Deterrence as a Geostrategic term and how it is successfully achieved

The geostrategic concept of deterrence only makes sense among powers with strategic weapons, such as countries with nuclear arsenals. In detail, the above term was established by American political scientists, such as Schelling (1960), precisely to prevent a nuclear war from occurring which would be simultaneously destructive for both sides (Mutually Assured Destruction – MAD).

After all, for this reason Hollywood produced related films that either tried to satirize the situation but strongly emphasize the main disadvantages of a nuclear war between America and the Soviet Union (Dr Strangelove, 1964) or showed the horror of such a mutual destruction with an emphasis on the terrible degradation that the American way of life would have suffered (The Day After, 1983). But let us consider that even in this case between powers with huge nuclear arsenals there were situations that reached the brink of war (brinkmanship), as for example with the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Since a nuclear war would bring enormous destruction to all sides, the value of acquiring nuclear weapons is important for the stability of states. For example, it is extremely difficult to manifest an orange revolution or in general an attempt to change a state to a more pro-American one in a nuclear power such as Russia, China and North Korea.

Substrategic & Tactical Weapons in the context of a High Strategy

Strategic weapons are those whose destruction is difficult to control locally and the effects of their use have a long duration (nuclear winter). Substrategic weapons have a shorter radius of destruction and less time impact (barrier destruction) and tactical weapons are used against high value point targets (aircraft carriers, AWACS).

Now for non-nuclear powers deterrence is not an effective method of avoiding a war conflict. In this case, military conflict has a very high chance of happening, especially as long as one side believes in the method of deterrence. In Taiwan, Greece, the Baltic countries, Japan and South Korea for example, these high chances of conflict are euphemistically called “hot episodes” and usually mean the retreat of the least populous country in each such case. Specifically this retreat is called “appeasement”, and it means defeat without waging war, since the opponent has won his objective without military resistance.

Diplomatic Advance

Among nuclear powers, deterrence is quite effective, but in the case of non-nuclear powers, the effective strategy is the diplomatic advance, i.e. the projection of military power together with appropriate strategic initiatives in the context of civil war, which allow the promotion of a state’s interests at the expense of of another.

Of course the diplomatic advance can be used in any case. After all, this strategy had also been adopted by America, especially at the expense of Russia, i.e. after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, with the gradual expansion of NATO and the holding of high schools in Poland, the Baltic countries and also in Ukraine (RAPID TRIDENT-2021) .

But since there is always the possibility of military conflict, in order to delay this juncture, the acquisition of sub-strategic weapons (destruction of military & civil infrastructure, airports, barracks, power plants, dams) and tactical weapons is a necessary condition for supporting the high strategy of a state for high value targets (artillery positions, frigates, aircraft carriers, submarines).

High Strategy

In addition, the choice of equipment should follow a clear strategic route, a high strategy. All potential fronts should be considered. For example, typically Kaliningrad, Belarus, Russia, in the case of Estonia and Poland respectively.

For example, should Greece adopt a strategic narrative that seeks the liberation of the territories in Asia Minor? On the defense side, will the defense of the islands of Taiwan and/or the Philippines be limited to the China Sea theater of operations or will it include operations in the Philippine Archipelago and the Chinese mainland? Should the anti-access/area denial enclave in the Blue Sea be supported primarily with fleet or artillery units? Correspondingly, in the Southern-Eastern Mediterranean will the fleet act under the cover of submarines or will the submarines act more autonomously perhaps with the cooperation of unmanned platforms? More generally these examples are not mutually exclusive, but merely give an idea of ​​devising a high strategy to maximize the chances of victory in the event of hostilities. So depending on the strategic plans, the appropriate defense equipment should also be made.

Geopolitical Vision & Sources of Weapon Systems Supply

It is certainly worth buying weapons systems from countries that have a similar geopolitical vision, e.g. Japan and Taiwan, Greece and France (EU), AUKUS (Australia, UK, US) respectively. France has suffered from Islamist attacks, such as in the magazine Charlie Hebdo, but also in many other circumstances such as characteristically in the Bataclan theater. In addition, France’s anti-Islamist agenda fits extremely well with Greece’s geopolitical aspirations. After all, one of the Islamist killers in the Bataclan incident had passed as a “refugee” from the Greek island of Leros, triggering more cooperation between Greece and France in the fight against Islamist terrorism.

There can also be better cooperation with military industries of countries that have a parallel geopolitical vision. But the necessary condition is the existence of a defense industry in a country under “siege” (eg Taiwan, Greece, Finland) that produces some military capability at competitive standards. For example, the development of autonomous unmanned vehicles using artificial intelligence could provide a weapon system that would arouse interest in cooperation with other defense industries.

Especially for a country like Greece, the armaments policy should include more than one source of supply of weapons systems, since there is essentially no heavy defense industry in Greece. In addition, the respective procurements must be consistent with and reinforce the high strategy of the specific country. In addition, the acquisition of weapons systems only from NATO countries does not properly serve the creation of an effective high strategy for Greece, since for example its “eternal” enemy, Turkey has a developed industry for the production of unmanned systems and the best anti-aircraft systems for in this case they belong to the Russian arsenal.

Further today there is a great deal of debate about the survivability of conventional platforms such as fighter jets or warships. In detail there is a shift in doctrine that tends to replace these manned platforms with unmanned systems.

Self-protection and remote protection systems also play an important role in the context of electronic warfare. More generally, the belief is that any manned fighter aircraft that does not have the appropriate long-range attack weapon systems, i.e. missile systems and proper self-protection, is not military but is either tourist or for kamikaze use.

So the production of an effective defense industry should listen to the change of military doctrines and with a compass the high strategy of the country under examination to adjust its production appropriately with the right tactical and operational needs.

Theoretical bases for an effective Defense Industry

The defense industry is linked more to geopolitics than simply to economics. But the construction of strategic and sub-strategic weapons (non-nuclear) means that the respective country can have a say in shaping international balances, especially with neighboring competitive states, e.g. Taiwan and China, Greece and Turkey, North and South Korea.

This fact, of course, does not mean that a country’s defense industry can engage in pointless and costly programs just to justify some production.

In particular, the defense industry must produce weapons systems that will respond and adapt to the country’s high strategy. For example, the geostrategic structure of Taiwan, Greece, Finland and Sweden dictates above all a strong air force together with a strong development for unmanned vehicles of all types. The emphasis on strengthening the air weapon is necessary because aviation can quickly transition over maritime environments such as the Sinic Sea, Aegean Archipelago, Southern Mediterranean, Antarctic and Baltic Sea regions respectively, as well as of course in any other land part of these lands that may be necessary. In addition, emphasis should be given to submarine weaponry as well as anti-submarine warfare.

Conclusions

Of greater importance is the determination of a state to defend its altars and hearths, either by civil war alone or in combination with mild military force, i.e. hybrid war, or by full conventional war. But a people’s will for its defense depends to a large extent on the domestic capabilities of producing weapons systems from its national defense industry.

As far as the procurement of weapons systems is concerned, these should be done in accordance with the high strategy of the country under examination. Obviously, the high strategy presupposes the corresponding weighty and real alliances that share as parallel a geopolitical vision for the future as possible, since only from allies and generally friendly countries with a heavy defense industry can the correct supplies of weapon systems be made.

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The Liberal Globe is an independent online magazine that provides carefully selected varieties of stories. Our authoritative insight opinions, analyses, researches are reflected in the sections which are both thematic and geographical. We do not attach ourselves to any political party. Our political agenda is liberal in the classical sense. We continue to advocate bold policies in favour of individual freedoms, even if that means we must oppose the will and the majority view, even if these positions that we express may be unpleasant and unbearable for the majority.

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