Iran and Israel are at odds on various fronts in the wider Middle East. This has become even more intense since Iran managed to form the so-called “axis of resistance”, i.e. an alliance with pro-Iranian movements in various countries, among which stands out Hezbollah in Lebanon, which – let’s not forget – managed to emerge victorious in Israel’s 2006 invasion of Lebanon.
Of particular concern to Israel is Iran’s nuclear program. The possibility of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is a real existential fear for Israel, which explains why it opposes the deal on Iran’s nuclear program, favoring in particular the formation of an international coalition that could consider attacking Iran. Essentially, Israel believes that there should be much more aggression, isolation and pressure on Iran, to the point of taking armed initiatives.
At the same time, of course, Israel observes with relative concern the normalization trend that is developing in the wider area of the Persian Gulf. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and the United Arab Emirates and especially the re-approach with Saudi Arabia form a new treaty, quite different from the attempt, during the days mainly of Donald Trump, through the “Abraham agreements” to rally the Arab countries in an anti-Iranian coalition.
Syria is a field of conflict
In recent years, this confrontation has been transferred to a significant extent to Syria. Already in 2011, Iran chose the start of the Syrian civil war, chose to stand by the Assad government, send forces and equipment and coordinate the presence of Hezbollah and local militias, against the armed Islamist opposition organizations and from a point and then the Islamic State. Iran followed a similar policy in Iraq, particularly strengthening the Popular Mobilization Units, militias that later joined the Iraqi armed forces.
A major role in this mobilization was played by Qassem Suleimani, head of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards, assassinated by the US in January 2020 in Baghdad and the main person responsible for the current form of the “Axis of Resistance.
Syria, like Lebanon, are areas of particular interest to Israel. Let’s not forget that the issue of the Golan Heights that Israel holds, while they belonged to Syria, remains open. Most of all, Israel fears the presence of Iranian forces in a country that is within firing distance of Israeli cities, as this would pose much greater pressure.
On the other hand, Iran, by supporting the Assad government and preventing the possibility of regime change in Syria, secured its position to a significant extent.
To this Israel has responded with various raids it has carried out in recent years, targeting Iranian or pro-Iranian militia installations, missile and air attacks for which there is usually no formal claim of responsibility. At the same time, he has used the fact that he maintains good relations with Russia so that there are some guarantees that Iran’s action in Syria will remain “within context”. In fact, for a while Israel also used Russia to announce attacks on Syrian territory, in order to inform the Iranians and limit the number of possible victims.
The escalation of Israeli attacks
But recently attacks on Iranian targets in Syria that can be attributed to Israel have become much more frequent, killing two Iranian military advisers, temporarily shutting down the two largest airports and raising concerns of further escalation. Since the beginning of 2023, Syrian officials have blamed Israel for 10 attacks on Syrian soil, including four as of last Tuesday.
These attacks also coincided with the recent confrontations between the US and Iranian and pro-Iranian forces also in Syria. A drone strike that killed a US military contractor at a base in Syria, which the US blamed on Iran, has been followed by US attacks on bases of pro-Iranian forces in Syria.
For its part, Iran appears to have tried to respond with a drone that entered Israeli airspace from Syria and was shot down by the Israeli air force.
Meanwhile, Iran has recently been preparing to contribute to Syria’s air defense. This was helped by the lifting of the embargo against Iran in terms of the export of weapons systems, which took place in 2020. In this way, the Syrian air defense can be strengthened with Khorad 15 arrays. This may also fill the gap left by the partial withdrawal of S-300 air defense systems by Russian forces to strengthen Russian air defenses in the Black Sea.
The swings from both sides
At the level of rhetoric, the Iranian side has used high tones. THE Revolutionary Guards vowed revenge, even stating that it has already begun to materialize. Of course, so far there have been no major offensive moves.
Accordingly, Israel, which, among other things, faces a previous internal political crisis due to the large mobilizations against the reform of the judicial system, has tried to avoid moves that could involve it in a large-scale military conflict, either with the Iranian and pro-Iranian forces in Syria and Lebanon (especially considering the trauma left by the previous military confrontation with Hezbollah).
Iran shows more on this basis that it is trying to weigh its movements and mainly to take advantage of the rewarming of relations with Persian countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Emirates, as of course also the fact that conditions are gradually being formed for a policy solution in Syria that will bring it from the side of the winners. And this is because these dynamics together with the deeper integration of Iran into the “Eurasian” processes together with Russia and China, can also be a compensation for the “freezing” of the negotiations on the nuclear program and thus the lifting of sanctions.
On the other hand, these very dynamics increase Israel’s concern, which in turn may lead to an escalation of strikes against Iranian and pro-Iranian targets in Syria. This, of course, may make a strong Iranian response more likely and bring back the risk of widespread conflagration in the region.
