses and crashes about 100 meters from the ship, causing minor damage.
Two more charge at the White Plains, one of which explodes in flight and heavily damages the White Plains, while the other at the last minute maneuvers and crashes into the destroyer St.Lo.
The explosion causes a large fire that spreads to the ship’s torpedo storage area. The torpedoes ignite and within minutes the ship sinks. The remaining two aircraft of the “Shikima” division are shot down by the heavy fire of “White Plains”.
The other two divisions of the first special corps, “Asahi” and “Yamazakura”, follow the ships of the same American naval force.
Some charge against “Kitkun Bay” without success. Four more are attacking Kalinin Bey as a group. One of them hits the target and deals significant damage. At 12:20 only three escort aircraft return to Cebu.
Many of the escort aircraft, although not carrying bombs, followed the example of their “colleagues” and crashed.
Despite the relatively good results achieved by the Kamikazes in the Battle of Leyte, Imperial Navy ships and conventional aircraft attacks sank only 5 enemy ships, while the losses amounted to 26 ships, including the battleships Yamashiro and Fuso. , as well as 391 aircraft.
The staffs realize the colossal failure of the Shaw Plan combined with the large offering of Kamikaze volunteers and decide to form new special suicide squads.
The staffs of the 1st and 2nd Air Fleets are merged and Admiral Fukudome, Commander of the 2nd Fleet, is placed in command.
Onishi, as a junior, assumes the duties of deputy commander. Immediately, 4 new Kamikaze Squadrons are created by the pilots of the 701st Squadron named “Koyou”, “Seikou”, “Junkou” and “Jiretsu”. Special suicide squads are now a reality.
On 27 October, 4 Squadrons attempt their first mission and inflict heavy damage on the light cruiser Denver.
In a meeting of those responsible for the special forces and the escort pilots, it was decided that each Squadron should consist of three attack aircraft and two escort aircraft. Also, two opinions prevailed regarding the method of attack:
1) The high-altitude dash, which avoids enemy anti-aircraft fire and becomes a better target choice.
2) The low flight so as not to be detected by the enemy radars, to minimize the intervention time of the Hellcats and at the last moment to rise and charge from a height of 2,500 feet at most.
At first the first method was used with considerable success, but very quickly the second method was also adopted, which was used with great frequency by Seki’s Kamikaze in Samar. For the first method to be successful the pilots would have to be skilled and experienced. Experienced pilots, however, were needed for conventional operations and the defense of strategic points behind the front line.
Nevertheless, both methods were used, with the aim of creating a false impression on the enemy as to their modus operandi. Onishi, in a meeting with the High Command in Tokyo, is informed of the criticality of the situation and the importance of the Philippines and proposes to defend them exclusively from the Kamikaze.
The proposal is accepted, and about 150 aircraft are sent to Tainan and Taikou airfields to train the new Kamikazes. Despite the large number of volunteers, the selection is based on their young age and lack of family obligations.
The education of the young Kamikaze could be described as anything but adequate. It lasted a maximum of twelve days, with minimal flying hours due to fuel economy.
Most dramatically, many of the trainees towards the end of the war were trained on wooden dummies, due to lack of fuel and planes. For most, their last mission was also their first.
It is perfectly understandable from the above that the new Kamikaze swarms did not have the same capabilities as the first divisions, but they certainly achieved much better results than conventional air attacks.
Next we will refer to the most important blows inflicted by the Kamikaze on the enemy, because it is practically impossible to mention all their missions. However, there was hardly a single day during the period we are describing that there was not a successful or failed Kamikaze mission.
A major Kamikaze operation took place on 25 November when 8 Kamikaze and 4 escort aircraft from Mambalakat tagged ‘Task Force 38’.
Despite the navy’s formidable anti-aircraft umbrella, the 8 Kamikazes managed to inflict massive damage on the aircraft carriers Essex, Intrepid, Hancock and Cabot. Smaller shipments are carried out throughout December. The many suicide missions further weaken an already bleeding Japan, resulting in horrendous losses of pilots and planes. On January 5th a large enemy naval force of 700 ships is noted between Mindoro and Luzon.
At 11:25 of the same day, after a superhuman effort by the technical department, 35 Kamikaze and 7 escort aircraft take off. They meet the enemy ships west of Luzon, off Iba, in San Fernando Bay, where they encounter heavy anti-aircraft fire.
They manage to get through and attack the escort carriers Manila Bay and Savo Atlantic, the cruiser Louisville, the destroyers David Taylor, Helm and Stafford, the aircraft carrier Orca and the tug Apache ». The next day, 29 Kamikazes and 15 escort aircraft attack the same force, inflicting heavy damage on the battleships California and New Mexico, the cruisers Minneapolis, Louisville, and Columbia, five destroyers, one minelayer, and a commutator.
The attacks continued in the following days, causing serious damage to the escort aircraft carriers “Kitkun Bay” and “Kandasan Bay”, as well as to the light cruiser “Columbia”, but with terrible losses. Onishi, seeing the Philippine air reserves depleted, convinces Fukudome to move the bases and unified command of the two fleets to Formosa.
On January 10, the headquarters was established on a hill near Takao. Essentially this is where the Kamikaze action in the Philippines ends, although formally the last mission took place on January 25th. In total, in the three months they operated in the Philippines, 421 Kamikazes were used, of which 378 carried out their mission, while the rest did not find their target.
Along with the escort chasers, a total of 480 aircraft were lost, while 16 ships were sunk and another 87 were severely damaged.
With the completion of the transfer of air forces from the Philippines, guarding was taken over by ground forces. At the new base the special suicide squads are reorganized, and on January 15th 8 Kamikaze and 4 escort aircraft take off from the Taikou base for their first mission.
During the mission they encounter American Hellcats and lose a Kamikaze aircraft and an escort. On January 20, a new Kamikaze unit named “Niitaka” is formed.
On January 21st the Niitaka squadron, consisting of 6 Suisei bombers, 6 Zero-Sen fighters and 6 escort aircraft, prepares to take off to strike the US 3rd Fleet which is 200 miles from its base.
Suddenly, a large American air force passes over them, heading for Formosa. Enemy forces, in Tainan alone sink 10 Japanese ships and more than 60 aircraft.
The “Niitaka” Squadron, approaching the ships of the 3rd Fleet, faces a number of enemy aircraft and heavy fire. Four kamikaze planes manage to break the cordon.
Two attack the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, one the light aircraft carrier Langley and the other the destroyer Maddox. Apart from the Langley, the other two ships suffered massive damage, which forced them to be out of action for some time.
On their return, the few aircraft of the Niitaka Squadron saw literally scorched earth after the “visit” of the enemy forces and required aerobatic skills to land on the bombed-out runway.
Seeing the desperate situation, the Supreme Leadership of Japan decided on February 11, 1945 to establish the 5th Air Fleet, with the aim of striking the enemy on the Okinawa-Iwo Jima front. Admiral Kibei Teraoka takes command and immediately assembles special suicide squads from the strength of the 601st Squadron. The new division named “Mitate” consists of five squadrons with a total of 32 aircraft.
The very next day, the Americans attack the island of Iwo-Jima. The American forces are vastly superior to the Japanese and everyone knows that there is no way to stop the Allied advance.
Teraoka himself considers the Kamikaze action on Iwo-Jima useless. The “Midate” Cluster performed essentially a single mission on February 21st.
Mitate’s 32 Kamikazes, flying over Iwo-Jima and facing a volcanic landscape from the smoke of battle, are ordered to attack. At 17:00 two Kamikazes, perfectly performing chebaku, crash almost simultaneously on the bridge of the “Saratoga”. Immediately the anti-aircraft defenses of the ships are activated and heavy fire hits the Kamikazes.
Two stricken aircraft crash into the Bismarck Sea, causing a large fire from the explosion. Another aircraft explodes in mid-air, a few meters above the Luga Point escort carrier, causing significant damage to it. Another aircraft crashes into the “Saratoga” and three others into two landing craft and a transporter.
The “Bismarck Sea” becomes engulfed in flames and in a few minutes breaks up with a gigantic explosion and sinks with the 350 men of the crew. The “Saratoga” lost about 300 men and with heavy damage sailed to Pearl Harbor for repairs. From the “Mitate” squadron all the aircraft were lost heroically fighting, not a single escort plane returning to the base at Katori.
In March 1945 the Americans began systematic bombing of Japanese cities, starting with Tokyo with B-29 flying superfortresses, resulting in the sad toll of around 130,000 casualties. The High Command orders the implementation of Plan Tan, with the aim of hitting the American base in Ulithi where the large aircraft carriers are being repaired.
From the 5th Fleet, the Azusa group is formed with 24 new high-speed aircraft equipped with 800 kg bombs. On March 11, the aircraft take off to travel 3,000 kilometers from the Kyushu base to find and strike their target.
The weather at take-off is ideal for the mission, but over the island of Okinotori Shima the situation changes and the sky fills with dark clouds. Aircraft, trying to avoid bad weather, change their route, wasting precious fuel. Some land on Minami Detojima, others are lost in the storm’s vortex, and finally only 11 with little fuel manage to continue.
Arriving near Ulithi they spot the American installations in the distance, but having traveled about 4,000 miles they fall one after the other into the sea from lack of fuel. Only one, with its engines shut down, goes unnoticed against the aircraft carrier Randolph and crashes into the ship’s bridge, causing a large fire.
The negative outcome of the Tan Plan and the heavy losses force Terracoa not to attempt similar missions. The Navy now has only 2,100 aircraft of various types, many of which lack spare parts or are grounded due to lack of fuel.
Another desperate weapon used was the OHKA flying bomb (its name means cherry blossom). The OHKA was a guided bomb with 800 kilograms of explosives, carried to the target by a twin-engine Mitsubishi GAM, known in the Allied camp by the nickname “Betty”.
The first mission was carried out on 21 March to target a large naval formation marked southeast of Kyushu. At 11:35, 16 Bettys with OHKA bombs, two escort aircraft and 30 Zero-Sen approach the target.
The Japanese are confident of the mission’s success. Suddenly 50 Hellcats appear, and the slow-moving Bettys are all mowed down in no time, without the Zero-Sen having time to react. The losses are horrendous. Few Zero-Sen return, while the Hellcats take no losses.
Despite the complete failure of the first mission, Admiral Matome Ugaki, Commander of all air forces of the Kyushu Navy, orders the formation of special suicide squads, which he calls “Kikusui” (floating chrysanthemums), to reinforce the last bastion before Japan , Okinawa, whose defense has been undertaken by the 32nd Army. The example of the navy is followed by the army, creating its own special suicide squads which it calls “Tokubetsu” (specialist). The 10th and 3rd Air Fleets also have special suicide squads.
On March 18, 40 Kamikazes from Kanoya and 8 from Kokubu operate against an enemy naval force, causing serious damage to the aircraft carrier “Indrepid”.
Finally, only 18 return to base. Between March 20-25 they hit the destroyer Halsey Powell, the submarine Nevillefish, a minesweeper and a landing craft.
On March 26, at the moment when the Americans were attempting to land on an island in Okinawa, more than 100 kamikazes took off and hit the USS Nevada, A/T Portefield, O’Brien, Callaghan and Foreman “, the light cruiser “Bilox”, the minesweeper “Dolci” and the minesweeper “Skermis”. On March 29, Kamikaze crashes into the heavy cruiser Indianapolis.
On April 1, American marines manage to land on the coast of Okinawa. After a while, three Bettys with OHKA bombs hit the T/K “West Virginia” and three small trucks.
On April 6, the first mass attack of the “Kikusui” takes place, where 80 Kamikazes, 8 Bettys with OHKA bombs, 11 escort fighters and 160 Tokubetsu take off.
Of the 358 aircraft that took part in the operation, only 41 would return, managing to sink the A/T “Bass” and “Colum”, the minesweeper “Emmons”, a landing craft, as well as causing damage to the light cruiser “San Giacchino” » in 12 A/T, 1 minesweeper, 4 minesweepers and 2 smaller boats. On April 7th they damage the battleship “Maryland” and the aircraft carrier “Hancock”.
On April 11, the battleship “Missouri” and the aircraft carrier “Enterprise” were attacked.
On April 12, a second mass attack is launched consisting of 83 Kamikaze, 9 Bettys with OHKA, 60 Tokobetsu and 196 escort aircraft. The result was that 330 Japanese aircraft were lost in the waters off Okinawa, managing to sink the A/T “Manert Abele” and hit the A/T “Stanley” and the T/K “Tennessee” and “Idaho”.
On April 14, 76 Kamikazes and 7 Bettys with Ohka hit the T/K “New York” and 3 A/T. On 16 April, 126 Kamikaze, 6 Bettys with OHKA, 23 Tokubetsu and escort aircraft are decimated. 110 aircraft are lost, sinking the aircraft carrier “Pringle” and causing serious damage to the aircraft carrier “Interpid”, the battleship “Missouri” and 4 smaller ships. Between April 17th and 22nd, 87 Kamikazes are attempted and only 33 return.
The blow they achieve on the enemy is to sink a minesweeper and damage 4 A/Ts and 3 minesweepers.
On April 28 and 29, 90 Kamikazes, 4 Bettys with OHKA bombs and 21 Tokubetsus set off. Only 22 return to base causing minor damage to 6 A/Ts, 3 minesweepers and 2 floating hospitals. On May 3 and 4, 75 Kamikazes again take off from Kyushu.
They sink 3 A/Ts and cause minor damage to the aircraft carrier “Birmingham”, the escort carrier “Sangamon” and 4 A/Ts. On May 24 and 25 mass Kamikaze sorties also take place, but without significant losses for the enemy. On the 5th and 6th of June, the battleship “Mississippi”, the heavy cruiser “Louisville” and the escort aircraft carrier “Natoma Bay” are attacked.
In the following days until June 21, when Okinawa is occupied by the US army, the Kamikazes attempt many exits, but without any substantial result. The last Kamikaze sinking took place on July 28, 1945, when an aircraft from the Kamikaze Squadron struck and crashed into the commander’s turret of A/T Callahan, sinking the ship within minutes.
On August 13, the “Lagrange” truck is slightly hit by an unknown kamikaze.
On August 15, the day of Japan’s unconditional surrender, 11 Susei aircraft with Ugaki depart for their final mission. Four of them land due to mechanical failures at bases near Okinawa, still held by Japan.
The remaining 7 along with Ugaki crash into the icy waters of the island, as a mark of honor for their fallen comrades. Thus ingloriously ended the heroic, but ultimately fruitless, action of the Kamikaze and Tokubetsu.
From their creation on October 25, 1944 until their last mission on August 15, 1945, 4,615 thousand airmen of the special forces were sacrificed, of which 2,630 belonged to the Naval Air Force and 1,985 to the Army Air Force.
The Navy launched a total of 298 single-seat guided bombs, sinking a total of 34 Allied ships and severely damaging another 288.
Certainly the percentage is much higher than the results of conventional airstrikes, if we exclude of course the price: 4,615 people sacrificed their lives for a cause without perspective. The warriors of the sulfur wind may not have been able to save Japan in the end, but they certainly proved themselves to be worthy descendants of the legendary samurai.
Midget submarines and other Navy suicide weapons
After the first Kamikaze missions, a competitive mood is manifested mainly in the Navy, which insistently wants to set up suicide squads using midget submarines. Submarines of this type were first used at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The prototypes of the “Ko” type midget submarines were built in 1938 at the Cure shipyards.
They were essentially miniature submarines, with a length of 24 meters, a maximum speed of 19 knots and a displacement of 46 tons. They had the ability to sail at a maximum speed of 32 km or at an economical speed of 2 knots.
The drive was given to the four-bladed propeller by a 600 hp electric motor. Their armament consisted of two 458mm torpedoes. and crew of two men.
Due to their limited capabilities they were not able to sail in the open sea, so they were carried by regular submarines at a distance of 20 kilometers from the target. Their mode of action was based on the fact that they were not easily noticed by the enemy and could easily penetrate the protective grids of the ports and attack the anchored ships.
Then the crew would have to leave the midget submarine and swim back to the mother submarine. So we understand that although the midget submarine was not exactly a kamikaze weapon, the crew must certainly have had the mental reserves of a genuine kamikaze, for in most cases death was certain.
Perhaps the most successful midget submarine mission was carried out on the night of 30 May 1942 in Port Diego Suarez, Madagascar, with the aim of damaging British ships in port. The result of the operation was the sinking of an oil tanker and minor damage to the battleship “Ramirez”. Certainly a small gain, considering that two midget submarines were lost in the process.
They were used in several missions in the Philippines in late 1944 and early 1945, but without any significant effect.
A newer type of submarine-dwarf or “fly”, according to the Japanese nickname, was the “Otsu” type with a length of 24.5 meters, a displacement of 50 tons, with a cruising range of 650 kilometers on the surface and 220 kilometers in a dive. From this type arose the “Hey” type, with a crew of three and with the possibility of being transported by ship.
The next type “Kori” was introduced in the second half of 1944 and had a crew of five, length 26.20 meters, displacement 60 tons, a cruising range of 1,850 km on the surface at a speed of 8 knots and 320 km in a dive at 4 knots. A total of 115 units were built, without achieving any significant result.
The last and most advanced midget submarine was the “Kerius” type, with movable balance fins, a displacement of 19 tons and a length of 17 meters. 20 units were built in 1945. It had a cruising range of 830 km at sea level and 67 km in a dive at 3 knots. She carried two 600 kg torpedoes for armament, but never took part in any operations.
Despite all the self-sacrifice of the crews and the various sophisticated types that were built, wherever they operated the submarines failed miserably.
Another type of kamikaze weapon used by the Imperial Navy was the Kaiten guided torpedo. It evolved into four versions, the most advanced of which had a crew of two, could develop a speed of 40 knots, had a hydrogen peroxide chemical engine of 1,500 horsepower and carried an explosive charge of 1,800 kg of trinitrotoluene.
Although the crew theoretically abandoned the torpedo 50 meters before the target, their death was certain from the shock wave of the explosion.
On November 8, 1944, the first unit with “Kaiten”, named “Kikumizu”, was formed, followed by two others, “Kabaya” and “Kamitake”. The three special units with the Kaiten guided torpedoes operated from November 1944 until July 1945, achieving better results than the midget submarines, but without being able to compensate for the huge losses of men and material.
The last suicide weapon of the Navy that was used was actually ships loaded with large amounts of explosive material and named “Singyo”. They were made in three types, two of which were wooden with dimensions of 4.90m. and 5.20 m., with a total weight of 1,125 and 1,700 kg, with the ability to develop 26 knots and with the ability to transport 1.5 tons of trinitrotoluene explosive.
The third type was aluminum-clad steel, with a length of 5.50 meters, a weight of 2,150 kg, a speed of 30 knots and the ability to carry 2 tons of trinitrotoluene. A total of 6,000 units were built with the mission of approaching enemy ships at maximum speed and crashing into them.
Their first mission took place on January 9, 1945, when 70 Singios attacked the US Navy in Lingayen Gulf, Philippines.
On 31 March their last mission was carried out off the Hagushi coast of Okinawa, where a Shinyo managed to sink a landing craft.
The High Command, seeing the fruitless sacrifices of the manual pilots of the “Shinjo”, decided to remove them from active action and use them for the defense of the coast of Japan, a thought that was never realized due to the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
In general, apart from isolated cases, the “Singyos” failed miserably in their mission, as did the “Kaitans” and the midget submarines.
The main reason for the failure of missions by these means is found in the impossibility of approaching the target and in the poor estimation of the effectiveness of the enemy.
The Imperial High Command, constantly underestimating the enemy and fanatically believing in the spiritual superiority of the Japanese over their opponents, wanted to reverse a prescribed course of defeat in the worst way and with the most casualties.
