When the US recently added several units of BGI Group, a Chinese genetic sequencing company, to its list of entities restricting technology transfer, the main justification was that the company “contributed to monitoring and surveillance,” including of ethnic minorities. But the human rights implications of China’s domestic surveillance state are not Washington’s only concern. The new regulations also state that BGI’s “genetic data collection and analysis programs (present) a significant risk of diversion to China’s military.”
Biotechnology has quietly become America’s newest national security concern. From Congress to the intelligence agencies, Washington leaders have come to the conclusion that controlling biotechnologies will be critical not only to the nation’s health, but also to national security.
Biotech tools have made rapid advances in recent times, enabling new treatments, vaccines, production techniques — and biosecurity risks. It has long been recognized that DNA is simply a complex type of code that tells cells how to function. Gene editing technologies have become more precise and much cheaper, making it easier than ever to “reprogram” organisms. In addition, more powerful computational capabilities have brought new clarity to the concept of DNA’s “code.”
One use of these capabilities is for manufacturing. For centuries, humans have relied on microorganisms to make beer and yogurt, but with the right reprogramming, bacteria can produce many new kinds of chemicals. In 2010, Darpa, the Pentagon’s far-reaching R&D arm, launched a program called Living Foundries, aiming to synthetically manufacture 1,000 molecules.
While there are many potential civilian uses of biotechnology, the US military was a critical early investor. Living Foundries, for example, has already produced new rocket fuels that can be better adapted to the needs of rocket engines than traditional fuel refining allows. The supply chain is also simpler, with yeast (which produces the fuel) and sugar (which feeds the yeast) the two main ingredients. Darpa-supported researchers have also used microbes to produce antibiotics, pesticides, detergents, drug ingredients and liquid crystals.
A key driver of these advances is the application of massive amounts of computing power to DNA. Guess-and-check was a slow research method. Deep learning systems like Google’s Deep Mind are much faster, as the company’s AlphaFold protein structure prediction tool shows. Because of this, access to genetic data will be a critical resource. BGI, the Beijing-based company, has amassed a vast trove of data, using products such as prenatal tests and Covid-19 swabs, which are sold worldwide, to gather genetic data.
Collecting genetic data isn’t bad. Progress depends on our ability to recognize patterns in large data sets. The US is also trying to develop its own biodata infrastructure, although privacy concerns make this complicated. However, the question of who first gleans and uses lessons from genetic data matters. Technological developments are morally and politically neutral. As one Darpa director warned a decade ago, these techniques will eventually be used not only to create treatments and new life-saving materials, but also to “engineer microorganisms to do bad things.”
Countries have been involved in biological warfare research for many decades, although fortunately we have avoided the large-scale use of biological weapons thus far. Synthetic biology techniques potentially increase this risk by reducing costs and improving targeting capabilities. The same technologies that will enable increasingly personalized medicine raise the risk of personalized pathogens, too. Worryingly, a recent report from the US National Academies concluded that weapons targeting a specific group’s genome were not “technically feasible yet” but “will require continued monitoring.”
That’s one reason why in last year’s defense budget legislation, the US Congress created a National Security Committee on Emerging Biotechnology. Several influential, tech-savvy lawmakers have been appointed to the committee. Meanwhile, the Biden administration last year released its own plan to create a “sustainable, safe” bioeconomy, while commissioning new studies on biotech’s safety and supply chain risks. From the State Department to the intelligence agencies, the Washington bureaucracy is piling on biotech expertise to prepare for when the new national security concern becomes a reality.
