The debate surrounding France’s stance towards Turkey’s ambitions to acquire Meteor missiles has taken on great proportions in the Greek public debate, often with intense emotion and critical tone. However, certain crucial aspects are overlooked that should be taken into account for a more balanced assessment of the situation. Where the absence of a “veto” by France on this issue is not necessarily a sign of weakness or indifference, but is part of a broader context of geopolitical and strategic factors.
First, let’s start from a basic fact: Turkey needs, in order to launch Meteor missiles, a high-tech air platform, which is the Eurofighter fighter. Which in its latest version costs over 150 million euros each, plus the cost of infrastructure and weapons. This is a costly investment, which, even if it is implemented, with all the complexity it presents, namely the purchase of British used vehicles that will have to be upgraded, then in a next phase with more new production, it is not certain that it will be completed quickly or without obstacles.
In 2020, when tensions between Greece and Turkey escalated dangerously in the Eastern Mediterranean, France did not remain a passive observer. On the contrary, it sent naval forces to the region, including the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, in a move that was both symbolic and deterrent, to support Greece. And Ankara received condemnation for its provocation from both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Why don’t we remember this?
Also in 2020, France made a move that changed the air balance in the Aegean. Despite its own defense needs, it agreed to reduce its Rafale F3R fleet by 12 aircraft, so that they could be sold to Greece. These aircraft, equipped with Meteor missiles, gave our Air Force the ability to strike targets at distances of up to 200 kilometers within 12 months of the purchase decision.
This capability is not only impressive, but also has an important operational background as it crucially undermines the action of the Turkish KC-135R tanker aircraft and the AWACS E-7T Wedgetail early warning aircraft. This is therefore a significant reinforcement of the Greek Air Force, which came from the direct support of France.
Of course, Franco-Greek defense cooperation has deep roots. In 1975, amid the Turkish threat in the Aegean after the invasion of Cyprus, France delivered Mirage F.1Cs from its own fleet to the Air Force, strengthening our deterrence at a time when air superiority was critical. And there are other examples, both defense and political support, that show that France is not just “a trading partner,” but an ally that has stood by Greece.
Greece is the recipient of top French weapons
We wonder if the criticism has taken into account the fact that top French weapons, produced by the MBDA group, have been released to our country. From SCALP EG, MICA, to Aster 30 of every version, to Exocet MM.40 Block 3c, which although few, make a difference in the Aegean. Finally, Greece is the only country that has so far purchased the Sea Fire radar, a product of Thales France, and of course the FDI frigates.
Meanwhile, Greece is now also participating in the French military satellite surveillance program, something particularly high-tech and critical in terms of defense. And something that is not widely known: MBDA, through French intervention, is seeking a solution to quickly receive Aster 30 and MM.40 Block 3c missiles, while the French Navy has offered its own reserves to the Greek Navy. Obviously, all of this is not done for free, but it clearly shows the political dimension and willingness for support and alignment.
Of course, if French aid and political support have been guaranteed for decades (and with successive French/Greek governments, so it is not a “one-man strategy”), the question remains: Why does France not exercise the “veto” it is entitled to on the sale of Meteor to Turkey?
There are many answers here. Initially, since Meteor/Eurofighter go “as a package” as equipment, there is currently – both behind the scenes and in the spotlight – a major effort to establish and organize a “pan-European defense” structure. Especially after the isolationist turn of the US, with the Trump presidency.
Therefore, France’s relations with mainly Britain, Germany and Italy, especially in multinational defense programs (such as Eurofighter), must be kept in balance and without mutual exclusion. Thus, it is very likely that Paris will decide that it is not in its interest to block a potentially high value (in terms of money, investment, job creation) for Britain – such as the sale of Eurofighter/Meteor to Turkey – at the same time as it attempts to bring Britain back to the core of European defense policy.
Furthermore, France is developing a series of other programs of both an economic and defense nature, with the cooperation of other countries. For example, the Franco-British FC/ASW cruise missile program (also that of MBDA), all of which must be developed, with mutual benefit. So a “no to Meteor in Turkey” may cause friction and tension in many more collaborative programs and investments than we can know.
Third, if the French demand for a “Meteor freeze” is formulated in a competitive world with a strong memory, it is not unlikely that we will see some retaliation in the future, but this time at the expense of Greece. Where we expect, for example, that the Greek F-35A fighters will also be armed with Meteor missiles (in a deadly combination of a stealth fighter with a long-range weapon), only for this program to be developed by Britain! So Greece will wait for its own licensing and know-how so that the Greeks can implement it as well.
Greek sloppiness that is not affected
Let us emphasize one more thing: If Greece “salamiizes” its defense supplies, buying “a little from here and a little from there”, it is not France’s fault. If the Greeks do not make serious and long-term purchases with a guaranteed transfer of know-how, it is not France’s fault. If the Greeks signed the very important five-year Greek-French defense cooperation agreement, and now, years later, have barely utilized, exploited and peaked, it is not France’s fault. Where already dozens of Greek Armed Forces officers should be trained and studying in French military schools, have secured the transfer of know-how and experience (especially from France, which has continuous war experience…), have constantly conducted joint exercises (and not just occasional ones when a French fleet passes through the Aegean), have jointly designed defense and cooperation scenarios.
Furthermore, if Greek-French cooperation at all levels is limping and can evolve, this will happen again at all levels and not just in a demand, “but why don’t you block a sale to Turkey”. So if Greece wants to hold Paris accountable, let it start with Athens. Let them first look at their own political and long-term defense and, above all, productive policy lag. Who on the one hand proclaim their identification with Europe, and on the other hand are going around buying many defense systems from outside Europe, discovering magical solutions and properties in them.
While at the same time they make highly publicized non-diplomatic moves, which lead to embarrassment even within Greece, such as the public reprimand of the French ambassador. As if France is the… small country that we will make an “observation” and even in high tones, demanding that we determine its foreign policy.
Furthermore, how does Greece appear surprised that there is a possibility of Meteor procurement from Turkey, when Greece, after quickly concluding multi-billion dollar defense contracts with Paris, found that in the “rush” they had not included, even informal commitments, that would exclude military reinforcement of Ankara? If Greece is making our armaments and alliances haphazardly and without geopolitical analysis, why are we looking for someone else to blame after the celebration?
Here it is worth noting a contradiction in the Greek domestic public debate on defense. For example, if Greece deserves criticism of France for the possible sale of Meteor to Turkey (justified to some extent), how at the same time other countries and companies that have permanent and deep relations with Turkey, especially on defense issues, are being promoted and praised – even by the Greek defense press?
For example, Why is the possible purchase of AW-139 civilian helicopters from the Italian Leonardo, which are also partially manufactured in Turkey, being promoted? Or why is the Greek military focused on France and not on Germany, which sells submarines to Turkey, the same ones that Greece first procured and then “neglected” to build more of even though they absolutely needed them? Why have the Greeks also granted Turkey defense relations with Italy and Spain, two countries that belong to the European South, with which they have had very strong contacts and common interests for decades? Let the Greeks therefore study how many mistakes, mainly in foreign policy but also in military diplomacy, they have accumulated and then ask themselves “why does everyone want to sell to Turkey”.
In conclusion, the discussion on whether France should veto Turkey’s acquisition of Meteor missiles cannot be reduced to a one-dimensional criticism, which has substance but does not develop Greek-French relations. France has repeatedly demonstrated its support for Greece with actions and the responsibility for controlling Turkish military reinforcement cannot fall solely on its shoulders.
Perhaps, instead of the Greeks focusing on a single “culprit”, it would have been more constructive to examine the issue as a whole, evaluating all those involved and the strategic choices they have as a country. And finally, to look at the whole issue more calmly, focusing on the following: If Paris, for many of its own reasons, does not wish to block the sale of Meteor to Turkey, why don’t the Greeks approach France to see what it can offer them as “return” or “reassurance” or as new guarantees? In other words, has the Greek-French friendship already run out and has nothing more to give, even with any difficulties?
