Despite all its escalation and relentless pounding in places like Bakhmut, the war in Ukraine does not cease to be a kind of armed negotiation, at least on the Russian side, which still retains the initiative of the movements. In such a logic, it is clear that attacks aimed at directly hitting the enemy’s leadership are not included in the repertoire of war.
This is supported by a recent statement by former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett who claimed that when in March 2022, shortly after the start of the “special military operation”, he met with Vladimir Putin, the latter told him that he would not try to kill Zelensky, a fact that Bennett transferred to Zelensky himself. The logic of such a “red line” is precisely that you cannot directly hit the person you want to negotiate with.
Of course, since then negotiations have not worked and are now virtually non-existent, especially since the West has rallied to the goal of “defeating Russia” as the only desirable solution, but this perception that the Ukrainian leadership is not going to accept immediate hit, appeared to be sustained.
The significance of the attack on the Kremlin
This also explains the magnitude of the reaction from the Russian side after the apparent attempt to hit Putin’s own residence inside the Kremlin with a drone attack. It mattered little that such an attack had little chance of success anyway, the key point is precisely the symbolism that on the Russian side was just another proof that not only is there no willingness to negotiate on the other side, but decisions are being made that pass the “red lines” that were supposed to exist.
The feeling that at the moment Ukraine, but also the Western powers – the Kremlin directly accused the US – are turning to such options as trying to strike the Russian leadership itself, seems to prevail in Russia, especially on the basis of a certain correlation which is formed on the battlefield itself.
The front line remains stable and the attempt to maintain it in places like Bakhmut has the character of a continuous bleeding for the Ukrainian side, while the many times announced great spring counteroffensive of the Ukrainian armed forces, which was also the main argument invoked by Western governments to upgrade the kind of equipment they provided Ukraine (eg more sophisticated heavy tanks), appears not only to be not easily deployed, but also to face repeated Western expressions of disbelief in its capability to have the desired effect.
Let’s not forget that all of this is compounded by growing signs that there is also conflict within the Ukrainian side over tactics in a potential negotiation, with figures such as Kirill Bundamf, the head of military intelligence, pushing for even greater escalation, primarily strikes inside Russia, including Moscow itself, forcing US officials to intervene in the Ukrainian government to thwart such plans that could trigger an uncontrollable escalation on the adversary’s side as well.
West locked in line for ‘defeat of Russia’
However, at the same time as there are increasing signs of a certain “realism” on the part of Western officials about whether there might be a dramatic change of attitude on the Ukraine front, it is becoming increasingly clear that this is not going to turn into a an initiative for negotiations and for peace, even if even implicitly there is an investment in the initiatives of other countries, mainly China.
This has primarily to do with the way in which a huge political investment was made not in a goal of conflict prevention or early pacification, but in the prospect of a Russian defeat. This “self-commitment” of Western governments to the goal of defeating Russia, i.e. to a strategy inspired by that school of thought in the US which considers that the preservation of American hegemony passes primarily through confronting the forces that can challenge it, has as a result, it is very difficult to have both a rhetoric and a strategic elaboration that tends in a different direction.
The result is repeated commitments to further military reinforcement of Ukraine, most recently the decisions of the EU to use even the European budget (in violation of even the Treaty on Union itself) to subsidize defense industries that will produce ammunition for Ukraine (please also read the analysis titled “Will the EU break its Founding Treaty to fund arms factories for Ukraine?“. Nor is it without significance that we even see conflicts within the “Western camp” with a key dispute over whether enough aid is being offered to Ukraine (the creeping confrontation between Germany and Poland within the EU is illustrative). One could say that a climate and a way of discussion and ultimately decision is being formed where, as much as there are concerns or assessments about the difficulty of various projects, the tone will ultimately be set by those who will push for an even harder line, since this will continue to seem more “consistent” and “coherent”.
Amidst this combination between the obsession with a strategy of defeating Russia and the apparent dead ends in trying to put that strategy into practice, it appears that the Kremlin believes that various centers will try even seemingly out-of-the-box options. . Hence the way he treats the attack on the Kremlin as a turning point, regardless of whether it was primarily a Ukrainian initiative or the result of collusion with some of the Western powers.
In this sense, the way Moscow decided to blame the US directly was not so much about assessing who actually orchestrated the attack as it was about trying to send the message that Russia not only passes the attack but without signs in the opposite direction considers it a reason to consider forms of escalation from its side as well and consequently the US must show what its real intentions are at this very phase.
