Military conclusions of the War in Ukraine and the Turkish operations in Syria-Libya

It is known that from the conduct of military operations-military encounters of the past, very useful conclusions emerge, which, after being studied by the Armed Forces of other countries, subsequently shape their new military doctrines.

The war in Ukraine is a first-class occasion for thorough study, as are the Turkish operations in Libya and Syria, for the extraction of military lessons, in order for them adapted to “contemporary reality” to shape modern military doctrines for the Armed Forces. Based on the above, we present a Study-Analysis of seven (7) useful conclusions:

1. Use of expensive Western Patriot anti-aircraft missiles by Ukraine against cheap Russian drones

The war in Ukraine continues unabated, with Russia launching waves of missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian targets, in urban centers hitting the country’s infrastructure as well as the business front.

For its part, Kiev has activated the state-of-the-art American-Western anti-aircraft systems sent to it, in order to intercept the wave of Russian attacks.

However, this confrontation is proving economically unprofitable and costly for Ukraine-US-NATO countries, since a Western anti-aircraft missile costing millions of dollars is used to intercept a Russian drone worth only a few hundred dollars.

At the same time, this economic imbalance leads the Russians to make massive use of their drones, in order for the Ukrainians to overspend the very expensive anti-aircraft missiles of Western origin, resulting, among other things, in the weakening of their air defense.

• The new tactics of the contemporary Armed Forces

It is known that the backbone of modern Air Defense is made up of Western-type anti-aircraft missiles, which operate in a unified multi-layered network, assisted by a multitude of medium and low-altitude anti-aircraft systems.

A country’s Air Defense will have to deal with enemy fighter jets, surface-to-surface missiles, air-to-surface missiles and UCAVs, as well as kamikaze drones.

The consequence of all this is that a country’s anti-drone system should be integrated into its unified air defense, so that the very expensive Western-style anti-aircraft missiles are not called upon to deal with the opponent’s cheap drones, which we estimate will be strategy of Western adversaries, whose adversaries in the event of an attack will send swarms of cheap drones with the aim of suppressing or significantly weakening the air defenses of the country under attack, causing the exhaustion of the existing stock of very expensive Western-type anti-aircraft missiles in a short period of time .

Following the above and in combination with the overconsumption of Western-type anti-aircraft missiles, e.g. Patriot PAC-3 by the Ukrainians, it is proposed that the Western countries proceed now to secure additional Western-type anti-aircraft missiles as a reserve either from the USA, or based on an agreement from EU countries, as well as other countries that also have the Western-type under consideration type anti-aircraft system.

2. Extensive Use of UCAVs by Ukrainians Deals Deadly Blows to Russian Black Sea Fleet

The Ukrainians, realizing the imperatives of the modern battlefield, recently successfully carried out another murderous attack by seaborne drones (USVs), in Novorossiysk this time, against the Russian amphibious assault ship Olenegorsky Gornyak. This was the second largest loss of a Russian warship after the similar sinking of the cruiser Moskva on April 13, 2022.

The Ukrainians are leading the way for the effectiveness of maritime drones (USVs). As a corresponding example, what can Taiwan do in its maritime territory in the South China Sea?

• The South China Sea operational environment

Let’s visualize the image where UAVs and USVs are launched en masse against speedboats full of enemy marines moving towards the shores of an island in the South Pacific Ocean. The results would be devastating in both casualties and the morale of the attacking Marines.

We should also realize that UCAVs – USVs give the possibility of attack depending on their range, the defending country will be able to attack military and non-military targets, both on the coasts of the attacked country and inside this attacked country.

It is better for the defending island nation to have 1 less F-16 BLOCK70 combat aircraft, which according to recent market prices, costs 200 million dollars with its weapon systems, and with the same money to buy about 200 UCAVs or 800 USVs (a Ukrainian UCV costs $250,000).

For example, the Philippines, with its multitude of islands, intermediate islands, micro-islands and islets in the South China Sea and its Archipelago, needs to have in its arsenal a multitude of highly accurate and lethal weapon systems in order to face any aggression from other country.

Kamikaze UAVs and USVs, in addition to the above characteristics, have as additional advantages the low cost of construction and the possibility to join the national defense as their operators, after a short training the National Guard of the defending country, even the civilian population living on the islands of its Archipelago.

3. Ukrainian use of Western advanced missiles from Soviet launchers

The Ukrainian military is modernizing older Soviet launchers by incorporating advanced missiles acquired mostly from Western allies, the majority from the US.

Let’s consider the US-led Franken-SAM program as an example. There are three known variants under this initiative:

1. The first focuses on the integration of US Sea Sparrow missiles into traditional Soviet-era Buk launch systems.
2. The second extends to coupling the American Sidewinder air-to-air missile with Soviet radar technology.
3. The latter is a highly confidential enterprise, prized for its superior capabilities, but the exact details are not known to the public.

As a third there is a wide range of projects, including those that simply place containers of American missiles on older Soviet launch systems, where they include the full integration of American launch systems into a unified S-300 air defense structure. Kiev uses AIM-9 air-to-air missiles as surface-to-air missiles now in its anti-aircraft systems.

• The operational environment of the South China Sea – The possibility of attack from the islands of the ports of the attacked country on its coast

The above creates implications for consideration by the competent bodies of the use of various missiles and munitions in the standards of the Ukraine-US program, “Franken-SAM”.

For example, the use of air-to-air AIM-9 missiles in Ukrainian standards as an anti-aircraft missile on the islands e.g. of the Philippines would shield them even more against attacking drones and helicopters in particular.

The placement of Western missiles in Russian TOR M1 anti-aircraft systems, as in the S-300 system, will be a one-way street for the countries that have them, as long as these countries do not replace them with other Western-type anti-aircraft systems, since the relations with Russia are not good and the maintenance-extension of their life limit through modernization seems improbable.

In addition to the above, it is proposed to convert the AGM-84 Harpoon missiles that the navies of these countries may have into surface-to-surface missiles and install them on the islands, which will allow them to hit all the ports on the coast of the attacked country. and even further inland.

This is of great importance in the event of an aeronautical military engagement in the South China Sea, since if the ports and above all the facilities of the attacked country’s shipbuilding repair zone and the administrative support facilities of its fleet are seen from the islands, then the results will be disastrous for the attacked country.

Thus any warship of the attacked country which is driven from the defending island country and has to go for repairs, or is damaged, or needs resupply, will be unable to receive the slightest assistance from their ports in the South China Sea, if and since the defending island country has hit them earlier as we mentioned above.

We understand that the survivability of the friendly artillery of the island country in the South China Sea is of very great importance, in order to be able to strike from the beginning of operations, such critical and vital land facilities of the ports of the attacked country, for the safety and survival of the fleet of the attacked country.

Without them the fleet of the attacked country will sooner or later be destroyed, sending any expansionist plans of the attacked country to the bottom of the South China Sea.

4. The other “patents” of the war in Ukraine

Specifically, we refer to:

1. The adaptation of American AIM-120 air-to-air BVR missiles to Ukrainian MiG fighters.
2. The fact that the Ukrainians are using the S-200 anti-aircraft system to attack Russian ground targets.
3. The conversion by the Russians of the antiquated Soviet anti-ship missiles, into more widely applicable ground missiles, such as the P-700 Granit, P-500 Basalt and P-1000 Vulkan.

Analogous moves with the conversion of outdated naval and aviation missiles of the Western European countries, into surface-to-surface or surface-to-air missiles should occupy them, activating their defense industry.

5. Construction of a multitude of dummy weapons systems as part of an Enemy Deception Plan

In mid-June 2023, inflatable dummies of the Russian 9K331 Tor-M1 self-propelled anti-aircraft system and the also Russian S-300PS anti-aircraft missile defense system were spotted on US railroads.

Reliable information indicates that the Czech Republic is quite active in the production of such “military equipment”. The Czechs produce inflatable dummies for both American and Russian weapon systems. An example of this is the inflatable HIMARS.

Last year it was reported that Ukraine was using wooden decoys of the HIMARS system. This type of bait is rarely recognized as wooden or original. When the missile seeker spots such a decoy, it almost always reads it as a VIP target. Then, according to various sources, but not confirmed information, at least 10 Caliber cruise missiles were “caught” hitting wooden decoys at HIMARS.

Finally, Russia is known to have factories that manufacture the inflatable dummies of major weapons systems we mentioned above, which are so perfected that in order to tell that they are dummies and not real, one needs to get within breathing distance.

• The South China Sea Island States Deception Scheme

It is a given that the attacked country cannot act against the islands in the South China Sea, if they have not previously dominated it by air force and have not largely destroyed the main weapon systems of the defending countries such as anti-aircraft, multiple missile launchers, self-propelled and towed artillery, tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-tanks, which are in them.

We understand from the above that the survivability of the main weapon systems of the defenseless island nation is of absolute priority in order for the defenseless nation to prevail against the enemy who will simultaneously attempt amphibious and airborne operations against them, with the initial aim of creating bridgehead and airbridges, which to then annex and occupy the principal island or principal islands of the defending country thereafter.

It is also a given that inflatable dummies of major weapons systems such as anti-aircraft, multiple rocket launchers, self-propelled and towed artillery, tanks, armored personnel carriers, anti-tanks and mortars are those that will cause tremendous confusion to the enemy regarding their combat power in place and time.

We point out that it would have a very large effect on the survival of the main weapons systems of the defending island nation and consequently on the operations if these inflatable dummies are moving and are either mixed and scattered together with the real weapons systems in the same place and time, or independently in a or more areas without the presence of actual weapon systems in them.

Imagine a possible enemy helicopter landing zone, to create an Airlift in which 13 dummies will move in Armored Personnel Carriers, what side effects will it have on the enemy.

First, his assessment will be that he is facing a friendly motorized Company, which means readjustment of his forces and his fire, and secondly, he will allocate a lot of his fire from UAVs and attack helicopters to destroy virtual targets with zero countermeasures to the progress of operations .

Regarding the movement of the weapon system dummies of the defending island nation, this is something that can be applied to sensor-driven autonomous vehicle standards, just like self-driving and driverless city buses.

Finally, there are active protection measures against enemy drones, such as anti-drone systems, but also passive protection measures such as the scattering of glass surfaces on the battlefield, e.g. car windshields as reflectors, human-like dolls such as those in clothing stores , virtual transmissions of mobile phones and radios as well as survival blankets for military personnel, since these reflect the heat of the human body inwards and not outwards thus not giving a target to the enemy.

Moreover, the cost of implementing such a plan is finally incomparably lower, in relation to the intended and most likely result, since it will ensure for a much longer period of time than now, the survivability and operation in the field of battle of the main weapon systems of the island defense country.

6. Electronic/Digital Warfare

Due to extensive Russian electronic warfare, Ukrainian drones, HIMARS missiles, and JDAMS smart bombs are either shot down or misfired, resulting in insufficient fire support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces operating on the front lines and effective deep strikes, axes and objectives of the enemy’s Administrative Care.

This largely accounts for the failure of the Ukrainian summer offensive so far. It is worth noting that only in May of this year that Moscow’s EW systems proved to be very effective by shooting down almost 10,000 Ukrainian drones per month, about 333 drones per day.

• The Turkish Doctrine for conducting operations in Syria in 2020

The new Turkish doctrine of operations successfully implemented by the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) in Idlib, causing heavy casualties and destruction of military equipment to the Syrian Army, is a combination of using various weapon systems on the battlefield, accompanied by similar regular movements on the ground.

It is known that Russia in Idlib had essentially imposed a no-fly zone for the Turkish air force, helping the Syrian army to advance in the Syrian province in question. Turkey then decided to implement a new Doctrine in order to face the Syrian advance. This was based on the following:

1. Continually advance Motorized Infantry, Armored, Special Forces and Artillery Units into idlib, thereby creating a “territorial oversaturation of forces”.
2. Promotion of Koral (Land based Radar Electronic Warfare System) near the Turkish-Syrian border to conduct electronic warfare.
3. Attacking the Syrian forces with artillery fire and long-range surface-to-surface missile systems as well as long-range and very high-precision air-to-surface missiles, which were launched by Turkish fighter jets (F-16) flying in Turkish airspace due to the no fly zone imposed by the Russian fighter jets.
4. Mass use of UAVs in reconnaissance, surveillance and destruction of Syrian army targets.

From the above, we will focus on the promotion of Koral for conducting electronic warfare, the mass use of UAVs and the interaction that their use had with regard to the use of Turkish artillery and the Turkish air force.

Koral (Land based Radar Electronic Warfare System) is a “weapon system for conducting electronic warfare”. The manufacturing company is Asselsan, it has a range of 150 kilometers and operates at temperatures from -30 to 50 degrees Celsius and humidity up to 95%. It consists of 2 8×8 vehicles. One carries Electronic Radar Support (ES) and the other Multi Radar Electronic Attack (EA).

We are essentially talking about an electronic defense and attack system at the same time. It was designed to locate-detect, analyze automatically, creating a bank of information and directly block-jam signals of enemy ground-air-sea radars.

• Using Koral

1. In Idlib the Syrian army had received the Almar-Antey IL271 Aistynok anti-aircraft radar which operates in the X-Band between 8.5-10.68 GHZ. This frequency range was within Koral’s jamming capabilities and so the Turks were able to jam it. As a result, the Syrian artillery is unable to locate the positions of the Turkish artillery with the above radar and fire anti-artillery shots against it.
2. Conducted detection and jamming of Syrian radars preventing the detection and detection of Turkish warplanes, which were unmolested in launching air-to-surface missiles against Syrian targets.
3. Locating and interfering with Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cordless phones signals. Koral also has the ability to locate and jam covering the S band spectrum between 2.3 GHZ to 2.5 GHZ and between 2.7 GHZ to 3.7 GHZ and the Ka band spectrum between 33.4 GHZ to 36 GHZ.

It should be noted that the S band covers a frequency range between 2-4 GHZ. The conventional limit between UHF and SHF is 3 GHZ. S band is used by air traffic control radar, weather radar, ship radar, satellite communications. In addition, the S band includes the ISM band between 2.4-2,483 GHZ which is widely used in wi-fi Bluetooth, cordless phones, which is why the Koral as I mentioned above can detect and interfere with them. Finally, the Ka band covers a spectrum between 26.5 -40 GHZ, while within this spectrum the radars of fighter aircraft emit.

Turks used UAVs in mass against Syrian forces in Idlib Notably, ANKA-S is capable of gathering communications and electronic intelligence (COMINT-ELINT), covering at least a frequency band from 30 MGHZ to 3 GHZ.

This is how they locate the exact location of a communications transmission, so by tracking and analyzing them they find and attack the enemy forces’ location with fire either from fighter jets, artillery, UAVs.

Finally, with the new Turkish doctrine, the close involvement of Turkish soldiers on the battlefield is avoided. As a vanguard, the TAF uses jihadists, assisted by professional personnel belonging to the Turkish Special Forces and the MIT. In addition, the strikes attempted on the enemy are precise, from a distance and specialized since they target and paralyze the opponent’s electronic means, disrupting his defense. Turkey has successfully tested its new doctrine and it should be studied and analyzed in depth in order to draw further useful conclusions. It should also undergo a thorough study and adaptation of any application as well as dealing with modern data in other countries.

Essentially, the new Turkish doctrine should be considered as part of the Multi domain operations doctrine that Turkey applies.

The Solutions for defenseless countries

1. A unified network of electronic warfare systems should be immediately established on the islands and in the borders of North-South Korea to intercept, disrupt the communication of the enemy UAVs with their control stations and destroy them or control them from the defending island country.
2. At the same time, the land forces of the defending island country should be equipped – from the company level and above – with anti-drone weapons, which will shoot down the UAVs of the attacked country.
3. Provision for the creation of anti-tank-portable & anti-aircraft-mortar Companies equally in each Infantry-Motorized Infantry Unit so that there will be an additional defense system in conjunction with the above. These should include, in terms of anti-tanks, e.g. 10 Javelin /6 Tow/4 Kornet, from the mobile anti-aircraft side 20 Stinger and from the side 4 of 4.2 mm.
4. The defending island country should now acquire anti-drone systems and tactical and strategic countermeasures electronic systems, which it should include in Units – Formations and also in major Formations.

7. Use of Mercenaries

The use of mercenaries on the battlefields in Syria-Libya by the Turks and in the war in Ukraine by both parties is now a fact, something that the defending island countries must take seriously. In common with any hostilities in the South China Sea islands and North-South Korea borders, we should seriously consider the involvement of mercenaries.

The defending countries of the South China Sea, as well as South Korea and Japan, should seriously consider setting up mercenary organizations modeled after Western counterparts, which would operate covertly in various theaters of military operations in the form of volunteers, recruiting personnel interested in the inside the country, with retired members of the Armed Forces as trainers, but also from countries with which they have common characteristics, such as the good relations of their countries, religion, cultural elements and others.

The granting of a residence permit to those who would join the mercenary company and their families in the country of the created mercenary company, would constitute the first positive incentive, which would then be upgraded with their social integration in the specific country, with the education of their children in the schools of this country, finding a job, etc.

The common religion is also an important factor of easier controlled integration of foreigners into the given societies, which would serve twofold.

Finally, the above mercenaries will be particularly useful in terms of gaining combat experience, due to their participation in modern battlefields and then passing on their experience through training schools to younger cadre-members.

​