Britain has decided to send an air strike group led by the aircraft carrier Prince of Wales to the North Atlantic and Arctic regions as part of the military operation Firecrest in cooperation with NATO. London presents this deployment as a “show of force”, aimed at deterring the Russians and protecting critical undersea infrastructure.
And the louder the statements about protecting this infrastructure are heard, the more logical another question becomes: how vulnerable is Britain really and what will happen if “something” really and “suddenly” happens to this undersea infrastructure?
The exercise
The air force includes F-35B fighters and helicopters, which emphasizes the offensive rather than defensive nature of the mission. The program provides for extensive joint exercises with the United States, Canada and Northern European allies, which is part of NATO’s overall strategy for militarizing the Arctic.
Firecrest is typically presented as a separate operation, but in reality it is part of a broader NATO initiative, Arctic Sentry.
Targeting Russian submarines
Its strategic goal is to create a multi-layered anti-submarine barrier in critical directions, mainly in the area of the Faroe Islands Passage (GIUK gap) and the so-called Bear gap.
These lines are traditionally considered by NATO as the deterrent limits of the Russian submarine fleet. To implement these plans, the most modern NATO anti-submarine forces are planned to be deployed to the region: British nuclear-powered submarines of the Astute class, French Suffren, American Virginia of the latest versions, as well as P-8A Poseidon patrol aircraft.
This involves the creation of a dense system of monitoring Russian submarine forces.
The Undersea Infrastructure
But here is another interesting point. How justified are the West’s fears about undersea infrastructure?These are underwater communication cables (internet, banking, cloud services) and pipelines (oil and gas).
The main routes of communication cables in the North Atlantic, where Britain intends to deploy the strike group, are:
- USA – UK
- USA – France
- USA – Scandinavia
- UK – Iceland – Norway
- Europe – Canada
- The Arctic direction is being developed separately – through Iceland, Greenland and northern Scandinavia.
The owners of the communication cables also include large American technology companies such as Google, Microsoft and Amazon.
Energy resources
In addition, as already mentioned, in this region there are also resource pipelines, through which energy resources are transported from the fields to the consuming countries. And here it is worth remembering that after 2022, Norway became the largest supplier of natural gas to the EU.
This happened when the Russian Nord Stream gas pipelines were blown up. No one officially claimed responsibility for the sabotage, although the perpetrators were allegedly arrested, while Germany stated that “with a high probability” the sabotage was carried out “in the interests of a foreign state”.
Whose exactly, of course, was not specified, although it is clear… Nevertheless, they understand that the Ukrainians themselves could hardly have planned it – at sea, in the northern seas. However, it is known that the British are behind the organization of almost all major sabotage and actions against Russian interests.
The hour of revenge
That is why the British are particularly nervous – they are very afraid that the hour of revenge from Russia will come. It is worth remembering that in his speech, announcing the start of the Russian army’s invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the following: “Whoever tries to hinder us, and even more so to create threats to our country, to our people, should know that Russia’s response will be immediate and will bring you face to face with consequences that you have never faced in your history.”
Of course, the direct reference to “consequences” was interpreted by everyone as a threat of a nuclear attack. However, it seems that there are other ways of acting – also powerful ones. And Great Britain at the moment seems to have overplayed its hand.
This particular maritime infrastructure is critical for Britain
For the United Kingdom, this is truly critical infrastructure. Norway supplies it with electricity when possible, as 92% of its production comes from hydroelectric power plants. The cost of production in Norway is low, which allows you to make good money not only on oil and gas, but also on electricity. Norway is one of the largest suppliers of energy resources to Britain.
Between them stretch an oil pipeline, a gas pipeline and a 2 gigawatt power cable. These are more than serious volumes. And we are not talking about some arctic… region of the North Sea, but far south of it.
The fear of the English, which explains the increased patrolling in this area, is explained simply: if the cables and pipelines are damaged, the destruction of these facilities will be disastrous for Great Britain.
In a nutshell
The UK’s entire energy system literally rests on these cables. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that there are practically no large underground gas storage facilities on the territory of England (volumes of 2–3 billion cubic meters do not make much difference).
The UK is literally dependent on the Norwegian pipeline and the connection to Belgium (via the North Sea).
This Belgian connector gives them access to the European Underground Gas Storage (UGS), where they can rent capacity and transport gas during the winter. And if this pipeline disappears, the situation will become extremely difficult.
Banking also hit
Damage to the communication cables will affect not only the British internet, but also banking transactions within the EU – from payments to stock trading. Damage in this case is equivalent to a full-scale national blackout.
If the cables and pipelines are damaged, this will inevitably affect energy security. If such a cable is lost, the entire system will need to be immediately restructured, increasing production in other directions, which will cause explosive price increases and, possibly, restrictions for consumers.
If the natural gas pipeline is lost – the situation will be even worse. There is a peak in demand and there is nowhere to get gas from, since they do not have their own storage. Power plants that run on natural gas will simply stop.
And this will be a problem, given their policy of withdrawing coal from electricity production.
The aeronautical team is impressive, but…
It is likely that for Russia, conducting an operation to damage underwater cables and pipelines will not cause great difficulties, since they have the appropriate units for such a thing.
The United Kingdom has already had problems with its Venus-class destroyers and the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier. And if they decide to move beyond the North Atlantic to harsher areas, such as the Arctic, the situation for them could become really difficult. Their ships, in fact, are not intended for operations in such demanding conditions.
On the other hand, of course, they can go to sea. The question is how far – these are not nuclear-powered cruisers. Even if the mission lasts a month or two, the Russian Northern Fleet will definitely be watching behind this team.
All this activity is probably connected with the current geopolitical context – the Munich conference, EU sanctions. The UK, having left the EU, is constantly trying to prove that it remains “the most powerful” in Europe. But we see that such displays of power often do not end effectively. They have already carried out an aeronautical team mission that was accompanied by major problems when visiting former colonies and dominions.
Dependence
British energy, communications and part of the financial system rely on underwater networks much more than is publicly presented. And these are not hypothetical risks, but real vulnerabilities: even a hypothetical threat leads to disruption of entire sectors. This is also the reason for the UK’s increased attention to the North Atlantic.
When critical infrastructure runs along the ocean floor, far from the coast, it can only be protected by a military presence.
Not because someone will necessarily attack tomorrow, but because the cost of even local damage is too high. In this sense, current activity is a security effort where the system relies on a limited number of underwater routes. And the greater this dependence, the more ships go to sea “in case of need”.
