In the half year since the fateful February 24, the pendulum of war has swung several times. At first we experienced the Russian version of “shock and awe” with the invading army penetrating a front of over 2000 kilometers, occupying large areas in the South, including Kherson, the capital of the province of the same name on the west bank of the Dnieper, and reaching towards the end of February-beginning of March, in a suburb of Kiev. In those days, everyone was wondering whether or not Zelensky – the president of Ukraine – would leave the country, whether elements of the military and secret services, in exchange for Moscow, would overthrow him, and whether the Ukrainian capital would change after a lightning advance of tanks and paratroopers.
With the arrival of spring, the picture changed immediately. Long prepared, the Ukrainian army managed to repel the invaders from Kyiv and Kharkiv, boosting the morale of the citizens, while the hitherto divided West appeared on a united front, imposing sanctions that exceeded Russia’s worst calculations. The sinking of the “Moscow”, flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, was another tactical and psychological blow to the attackers.
The next round, however, was decisively won by the Russians with the fall of martyred Mariupol on 17 May and the fall of the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lisitsansk in early June, securing Russian occupation of the entire Lugansk province. Already, Russia has placed under its control 22% of the territory and 70% of the coastlines of Ukraine. However, speculations about a quick advance of the Russians to neighboring Donetsk, resulting in the entire industrial region of Donbas being in their hands, have not been verified. In the two months that followed, the situation remained basically stagnant with small advances on both sides and reversals that did not change the big picture.
Bolstered by the most powerful weapon systems of the US and its Allies, the Ukrainians defend themselves, at great cost in soldiers and equipment, on the eastern fronts of Donbas and aspire to counterattack on the Southern front with the aim of recapturing Kherson, while disrupting the enemy’s rear with attacks or sabotage that hit Crimea, within 200 kilometers of the nearest Ukrainian positions, or even border Russian cities like Belgorod.
Despite the symbolic weight of these operations, nothing indicates that an immediate reversal is imminent. The most likely scenario is a long war of attrition, with artillery and trenches as the protagonists, something reminiscent of World War I, reviving the horror of the shadows as many generations knew it from the works of Remarque, him and Celine.
In theory, the unstable balance on the battlefield and the mutual attrition of wars could bring about a scenario, if not of peace, at least of a truce. In this direction, UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres tried to move, hoping that the recent agreement on the exports of Russia’s grain and agricultural products sector could become the basis for a ceasefire. But all this sounds like a midsummer night’s dream: Zelensky does not mean to enter into negotiations without first achieving certain technical victories, since otherwise it would be like handing over a quarter of the country to the Russians, while Putin will claim the minimum as a condition for the arms to be silenced is that Kyiv renounces forever not only Crimea but also Donbass.
Putin is hoping for the merciless Russian winter
General Winter was on Russia’s side against Napoleon and Hitler, and it is possible that he will again play his role in Russia’s new asymmetric conflict with the West. Inflation and an energy crisis are shaping up to be extremely tough months for Europe, with the pre-holidays already visible: the euro has slipped to one-for-one against the dollar at a 20-year record low, Germany is considering scenarios for a gas bond and a Liberal deputy speaker of the House is asking to put Nord stream 2 into operation.
At the same time, Britain is experiencing the biggest wave of strikes in recent decades. Extreme social phenomena and government overthrows are likely to occur in a number of countries, putting European cohesion and sanctions against Russia to a severe test. Beyond a clash of weapons and money, war and every war is also a clash of values. In the Ukraine war, it is not at all certain which of the two camps will show the stronger, long-term, will.
Τhe two camps
Ukrainian President Zelensky has more reasons to be in a hurry. Russia plans to consolidate its hold on Kherson in a referendum it has set for September, while Ukrainians worry that, despite what they say publicly, Western support in money and weapons may not last long unless they themselves have to show tangible successes on the battlefield – especially after a very likely defeat for the US Democrats in the November congressional elections.
All this pressures Zelensky for a dangerous attack on Kherson. Military analysts say he should not think so unless he has secured a numerical superiority of the order of 3 to 1 on the front of the conflict, while today the ratio of soldiers is roughly equivalent to one to one, but also in the field of equipment the Ukrainians despite recent reinforcement they do not feel confident.
