It has become increasingly clear that Moscow is not impressed by the erratic behavior of US President Trump and his repeated promises to send weapons to Ukraine. The Russians continue to pulverize Ukraine, knowing the obvious: The US ability to supply a variety of weapons systems, both offensive and defensive, is limited by the weak industrial capacity to increase production. Let’s take a look at some of the US weapons systems to give the reader an idea of what we mean, starting with the Patriot.
1. It is accepted by military experts that at least two Patriot missiles are launched to intercept an incoming missile. Over the past few days, Russia has launched more than 1,300 missiles and drones into Ukraine. Annual U.S. production of both the PAC-2 and PAC-3 variants (produced by Lockheed Martin and Raytheon) is projected at about 740 Patriot missiles by 2025, with plans to increase to about 1,100 annually by 2027. In other words, if Ukraine had attempted to shoot down every one of the 1,300 missiles and drones launched in recent days by Russia, those interceptions would have consumed more than three years of current U.S. Patriot production. All at what cost? The cost of a Patriot missile depends on the variant: The PAC-2 GEM-T missile costs about $4 million, the PAC-3 MSE missile about $7 million.
2. Consider a second example, the Abrams M1 main battle tank. In 2024, the US produced about 30 tanks of this type. This number is in line with the US Army’s budget plans for fiscal year 2024, which called for the production of 30 tanks for that year. Incidentally, most of these are not brand new builds, but rather upgraded or rebuilt tanks, mainly conversions of older M1 versions to the latest configurations (such as the M1A2 SEPv3).
Russia, by contrast, is producing 10 times that number. In 2024, Russia produced about 280 to 300 T-90M tanks. This figure is supported by multiple sources of defense analysis, including the Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT) and Military Watch magazine, which report a significant increase in production compared to pre-war levels. The increase is attributed to the expansion of operations at the Uralvagonzavod plant (24-hour, three-shift schedule) to meet wartime demand.
3. Let’s look at a third example, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system. Government reports and congressional hearings indicate that the US produces approximately 60-80 THAAD anti-ballistic missiles annually. This estimate is based on historical production rates and recent increases in demand due to deployments in the Middle East and new orders from allies. Israel reportedly fired over 90 THAAD missiles against Iranian ballistic missiles during the 12-day war. Each missile costs $13 million, meaning that $1.2 billion worth of THAAD was spent in a futile attempt to deter Iranian attacks.
4. A fourth example, the HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) missiles. In 2024, the US produced about 14,500 HIMARS missiles, specifically the Guided Multiple-Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) missiles, which are the primary ammunition used by the M142 HIMARS launcher. The cost of one HIMARS missile is about $220,000. In Ukraine, at least 7,000 missiles were used against Russian targets in 2024 (according to Forbes), which is about half of the annual production capacity of the US defense industry.
5. Fifth example, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. In 2024, the US has awarded BAE Systems the production of more than 200 new modernized Bradleys, specifically the A4 versions (M2A4 and M7A4). This increase in production responds to the need to replenish the vehicles sent to Ukraine and modernize the army’s fleet. These BTRs are mainly upgrades from older versions and are not entirely new builds, reflecting the current procurement and modernization strategies of the US military. The modernized M2A4 Bradley currently costs about $4.35 million per vehicle. In July 2025 alone, Russia destroyed or captured at least 140 Bradleys (mainly in the Kursk region) that had been supplied to Ukraine since February 2022, according to the Oryx intelligence group and multiple defense analysis reports. This number includes vehicles that are visually confirmed to be damaged, abandoned, or captured in combat. This represents a loss of approximately $600 million in Ukraine in July alone.
6. Sixth example, 155mm howitzers. In 2024, the US produced approximately 200-250 new 155mm howitzers. The US Army’s main 155mm howitzers are the M777 (towed) and the M109A7 Paladin (self-propelled). Russian drone manufacturer ZALA claims that nearly 200 US M777 howitzers delivered to Ukraine have been destroyed by Russian Lancet drones since February 2022. In 2024, the US produced fewer than 30 replacement barrels per month for the M777 howitzer, totaling fewer than 360 barrels per year. The only US production facility, Watervliet Arsenal, was unable to meet the “unprecedented demand” created by Ukraine’s high rate of artillery fire, which led to rapid barrel wear and an urgent need for replacements. The cost of a replacement barrel (M776 gun barrel) for the M777 howitzer is approximately $690,000.
As we can conclude from these examples (and there are many more), American production of weapons systems is anemic and expensive. Moreover, the demand for these systems is not limited to Ukraine. Israel, Taiwan, and other US allies also need these weapons, as well as the US providing supplies for its own armed forces. Military experts estimate that the US and NATO-Europe spend almost 15 times more on armaments than Russia, whose defense industry is state-owned or state-controlled, without lobbyists and bribes to senators or deputies. Russia can produce more weapons than all of NATO combined, including high-tech weapons that the collective West can only dream of, such as the new Oreshnik deterrent weapon.
The Oreshnik hypersonic missile reaches speeds of over Mach 10 (12,250 km/h), survives reentry temperatures of 4,000 degrees Celsius, and unleashes a kinetic energy that is in no way inferior to tactical nuclear weapons. With its development, Russia has rewritten the rules of strategic deterrence, not with an escalation that violates any existing treaty, but with something potentially as decisive as a nuclear weapon.
According to available data and expert observations, Oreshnik carries a cluster-type penetrating warhead, which is likely to consist of multiple high-density submunitions. The explosion occurs only after the payload has penetrated the target, i.e. it is designed to cause maximum damage to fortified military infrastructure. One of the critical features of the system is its ability to maintain hypersonic speed during the final phase of flight. Unlike conventional ballistic warheads, which slow down during descent, Oreshnik is said to maintain speeds above Mach 10, possibly Mach 11, even in dense atmospheric layers. This allows it to impact with enormous kinetic energy, increasing its penetration and lethality without the need for a large explosive charge. At such speeds, even a non-nuclear warhead becomes a strategic weapon.
A concentrated high-velocity impact is enough to destroy command bunkers, radar installations or missile silos. The weapon’s effectiveness does not depend on the blast radius, but on the high-energy radiation. This makes the Oreshnik very difficult to detect and, so far, impossible to intercept.
From a military point of view, the Oreshnik represents a new class of weapon system, namely a non-nuclear strategic ballistic missile. It moves between conventional long-range missiles and nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, with enough range, speed and effect to shape the battlefield without crossing the nuclear threshold. With a minimum range of 800 km and a maximum range of almost 5,500 km, Oreshnik, which will also be stationed in Belarus, will be able to hit almost all of Central and Western Europe. For Russia, it represents a non-nuclear deterrent. For NATO, it represents a new kind of threat that is very fast, highly accurate and difficult to intercept, but still remains below the threshold of nuclear retaliation.
For decades, the term “strategic weapon” has been synonymous with nuclear weapons, weapons of last resort used not for use but for deterrence. Oreshnik changes that equation. Combining intercontinental range, hypersonic speed, and precision penetration, the system introduces a new class of weapons: It is below the nuclear threshold, but well above conventional long-range artillery or cruise missiles. Unlike nuclear warheads, Oreshniks can be used without provoking global condemnation or risking uncontrolled escalation. However, their destructive potential, especially against fortified military targets or critical infrastructure, makes them a reliable strategic bargaining chip.
This is at the heart of what Russia now calls its “non-nuclear deterrence doctrine.” In this emerging context, Oreshnik is not just a missile, it is a prototype of the future logic of warfare: Fast enough to strike before detection, survivable enough to evade interception, and powerful enough to influence decisions before the war even begins.
This new type of Russian missile has rendered traditional US/NATO air superiority irrelevant. This means that US and NATO command, control, and communication centers, such as the US Ramstein base in Germany or the US nuclear weapons depot at Büchel airfield (Eifel), are completely defenseless.
The convoys of ships that are supposed to transport military supplies from the US to Europe in wartime are also defenseless against the new Russian missiles. The 68 American Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, specially designed to protect such convoys, are suddenly rendered obsolete by new Russian hypersonic anti-ship missiles. Although the destroyers are equipped with state-of-the-art anti-missile systems to shoot down ballistic or cruise missiles at ships approaching at low altitude but in a linear manner, they can do nothing against the new Russian missiles, which are directed towards the target in frequent changes of direction instead of in a straight line and at hypersonic speeds. Considering that weapons such as the Kinzhal and Kalibr missiles can sink a $13-14 billion Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, which cost only a small fraction of an aircraft carrier, then one can rightly speak of a military-technical revolution. These missiles have already been used many times in Ukraine and have proven to be very reliable, and are also available in sufficient numbers for emergency situations against NATO countries.
The new Russian weapons completely overturn the combat strategies of the US Navy. At their core have always been aircraft carrier strike groups as floating air bases. Each Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, for example, carries 80 combat aircraft, 52 of which are fighter-bombers. But now a dozen cheap Kinzhal missiles can destroy or at least disable all the major ships in the strike group at once.
The new Russian weapons are also affecting the combat strategy of the US military, which, like its NATO allies, has always assumed that its command, control and communications centers are well protected from air and missile attacks and that its supply lines from the US and communications routes to Europe are secure. The realization that all these targets are sitting ducks against cheap Russian missiles must come as a sharp shock to NATO generals.
The shift in the correlation of military capabilities in favor of Russia is recognized by many military analysts and non-systemic think tanks, this shift shows why neither the US/NATO nor the EU are in a position to threaten Russia or force it to compromise on the Ukraine issue.
