The Russian invasion of Ukraine has entered its 4th day and we can – with given reservations of course – dare to interpret the real geopolitical intentions of Moscow, as they appear from its military action. Of course we are talking about estimates, not evidence, which will come a long time later and may reveal very different strategies.
What we see in practice so far: 4 main offensive axes, where:
- The “Belarusian” as we will call him, has managed to encircle Kiev and we already have skirmishes in the city.
- Next we have the main “Northern” axis, the one that has made advances on Ukrainian territory along the northern Ukrainian-Russian border, targeting Konotop and Chernigiv (Chernigov), ie the big cities there.
- Then the 3rd important axis is that of the “South” which, starting from the Crimea, turns both west to Hersonissos but also east to Melitopolis and then Mariupol and is connected as a regular
- with the 4th axis that targets Kharkiv in the north, as we will analyze below.

But what are these axes geopolitically? The main points of attack of the Russians, with the territories they have occupied or even controlled to this day, show by depicting what is the dominant language spoken in each region. Thus, this map shows the 4 main axes of attack but on the “ground” of the populations of the country, depending on the predominance of Russian, where of course a large part of the population is bilingual. The Russian language is generally spoken more in the east (obviously more in Crimea and Donbass, which has been under Russian control and influence since 2014), while in the center of the country and in the west we have a predominance of the Ukrainian language. The color of the axes also shows their geopolitical differentiation.
So in detail:
1. Τhe No. 1- “Belarusian” axis is the most “political”, as it seeks to dissolve the Ukrainian government, with a siege of the capital. We call it “political” as the invasion here takes place in deep “Ukrainian” territory, ie in areas where the Russian-speakers of Ukraine are few, the population is more strongly concentrated in the Ukrainian ideal and of course the city itself, Kiev, is large, about 3 million in population. In other words, it is a very difficult area to control in the long run, while the civil battles are the worst, even for the best armies in the world and they end up in huge bloodshed, while it can take months until the occupation.
So the Russians here do not seem to have any intention of occupation, but mainly of pressure and military leverage, so that the Ukrainian government is forced to leave, perhaps to resign, or even better for them, to fall from a coup – as Putin directly suggested by urging him. Ukrainian army to take a stand against “Kiev drug addicts”. So the battles are mainly aimed at terrorizing the population and the collapse of the government that will give, if the successor state is willing to negotiate with Moscow, and the occasion to end the invasion and Putin to declare “winner.”

2. Τhe 2nd axis – the “North”, is the main destroyer in war (with blue color on the map, on multiple fronts). This is where Ukraine seems to have amassed significant ground forces, waiting for an invasion (while the advance from Belarus to Kiev probably took them by surprise as they did not believe that the Lukashenko regime would reach such an open alliance with Moscow). In this region, Russia “consumes” a large part of the Ukrainian armed forces and its arsenal, with its own losses of course.
But here, too, we have predominantly Ukrainian-speaking areas, difficult to control in the long run and to remain under occupation. We therefore consider that Russia’s main goal in this field is twofold, on the one hand, as we said, to seriously reduce the Ukrainian forces but also to occupy them, so that they can not move west, that is, to Kiev, to defend it.
3. The 3rd, the “Southern” axis, now seems to be the really conquering one. It starts from the Russian-speaking Crimea and reaches the Dnieper River, which is also the great strategic embankment of Ukraine, again occupying areas with a sufficient Russian-speaking element. The movement of Moscow troops is made to the east, in an attempt to occupy the coastal zone with centers in Melitopolis, Berdyansk and Mariupol, in order to establish contact with the already seceded Donbass. Also the same movement turned west with the anchorage point of the large city of Hersonissos, at the mouth of the Dnieper in the Black Sea.
4. The 4th conquest axis, that of “Kharkovo”, in the north is part of the same logic with the 3rd axis.

With these two offensive peaks, the Russian invasion gives strategic depth to the Crimea, which as a peninsula has so far been difficult to communicate, while offering it the necessary access to drinking water (from rivers of the Dnieper) and of course creates a huge Russian Black Sea control zone. , making the Sea of Azov an exclusively Russian territory. The same will have happened to the north, as the attack on Kharkov, again in areas with a Russian element, may turn east and “meet” the Luhansk (Donbass) zone, thus expanding the scope of Russia’s permanent control.
What do these two axes specifically show?
The areas that Russia wants to permanently detach from Ukraine, whatever the development of other operations. That is, even if the Ukrainians manage to resist on the other fronts, in their own South and partly in the Northeast, Moscow will have occupied a large area, geographically relatively autonomous and mainly with a strong presence of Russian-speaking populations, or at least populations that will gradually be more easy to “erupt”. Recall here that the eastern regions of Ukraine are the most industrially developed, while the central-western are more rural and lower incomes.

The interesting thing here is that another axis that many assumed would manifest, that is, the “Eastern” through the already seceded territories of Donbass, is not – for the time being, of course – particularly pressing. There are attacks but not on the intensity of the other three fronts. Maybe Russia feels that he can “wait” until the goals of others are stabilized-completed.
The above assessment – we emphasize it again – is temporary and may be overturned in the coming days. However, we propose it for discussion and of course point out that the division of Ukrainian citizens into “Ukrainian-speaking” and “Russian-speaking” does not mean that the latter welcome the Russian troops with “open arms”, nor that they are enthusiastic about the war (no reasonable person can to be). However, they are populations with a higher percentage of Russian origin, which Moscow can bet that in the long run will be able to approach and consolidate its control over as many Ukrainian territories as it actually wishes to maintain. Condemning the Ukrainian state in a shrinking geographical area, significantly more powerless and obviously more controlled by itself.



