For 2025, which ended a few days ago, from the Russian side, the political-communication image was built precisely on the logic of the gloomy headlines in the media, trying to convince that the final outcome is approaching with the final victory of the Russian forces. In this context, frequent public briefings, “victorious” presentations, a feeling that the initiative now belongs completely to Moscow are held. However, the crucial element for the analysis of the military operations and by extension for the outcome of the war is the triple equation of territory-losses-resources. And there, the available data show a harsh reality for Russia: slow progress, a very high human price, and economic costs that increase the wear and tear of the very system that produces it.
The “Gained Territory” of 2025: Two Measurements, Same Conclusion
On the territorial front, the most frequently cited open-source estimate for 2025 comes from the Ukrainian mapping project DeepState: Russian control expanded by 4,336 square kilometers over the past year, less than 1% of the total Ukrainian territory. Other analyses (e.g. ISW) give a higher figure, around 5,600 sq. km. for 2025. The difference is usually explained by how the “occupation” is measured: other calculations incorporate claimed zones or areas before they are fully confirmed by multiple sources. But the strategic conclusion does not change: whether we are talking about 4.3 or 5.6 thousand square kilometers of advance, 2025 remains a year of limited territorial change, far from that of the front in 2022.
To translate this into operational terms: the picture fits more with “continuous multi-axis pressure” than with a successful breakthrough that creates conditions for the collapse of a war front.
The dominance of UAVs, less metal, more blood
There is a tactical explanation for why the Russian advance turned into a slow expansion of the front: surveillance and attack through unmanned aircraft has drastically limited the possibility of massive mechanized maneuvers without direct detection and strike. In this environment, the offensive often ends up relying on smaller groups of mostly infantry, repeated micro-attacks against defensive lines, and tactics that produce steady attrition for the defender and heavy casualties for the attacker. Open source information from 2025 on the Donetsk operations describes an increase in attacks and extensive use of FPV drones, along with a shift to lighter vehicles (motorcycles/light vehicles) in response to the lethality of the modern battlefield.
This is a key element because it shifts the “currency weight” of war: when armor and the concentration of forces become more “expensive” operationally, pressure can be “bought” with personnel.
Casualties: from “confirmed names” to estimates
At the level of casualties, it is crucial to distinguish two categories of data. The first is the confirmed, nominal records of the dead. Mediazona, for example, maintains an up-to-date database of Russian casualties and explains its methodology, indicating that the “name lists” it provides are a minimum threshold and not the final number.
The second category is the estimates of total casualties, which arise from a combination of sources (satellite data, demographics, statistical models, cross-references of multiple estimates). At this level, The Economist’s interactive analysis (October 2025) records the total Russian casualties as particularly high, with the dead ranging from 190,000 to 480,000 by mid-October 2025, underscoring the extent of the damage suffered by the Russian army in its bloody offensives.
The Insider takes a more “conservative” approach: it talks about a minimum threshold of at least 100,000 Russian casualties by 2025, emphasizing that the numbers tend to be revised upwards over time as new confirmations of casualties come in.
The economy of replacement: when the army “runs to stay in the same place”
The most revealing aspect of 2025 is perhaps not just the losses, but the mechanics of their replacement. Russia does not rely on a “patriotic stream” of volunteer soldiers, but on an extensive system of financial incentives for enlisting professional soldiers: one-time contract payments, extra bonuses from local authorities, regions, municipalities, etc., on a constant flow of young people with a commitment to service, in order to maintain the intensity of operations. An estimate by the Ukrainian GUR indicates a rate of at least 35,000 new recruits per month and one-time payments of ~2 million rubles for a first contract in specific periods.
Re:Russia estimates that with an average bonus for a new soldier who joins the Russian Army as a professional, around 2.2 million rubles, then maintaining a recruitment of 35,000 people/month can cost around 460 billion rubles per semester across all levels of command, while the total annual expenditure on “manpower” under intense combat can exceed 4 trillion rubles ($50 billion).
This is where the war of attrition becomes a problem of economic sustainability. If recruitment is largely not creating new strategic reserves but filling “holes”, then offensive capability remains high only as long as the cycle of losses-replacement is continuously funded. In other words, the system does not “build” an increase in forces, but maintains a regulated “consumption” of personnel (for more information please read the analysis titled “Russia, the War and the Shadowy foreign fighters “cannon fodder”“).
Official War Spending and the Dark Side of the Budget
On the fiscal side, the end of 2025 saw a key development: public reporting by the Russian side on the size of the spending “directly related” to the war. According to a presentation by Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov, the direct spending for the so-called “special military operation” in 2025, as the Russians call the invasion of Ukraine, was estimated at 11.1 trillion rubles, about 5.1% of GDP.
At the same time, the 2025 budget spending for “National Defense” reached around 13.5 trillion rubles. It should be noted that even these huge amounts do not always describe the full economic footprint of the war, because part of the total war spending may be embedded in other funds or hidden. Think tanks such as SIPRI, which try to estimate the total military burden borne by Russia, talk about spending even higher, about 15.5 trillion rubles, ~7.2% of GDP, precisely because the budget picture is not completely transparent (for more information on this issue please read the analysis titled “For the Russian economy, the cost of war is becoming increasingly unbearable“).
The indicator that haunts 2025: deaths per square kilometer
The most painful assessment of the Russian advance is recorded in an indicator: how many lives are “spent” to occupy one more square kilometer of Ukrainian land. Here, The Liberal Globe is led to the conclusion that this exceeds ~28 deaths. The indicator is not very precise, but it is nevertheless very useful as a comparison tool, because it shows a trend: when the battlefield favors defense (sensors, drones, fortifications), the attacker pays disproportionately more for less territory. And this, in a war of attrition, is a strategic problem even if the attacking side keeps the initiative.
- And to think that we are talking about the (supposedly) second strongest military power in the world. Which has been fighting for 4 years next to its borders.
- And it is fighting the type of war it knows best: Land operations with extensive use of artillery and tanks, instead of air operations.
- And it is fighting a people a large part of whom are Russian-speaking, where their secret services could easily act and manipulate.
- And it is fighting an opponent with overwhelming superiority in all areas. It is fighting a Ukraine that has no navy and no significant air force.
- And yet in 4 years it has not managed to gain even air superiority!
- The “superweapons” it advertises from time to time (Su-57, Su-34, etc.) have not helped it against an opponent whose only notable air force is a dozen F16s and Mirage-2000, some of which were being retired as obsolete by the West.
What do we expect in 2026
If 2025 was the year that “proved” Russia’s ability to generate sustained pressure on the Ukrainian front, it was also the year that showed the limits of this model. As long as Ukraine maintains state cohesion and as its defense adapts technologically and organizationally, the Russian strategy of slow advance requires an ever-increasing supply of manpower and money to continue to perform. As long as Ukraine can also replace its own enormous personnel losses!
At the level of defense planning, the crucial question is not whether the front is “moving” to Russia’s advantage — it is moving. The question is whether it is doing so at a pace that produces a political-strategic effect before exhausting the resources and social/economic resilience required to maintain it.
The cost/benefit ratio can only be assessed by the parties involved because they are the ones paying. For the dictatorial leadership of Russia, the cost paid can be assessed as small!! Ukraine enjoys Western aid but at the same time writes debts in the notebook that will at some point be paid in money or kind, regardless of what happens on the battlefield. Because nothing is free. Whether Russia will continue at the same pace remains to be seen, but we can reasonably assume that it will not change its attitude and believing that Ukraine will find people but Russia will run out is unrealistic. As for whether Ukraine will be able to maintain its cohesion (with corruption cases “exploding” from time to time) and mainly to compensate for the losses of people, these are crucial conditions but not the only ones. It depends on external factors: is Ukraine lucky or unlucky that the US President’s attention is focused on Venezuela, Greenland, and Iran?
