Given the Ukrainians’ negative overall balance of military power, the counteroffensive is perhaps the most surprising development in the 31-month-long war since Russian forces invaded in February 2022.
According to the NATO campaign manual, surprise, which is one of the principles of war, i.e. the fundamental truths that regulate how it is conducted, “consists of attacking the enemy at a decisive place and at an appropriate time and in a way that is not expected or by means unknown to the enemy”.
In the same manual, the most important aspect of surprise is pointed out: “the enemy being completely unaware of what is about to happen is not as essential as realizing it so late that he does not have the time to react effectively”.
On the facts so far, the Ukrainian attack fully meets the definition.
Also, both the ongoing Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kursk and last May’s re-occupation by Russian forces of Ukrainian territory in the Kharkiv region demonstrate that achieving surprise continues to remain entirely possible.
Despite the use by both belligerents of a multitude of ground and air surveillance means at long distances (up to tens of kilometers), which according to the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW: Institute for the Study of War) have now made the field of the “transparent” battle.
It is noted that the war in Ukraine is the first large-scale conflict where both sides are making massive use of manned aircraft of all classes, sizes and capabilities (including commercial) for reconnaissance and strike missions as well as “first-person visual” cruise munitions. (First Person View – FPV).
In fact, the great superiority of the Ukrainian forces over the Russians in unmanned FPV (3 to 4 to 1 in the infantry divisions and 6 to 10 to 1 in the motorized divisions), proved to be decisive in dealing with the attack launched by the Russian forces since the beginning of this year, taking advantage of the suspension of US military aid to Ukraine, which has created major shortages in artillery ammunition and guided missiles for air defense systems.
But even if the means of ground and aerial surveillance allow the location of the enemy’s forces to be identified, this does not necessarily imply the avoidance of surprise, since the intention of the enemy commander cannot be assumed with a high degree of certainty. For example, the concentration of forces in one area may mean either the intention to launch a strong counterattack (not necessarily in the same area as it may be part of a deception plan) or to strengthen the enemy’s defensive arrangement in depth.
Electronic Warfare is a prerequisite
The second finding concerns the catalytic role of Electronic Warfare (EW) in achieving surprise, as has been demonstrated many times to date in the war in Ukraine. For example, the time- and location-selective deployment of US systems that can effectively jam enemy drones and, more generally, surveillance sensors significantly limits the enemy’s capabilities and creates more favorable conditions for friendly forces to achieve surprise (as happened in several cases in developing since the beginning of this year Russian operations in eastern Ukraine).
Accordingly, increasing the resistance to enemy interference of friendly drones and sensors, by definition, reduces the capabilities of enemy forces to achieve surprise. Equally decisive has been the impact of US on the operational effectiveness of systems and weapons.
In Ukraine, the continuous degradation of the operational effectiveness of Western-origin guided weapons has already been recorded due to the short period of development and use by the Russians of US systems. For example, the success rate of the American-origin, caliber 155 mm. of the M982 Excalibur guided artillery projectile has reportedly dropped from 55% to just 7% in the first eight months of 2023 due to the high effectiveness of Russian Global Positioning System (GPS) jamming systems, whose signal is necessary for the software to operate aiming the weapon.
The same applies to other US-sourced weapons, such as the M30 and M31 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets fired by the Ukrainian M142 HIMARS multiple launch rockets (M142 HIMARS), the JDAM-ER guided air weapon (Joint Direct Attack Munition-Extended Range: joint direct attack ammunition – extended range), etc.
Consequently, lagging behind the US is not an acceptable option today, and the development of national capabilities capable of reacting immediately and adapting to the technological achievements of the adversary is imperative. As has been demonstrated in Ukraine, the confrontation in the electromagnetic spectrum has a highly dynamic nature and the advantage alternates between the two sides.
Some other interesting findings
- The Kursk counter-offensive is a success because unlike the failed Ukrainian counter-offensive of the summer of 2023, it was not launched against very well-organized defensive positions in depth supported by dense minefields, anti-tank barriers, terrain organization works, artillery, fighter jet and helicopter fire. That is, it indirectly confirms the value of well-organized defensive positions in depth.
- It also confirms the continued usefulness – suitability of tanks and armored fighting vehicles in general in operations of the type, despite the new threats they face.
- So far it proves that to launch a successful counterattack, air superiority even at a local level and for a limited time is not a necessary condition and can be replaced by air defense.
- To what extent will be seen when the already delayed reaction of the Russian Air Force takes place. It also highlights the Russian side’s lack of well-trained and equipped reserves.
To counter the Ukrainian counteroffensive in Kursk, Russia is using a mix of conscripts serving in the Kursk region, elements of the Northern Force Group that began forming in May from forces under the Leningrad Military Regional Command that was reconstituted on February 26, 2024. and also elements from formations and units transferred from lower priority areas of the front in Ukraine.
It is easy to see that the lack of well-trained and equipped reserves increases the reaction time of the defender, allowing the attacker, if he has the necessary reserves, to further exploit his initial success and organize his defensive location, with all that this implies for achieving long-term land tenure.
