In detail, when we try to utilize an asset, we always look at the optimal, the maximum return that can bring the exploitation of the public property in question, always within the financial and macroeconomic conditions prevailing in the given period in the economy.
Unfortunately, the aggregate of the Greek state real estates is mortgaged as securing (collateral) to the Greek state international creditors against the country’s funding which is received through the Memorandum I (2010-2012), II (2012-2014) and III (2015-2018) respectively. In addition, an exception should be made to a single property asset of the Greek state.
Thanos S. Chonthrogiannis
The law of intellectual property is prohibited in any way unlawful use/appropriation of this article, with heavy civil and criminal penalties for the infringer.
The wrong type of investment-project
In this context, the Greek government, in cooperation with the EU-Commission, should make a derogation in respect of a specific asset which is wrongly led to a long-term lease scheme with a very low price and a correspondingly small expected benefit to the Greek state, in relation to its value and the prevailing macroeconomic conditions, causing its loss a terrible damage to the interests of the Greek state without reducing the unemployment and the public debt in the economy.
Particularly, I refer to the real-estate asset of the former airport of Hellinikon, which the Greek government (2012-2014), through an open competition, laid the foundations to sell it out (28/2/2014), while the Greek Government (2015-2019) completed “it’s killing” (8/6/2016).
The current Greek government (2019-today), in the best of cases, aimed the new investor-buyer to pay a price of €500m for the concession and operation of the former airport of Hellinikon which has total surface area of about 6500000sqm. for a time, lease-horizon of 99 years, and then the investor will spend an amount of around €7b for the development and exploitation of the specific asset within a fifteen-years investment horizon. In this case, the investment development of the site will include hotels, casinos, shopping malls, mild development with residential complexes which will then be sold etc.
The revenues that the Greek state expects to receive as a price of this privatization will come from a stake in future gross earnings of investors. Additionally, the Greek state looks forward to the jobs that will be created in the construction, tourism and hotel sectors, etc.
However, the investor requires the Greek state to build two metro stations, tram stations, new marina and two new expressways from the city center of Athens and Piraeus respectively to the position of the new investment. Additionally, the investor requires to connect directly the area of the new investment to the international airport of Athens “Eleutherius Venizelos”.
The total cost of construction of these projects to be made by the Greek state will exceed the amount of €1.5b (Source of numbers/figures: according to the information which appeared in the total of the electronic and publishing press equally during the period (25/2/2014-5/3/2014)).
Why should not qualify this type of investment?
1. A type of investment like the one I described above and which the Greek Government (2019-today) expected to realize does not contribute to the management of public debt if we consider that the benefits of the Greek state, apart from the long-term lease, include the expected increase of GDP level.
There will be no change in the fundamentals of macroeconomic growth to help the growth of the Greek economy. An investment of €7b over a period of fifteen years, as shown in this investment, will not achieve a significant GDP growth.
Over the next few years (a possible increase of 0.03% of GDP per year if €7b funds are invested within fifteen years) because the amount of investment is extremely low relative to the amount of time it will be invested so that the constructive and tourism industries to work again as a multiplier of Greek GDP.
2. The produced product will not be of high added value with the long-term benefits to the Greek economy being diminished as no added value is gained in acquiring specialized knowledge and know-how from the workforce for future capitalization by the state.
Greece has a developed and highly competitive industry in the entertainment and tourism industry respectively and another investment in these sectors will not make the difference that the Greek economy currently needs.
Instead, many low-paid jobs will be created for many, with few qualifications, who will be addressed for job appointments in the Greek political world who will have good cooperation with the investor.
3. The sale of an asset of this magnitude, at a given time, with the prevailing fiscal and macroeconomic conditions in the Greek economy at the price of €500m and which will be paid in part and the investment capital of €7b to take place in a long-term investment time, would be leniently characterized as a “sell-off” to the detriment of the Greek state without maximizing the benefits from its exploitation and without solving the fiscal and macroeconomic problems of the country.
4. The revenues from the long-term lease are scarce (€500m) and cannot be used to reduce the size of the public debt and without this reduction running parallel to the exit of the Greek economy from the accumulated recession and the unemployment that plagues it.
It will not substantially reduce the level of public debt and will not stop the fall or better will not cause an increase of the Greek GDP.
On the other hand, the future sale of luxury real estates that will be built on this property for residential use will be offered to the Greek tax-evaders who have their tax-free deposits abroad, while all these tax evaders in cooperation with the Greek government will mock the squeezed, from over taxation, Greek people.
At the same time, the Greek state will have to spend €1,5b to build all these additional projects that the investor asks for. In other words, the investor gives €500m to be used by the Greek state to construct the projects and will burden the central government’s regular budget with an additional €1b!!!! (Source of numbers/figures: according to the information which appeared in the total of the electronic and the publishing press equally).
5. The future development of the investment, as a tourist and entertainment destination, can operate competitively and not complementary to tourist businesses and destinations located within and near municipality of Attica with possible unpleasant results for these businesses e.g. closure of enterprises, job losses, increase in arrears of taxes and social security contributions, etc.
6. The job search in construction industry will accumulate more unemployed people without skilled qualifications from the region of the Greek periphery to Attica municipality, where is located the real estate asset of the former airport of Hellinikon.
These unemployed populations along with unemployed illegal immigrants, will further “evacuate” the Greek-run human-powered from the Greek periphery. When these constructions are completed, these workers will be unemployed and “locked up” in search of work in Attica municipality.
7. The cost of the long-term lease with the introduction of a special tax regime for the Greek state, which in the best of cases would be a percentage of gross future profits of the investor, would be good if the entire cash flow of these gross future profits from the utilization of the investment came exclusively from abroad, i.e. foreign exchange cash flows from foreigners (not from Greek tax evaders who have tax-free deposits abroad).
The international investment experience from such investments (e.g. casinos) has shown that the largest proportion of revenue comes from the domestic population. In other words, bloody domestic wealth is being abducted.
In the future, the Greek government, in the name of allegedly reducing unemployment and attracting investments, will “ease” the investor by abolishing the “origination of the investing money” of Greek citizens, which the Greek citizens are obligated to prove by law, if they invest their tax-evaded funds which are in abroad on the selected properties in the specific investor space (i.e. in complex-luxury housing properties).
In this way, they will “clean up” the tax-free funds of the Greek tax evaders who fled their funds abroad. On the other hand, a casino and entertainment city will be the cornerstone of the overall deterioration of the Greek capital and the country equally as a business and investment destination.
8. Rebuilding the area of former airport of Hellenicon will not turn the region into a business destination as it is other factors that act as a magnet for attracting businesses in one country.
For all the above reasons both the administration of the Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (H.R.A.D.F.) and the administration of Hellenic Company of Assets and Participations (H.C.A.P.) if such an investment is realized with the specific accompanying terms that presented, they are accountable for infidelity and a terrible loss to the Greek state and a detriment to the Greek people.
To proceed with this type of investment and the way it was presented, investors should deposit a lump sum of €8b in cash as a consideration for long-term leases (not in installments) and not €500m to the Greek state which the investors want to give initially, regardless of the amount of the investment (e.g. €7b) and the investment horizon (for example, fifteen years) that they will carry out.
Otherwise, the Greek justice should invalidate the exploitation agreement and the investors will have to return the asset to the Greek state. The reason of why a one-time deposit of €8b is required by investors so to use next this asset will be presented in the analysis with the title «How the Greek state will be able to finance the modernization of the Greek Armed Forces».
