US Secretary of State Antony Blinken issued a stern warning to China during a meeting of G7 foreign ministers on the Italian island of Capri on April 20. The United States’ top diplomat described China as a “major contributor” of defense-related technology to Russia, saying Beijing was fueling the “biggest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War.”
Blinken provided more details when he landed in Beijing this week: While China has complied with U.S. requests not to sell weapons to Russia during the war in Ukraine, the list of goods it is selling that could have a military use is extensive. They include semiconductors, drones, helmets, vests, machine tools and radio tracking systems.
Obviously, Chinese supply of the Russian military-industrial complex is also undermining Ukrainian security. And unfortunately for China, Chinese support for the Kremlin’s war effort is likely to result in sanctions on Chinese companies by the US government – particularly in the sensitive financial sector, hurting Chinese interests.
But why is Beijing so eager to help Moscow even as looming US sanctions are likely to worsen its problems with already anemic economic growth?
The answer is based on: The Principle of Survival of the Fittest.
China realizes that if it wants to break the US monopoly on global geopolitical balances, it cannot do it alone. In addition to helping to reform the US-dominated international system, China needs Russia for its long-term survival.
The “Geometry” of alliances
There is a famous Chinese idiom: “Once the lips are gone, the teeth will feel the cold.” (The point is that when two things are interdependent, the collapse of one will affect the other.)
At the moment, the West treats Russia as a “pariah state” of the system of international relations. But if Russia collapses, as Beijing realizes, the West could consolidate strategic positions in order to counter the “Chinese threat.” Therefore, Beijing has to help Moscow for its own reasons.
When there are no limits
Currently, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have a warm personal relationship. The closeness of both regimes was made more apparent through a joint statement released on February 4, 2022, which stated that there were no “limits” to Sino-Russian friendship and no “forbidden” areas of cooperation.
But let’s get one fact straight: Sino-Russian relations have not always been rosy. Both the Soviet Union and China experienced huge crises over communist doctrine and had disagreements over borders or national sovereignty.
Relations became so strained that both communist regimes severed their official alliance in 1961, and Chinese and Russian soldiers later clashed in northeastern China and the Xinjiang region.
Not surprisingly, there is a lingering mistrust on both the Chinese and Russian sides, and Chinese experts fear that Russia may prioritize its own interests over bilateral ties.
For example, if in the Trump presidency scenario, the US may express less support for Ukraine and improve ties with Russia. In such a scenario, the Kremlin may prioritize improving ties with the West and may withhold support for China’s fight against the USA.
The paradoxical relationship with North Korea
Incidentally, China’s mistrust of Russia and existential concerns may have fueled a recent high-level visit from Beijing to North Korea’s Pyongyang. On April 13, 2024, China’s third-ranking Communist leader, Zhao Leji, paid an official visit to Pyongyang.
During the meeting with North Korean strongman Kim Jung Un, Zhao maintained that the meeting was meant to confirm good relations and deepen bilateral cooperation between the two nations. The timing of the meeting could not be more strange. It came amid a rewarming of North Korea-Russia relations.
Reports indicate that Russia is buying large quantities of ammunition from North Korea to fuel the Kremlin’s war effort against Ukraine. This would bring Moscow and Pyongyang closer. The reality is that Pyongyang has traditionally exploited Russian and Chinese rivalry to achieve its goals.
The strategy of confronting the Chinese with the Russians comes from a chapter in the book of realpolitik in international relations. But the truth is that Beijing cannot afford to lose its influence in North Korea to anyone else, be it American or Russian. This is because China’s security doctrine depends on North Korea’s dependence on it.
North Korean threats
This fear is not unfounded. North Korea has a tradition of challenging China. The defiance came in the form of the execution of Kim Jung Un’s pro-Chinese uncle, the assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia, or North Korea’s high-profile weapons tests.
More importantly, Beijing fears that if North Korea becomes a fully developed nuclear power, it may even detonate nuclear weapons on Chinese soil. All this sounds strange, since both regimes signed a treaty of mutual defense and cooperation in 1961, which was renewed in 2021. But beneath the veneer of friendship lies deep-rooted resentment that has been simmering for centuries.
The historical background
Korea was a vassal state in Imperial China and played a secondary role to the Chinese for centuries. Thus, when the Chinese intervened in the course of the Korean War, and even normalized ties with the main enemy of North Korea, such actions not only angered North Korea, but also opened historical wounds of treating it as a vassal of China.
If Beijing wishes to maintain a significant base in North Korea, it must limit non-Chinese influence around Pyongyang at all costs. It does so with a two-pronged approach.
- China sends Zhao to pamper Kim Jung Un and assure the North Korean strongman that Beijing fully supports him.
- China sends weapons and technology to Russia so that the Kremlin’s dependence on weapons from Pyongyang is reduced.
At first glance, Beijing’s supply of arms and technology to the Kremlin might seem unrelated to Zhao’s visit to Pyongyang. But this is simply not true – and the realpolitik chapters in the book of international relations have many more pages to write.
