Ukraine seems to be losing the war against Russia. The question that is asked is how high will be the price that he will have to accept in case he is led to capitulation.
In this largest European slaughter since the end of World War II, quantity ultimately decided the war, not quality. The NATO idea of using superior Western weapons technology to push the Russian military out of eastern Ukraine has been abandoned after the fiasco of the Ukrainian summer offensive, while Western military technology proved to be overrated. Russia has more artillery, more drones, more tanks, more planes, more manpower.
Moscow was also able to conclude several arms deals with North Korea and Iran, ensuring the massive supply of drones and artillery missiles. North Korea has supplied Russia with one million artillery shells, according to intelligence sources, while the West has so far managed to deliver only a third of the promised artillery shells. The output of Russia’s arms industry has grown exponentially and is now producing at full speed, indeed there is a shortage of workers, with Russian exports of energy and raw materials funding this war economy (sanctions have proven to be yet another failing of the West).
The Russians in the war made extensive use of the old Soviet arsenal to great effect. Vast numbers of Soviet aerial bombs were cheaply converted into satellite-guided glide bombs dropped by Russian bombers beyond the range of Western Ukrainian air defense technology, with explosive payloads ranging from 500 kg to 1.5 tons. Thermobaric missile systems, use of cluster munitions (by both sides), mortar systems that cut off retreating units, all this points to the fact that the Russian military machine was and is calibrated in this war for maximum attrition of the enemy’s animate and inanimate material .
After the apparent failure of the Ukrainian armed forces, the West is changing its strategy, so NATO is moving away from the plan to recapture the territories occupied by Russia (Donetsk, Lugansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson). Now the new goal is to prevent a Russian territorial victory in Odessa and Kharkiv. While the Ukrainian government continues to refuse to negotiate, there are growing signs that this is no longer happening consistently in the West and that efforts are being made, at least behind the scenes, to put pressure on the Zelenskyi government. On the other hand, however, there is still a (shrinking) section of the West that supports an indefinite continuation of proxy war or even a further escalation in the form of (even) more extensive Western arms deliveries with little predictable risks.
On December 1, 2023, Ukrainian President Zelensky admitted the failure of the counteroffensive in an interview with the Associated Press: “We want faster results. In this respect, unfortunately, we have not achieved the desired results. And this is a fact.” At the same time, however, he emphasized that he will unwaveringly persist in his goals and in the war. These problems “do not mean that we should give up, that we give up. We have confidence in what we do. We are fighting for what is ours.” At the same time he complained that he was “not satisfied that he did not receive all the weapons that were requested”, a statement that prompted US Press Secretary John Kirby to react angrily: “I can certainly confirm President Zelensky’s assessment that they have not achieved that which they hoped to achieve. But I can assure you that the US has done everything possible.”
But this is not the only sign that Western patience with Zelensky is slowly wearing thin. Again and again Zelensky emphasizes that he believes in a Ukrainian victory, which he defines as the complete conquest of all Russian-held territories, including Crimea. There are many indications that this position is now increasingly seen as unrealistic and highly counterproductive, even within Ukraine. For example, recently Zelensky clashed violently with the head of the Armed Forces Valery Zaluzny, who spoke to the Economist in early November 2023 about the failure of the counterattack, stressing that “there are no more options to attack, one can only prepare for a long war of attrition”. Zelensky strongly disagreed with this, so there have been constant reports of a final rift between him and Zaluzny, who is seen as the only promising opponent in any election.
The apparent failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive and the looming election campaign in the US appear to be prompting a rethink in the West. The US and Germany are now calling for the start of negotiations: “The White House and the Chancellery are coordinating on this,” reports the systemic German newspaper Bild, citing government circles: “Zelensky himself will have to come to the conclusion that things cannot to continue like this. Without any request from abroad he should address his nation of his own free will and declare that it is necessary to negotiate.”
Negotiations should start “based on the current course of the front”, so the West only wants to supply enough weapons so that Ukraine can “hold the current front”, but a “recapture of the occupied territories” would not be strong.
A few days ago it became known that the American Pentagon sent Lieutenant General Antonio Aguto to Kiev in order to convince Zelensky to “freeze” the military conflict with Russia. He will serve as shadow commander of the Ukrainian military, with instructions from Washington to force the Ukrainian armed forces to adopt a defensive strategy and to conserve as much territory as possible. However, these directives from Washington are effectively nullified by the actions of the Russian army, which continues to attack Ukrainian positions and force them into a disorderly retreat. So no Western strategy can reverse or change the situation on the front line, even if the Ukrainian troops were commanded by Mark Miley, the chief of the general staff of the US armed forces.
On the other hand, the few propagandists of further escalation are actually going out of their way to call on the West to support Ukraine even more massively in what is likely to be a hopeless fight. Because short of a direct and open entry of the West into the war, it is difficult to imagine by what means the war could turn in favor of Ukraine, so in this case the stakes with a nuclear power are incomparably higher, which the West does not apparently want to pursue, its geopolitical compass is set on Southeast Asia.
It is doubtful whether negotiations will provide a sustainable way out of this war. As is well known, Moscow’s military objectives change with the course of the war. Russia’s military situation is now much better than it was a year ago. Consequently, the price of peace will be higher, also because Russia meanwhile is not only interested in the territories it has annexed (Lugansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson regions) or any other territorial claims (Odessa, Kharkiv), but for the existence and sovereignty of the Ukrainian state. Moscow will not agree to Ukraine’s ties with the West and in case of further military successes, it will also work for a “regime change” in Kiev to form a satellite state. It is well known that Moscow considers the Ukrainian state a fiction.
Ukraine thus finds itself wedged between a West now primarily concerned with damage limitation and a militarily-enhanced Russian re-signaling of geopolitics, a re-signaling that will exact a very high price for peace.
