With the conflict in Ukraine entering its fourth week since the start of the Russian invasion, developments are not at all what the Kremlin expected and little as the West expected – more or less. The Russian forces, large in size, with modern general armament and renewed tactics, were expected to carry out a military march. Analogous to the large motor warfare operations that built the legend of the Red Army during the second half of World War II and were the Soviet threat during the Cold War.
We got a taste of the capabilities of the Russian Army and its offensive tactics in 2008 during the short war in Georgia. In that case the dimensions and numbers were limited (only 23 thousand men of the local forces who scanned half of Georgia in 10 days), while material of known technology was used. In addition, the operation to occupy Crimea in 2014 and the Russian operations in Syria, foreshadowed a war that would combine high speed of action, originality in the tactical and operational planning and use of modern means, from the more than 150,000 men lined up along the of the northern, eastern and southern borders of Ukraine.
The Russian operation and the battlefield
This time, the field of Russian operation would be the open Ukrainian plain, an environment that seemed built to the measures of the numerous and consisting of numerous motorized and artillery, Russian troops. But what we saw in the satellite images, photos and short videos from Social Media and confirmed by Western intelligence services, was that the Russian tactics led to serious problems. Initially developed as a lightning operation with airborne operations and rapid advance of armor to join the paratroopers on three main axes, aiming at the rapid occupation of the cities of Kiev, Kharkiv and Mariupol.
However, the armor of the Russian Army gradually fell into the ambush of the Ukrainians who, applying standard doctrines of small-scale struggle, isolated them, hit them with anti-tank weapons from multiple directions, delaying and stopping the momentum of the attacks, causing casualties. How did this happen? The answer is complex, as it contains Ukrainian trump cards and Russian mistakes.
The first includes the protagonists of the war: the modern anti-tank anti-tank weapons of western origin. Javelin, NLAW, AT4 and Panzerfaust 3 missiles arrived from the West arming the Ukrainians at a critical time.
The Russians had countermeasures in the western media, with missile deception systems, “grilles” on their chariots to cause premature explosion of anti-tank and active shields in the form of “bricks” containing explosives. In active shielding the projectile hits the “bricks”, the explosives explode and the opposite direction of their detonation neutralizes the perforation of the projectile. However, Javelin and NLAW have a double head and after neutralizing the first filling, the second pierces the chariot.
One wonders if this is enough. The Russian Army has a reputation for being a ruthless formation that spares no means – and men – to achieve its goals. Western anti-tank guns may have conquered the “grilles” and “bricks” of active armor of Russian tanks, but the losses alone are not enough to explain the Russian hardship, at a time when they seemed to be approaching their main targets almost from first day.
Russian battle formations and their weaknesses
Let’s then look for the answers to the way the Russians tried to take Ukraine. As we have said, the general plan called for a lightning war that would bring Russian troops to the streets of the capital and paralyze the country, beheading its leadership.
The Russians used as a tip their new mixed battalion units, which came after the great regular reorganization of 2012. Each unit has a mile of chariots (3 ulams of 3 chariots and an administrative), 2-3 motorized infantry battalions with BTR vehicles (3 squads with 3 TOMP each and two administrative vehicles), 2-3 artillery units with 12-18 self-propelled artillery shells, one with PEP rocket launchers and 2 anti-aircraft artillery units with 6 vehicles. This basic unit numbers about 400-500 men and is fully professional, consisting of personnel of permanent officers and non-commissioned officers and contracted hoplites.
Immediately, we can identify some weaknesses associated with their performance in the field. The unit does not have enough infantry, based on an M / C battalion with perhaps 200 soldiers. They are quite heavy, lining up at least 70 armors of various types with the corresponding requirements in consumables, space of movement, etc. In addition, the unit lacks essential formations, such as a reconnaissance unit, which should precede the force, and engineer units to remove obstacles and pick up vehicles. The biggest problem is that the unit is not sufficiently supplied with organic trucks and logistics units to supply fuel, water, lubricants, ammunition, food and everything that every army in general needs in operations. It is estimated that of the 170 Joint Battalions of the Russian Army, about 100 have been deployed in Ukraine.
The tactical analysis
The next factor is tactical analysis. Predicting a brief war in which the Ukrainians would not put up strong resistance and the numbers would bend the defenses quickly, the Russians were concerned with neither air sovereignty, nor recognition, nor the support of their units.
However, the advance in February from the muddy fields proved to be problematic for the armor, leading to significant delays and abandonment of vehicles due to damage. Thus, in order to achieve the necessary rapid penetration, the complexes were channeled through major highways. This made the Russian advance predictable in its course and relatively slow, since the width of the advance was equal to the width of the road. He also left the Ukrainian groups with anti-tank ambushes undisturbed and stopped the Russian phalanxes, which, helpless from the air, suddenly and without engineer vehicles, left their vehicles and left.
Central to the criticism is that the Russians did not seek to gain complete control over the air, a factor that gave them an advantage over operations in Syria. The destruction of Ukrainian aircraft on the ground was not complete, with the result that the Russians fought against determined Ukrainian pilots and suffered losses, even weeks after the initial manifestation of the attack.
Perhaps Russian optimism that the case would end before the Ukrainian Sukhoi lit their engines contributed to this choice, but aviation is no longer just fighter jets. Ukraine had a number of Bayraktar TB2 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) from Turkey and took more during the conflict. Armed with guided bombs, but also as flying “observatories”, they provided the replacement of the air force requested by Ukraine, while the fact that they are remotely controlled from long distances, protected their center of control from any countermeasures of Russian forces. In addition, the Ukrainians seem to be cleverly using all kinds of small -commercial- drones to target Russian troops.
Finally, we have the portable anti-aircraft systems. Again from the West, the Stinger, Piorun and soon Starstreak missiles turn one or two pilots into low-flying range negroes. As in Afghanistan, the crucial element of such weapons is not the complete protection of a zone but the containment it can cause.
With Russian ground units being severely tested by the weather, local resistance and lack of supplies, the air force is becoming the flying cavalry to save many lives, material and not stop the advance for days. But the lack of guided weapons in the Russian arsenal is forcing aircraft and attack helicopters to fly low and slow, as shots from the field have shown. In this way, the Russian aircraft enter exactly in the file of such weapons, since with a range of 3-6 kilometers they can be a constant thorn in any business.
At least 28 Russian aircraft have been lost in the three weeks of fighting over Ukraine, with only 1/3 of them from air battles with Ukrainians. Excessive regular use of airstrikes to protect the phalanx has forced the Russian Air Force to deploy almost all of its means for such missions, depriving the Russian staff of systematic airstrikes on the rear of the Ukrainians and gathering intelligence from the field.
Overall, the Russian invasion, although with significant territorial gains so far, has not become the “lightning” occupation that many assumed. Poor logistics, lack of alternative means of promotion, generally optimistic planning, Ukrainian “guerrilla” tactics and rallying around large urban centers have deprived the Russian military of the speed and strike power it can provide. overthrow every enemy in the open field, but if there is one there. Results; Prolongation of the war, many losses from damage and skirmishes, blockage of supplies and generally a delay that counts down to the Russian invasion, not only militarily but also politically and economically.
