There has been a flurry in recent weeks with statements and commitments from Western countries to provide tanks and armored vehicles and guns to Ukraine, with some having already made the first deliveries. We have tried to collect – so far of course – what has been declared to be offered, although of course the list will constantly change. But be careful, in the recording that follows, only the recent commitments are mentioned – approximately from November 2022 until now – and not the older ones. So what you see is “new” and not what has already arrived in Ukraine within 2022.
Initially the two big supporters of Ukraine, USA and Britain have announced that they will send Abrams M1 the first and Challenger 2 the second, two of the 4 types of tanks that are being prepared for the Ukrainian steppe. The other two are of the Leopard family, both the Leopard 1A5 and the much more advanced Leopard A2 in various versions. In addition to these 4 types of Western tanks, the supply of Soviet designs, mainly of the T-72 family, continues. So we have the following:
Armoured Battle Tanks
- USA: 31 Abrams M1A2
- UK: 14 Challenger 2
- Germany: 18 Leo 2A6
- Poland: 14 Leo 2A4 and 30 older PT-91 Twardy, a local version of the T-72
- Spain: 10 Leo 2A4
- Sweden: 10 Leo 2A5 (Strv 122)
- Canada: 8 Leo 2A4
- Norway: 8 Leo 2A4NO
- Finland: 3 Leo 2R
- Portugal: 3 Leo 2A6
- Germany-Denmark-Netherlands: A joint effort to supply at least 100 Leopard 1A5s, while Germany has given permission to supply up to 178 tanks of the type. But the 100 are the ones that are being tried to be delivered “soon”, i.e. within 2023, but without an announced timetable because they need repair/maintenance.
- Czech Republic-USA: 90 T-72EAs being upgraded by the Excalibur Army company in the Czech Republic, with American and Dutch funding. Tanks have been “collected” from various countries, e.g. Morocco.
- France: 40 AMX-10 RC tank destroyers (putting them in the tank category for brevity) while Paris has left open the issue of granting Leclerc heavy tanks as well, but no decision yet.
General totals: 31 Abrams, 14 Challenger 2, 120 T-72 (variants), 74 Leopard 2 (variants), 100 Leopard 1, 40 AMX-10RC, that’s 379 all together.
The number is impressive but we cannot fail to emphasize the multiplicity that will create an accounting chaos of support. However, Ukrainian crews and engineers are already being trained in Germany, Britain, Poland and other countries on the new tanks.
Cannons/Rocket Launchers
- UK: 30 self-propelled AS90, 155mm
- Germany: 18 self-propelled 155mm RCHs
- Denmark: 19 self-propelled Caesar 155mm (entire stock of the country!)
- Germany-Denmark-Norway: 16 Zuzana 2 motorhomes from Slovakia, financed by the three countries.
- Sweden: 8 self-propelled Archer, 155 mm
- Italy: 6 self-propelled 155mm PzH 2000
- France: 2 MLRS
- Spain: 6 105mm Oto Melara Mod 56 trailers
Grand total: 97 self-propelled 155mm, 2 MLRS, 6 towed 105mm, 105 all together.
The “harvest” for the Ukrainians here is also large, while many are modern with a long range of ammunition (at 40 km maximum with the exception of the British AS90), high speed and fast order. But the gamble is to provide plenty of projectiles so that a high rate of daily use can be sustained. The Ukrainians have shown they are unconcerned about gun damage and standard use instructions, and rightly so as they face a powerful Russian artillery barrage.
Armored Fighting Vehicles/Personnel Carriers
- USA: 113 Bradley M2A2 ODS and 90 Strykers
- Germany: 40 Marder aiming for 100
- Canada: 39 LAV 6
- Sweden: 50 CV90
- Spain: 35 M113s and 5 more as mortar carriers
- Lithuania: 10 M113 120mm mortar carriers
- Portugal: 14 M113
- Slovakia: 30 BMP-1
Grand total: 426 all together, mostly 113 Bradleys, 90 Strykers and 64 M-113s.
In these expected batches, we have a clear quality upgrade of the TOMA/ТОМП that Ukraine is getting, since it is moving from the outdated BMP-1 to much newer western designs, among them top vehicles such as the CV90 and the Stryker. Again here we will emphasize the issue of multi-type, although the Ukrainians already use many M113s.
The above – we say again – are commitments of the last five months or so but their implementation will take all of 2023 (at least), which raises a big question as to whether Ukraine will be able to have a serious number of mainly heavy tanks at one moment, in order to takes an aggressive action. If the Western tanks arrive in Kiev in small batches of 10-20 at a time, and are pushed to the front, there is a risk that they will wear out-destroy there at a similar rate, so that there will never be a critical mass of them.
So important and unknown is how many tanks Ukraine already has in service, mostly Soviet-era T-72s and T-64s, and whether these are sufficient to hold the line of confrontation until new “western” armed large motorized tanks are assembled in the rear. units to make the decisive blow at some point. Here, however, the continuous supply of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine, which do not allow a Russian motorized advance, helps.
On the Russian side, the tank numerical superiority is clear (there are huge stocks from the Cold War), but there is a race to make them operational, to upgrade them if possible and to train crews. It is on this last point that Russia lags behind, since its industrial production is braked by the Western embargo, with many subsystems of its tanks, e.g. in the cameras to need western-made chips, while the serious training of charioteers who will not be lost in a Bahamut-type “meat machine” takes a lot of effort and time.
So for a second year of war in Ukraine, we are again seeing a “productivity” conflict, with the West largely allied and looking to its own deficient active (because here too there is stock but long-storage) stocks to find quality materials to send to the Ukrainians (not only tanks but also their ammunition and spare parts) and on the other hand Russia to have an even bigger stock but hardly usable. Something that can be seen on both sides in the deadly clashes for many months in Bahamut, where they are mainly fought with 1st World tactics. Trenches, house-to-house fighting, artillery barrages, skirmishes of infantry patrols, with some unrelated tank skirmishes. And these in a steppe environment, theoretically ideal for the use of tanks, as long as there is – which is not – the holistic culture and infrastructure of their use in combination with experienced motorized infantry. Thus we have the return to the past of the “big” wars, even with many notes of high technology in the mud.
Will the Western aid in tank power – among many others – be able to turn the situation on the front in favor of Ukraine? It is difficult because as we have recorded a concentration of this material must be sought in well-trained units, these must be advanced to the front line relatively intact and with a good supply of ammunition, so that then a strong attack can be launched, mainly on the central and northern fronts, since in south, the crossing of the Dnieper River will be required, something very difficult since Ukraine does not have landing means. In other words, we have a series of conditions that must be satisfied in order to see the “decisive battle-penetration”.
Does Ukraine have the ability to do all this? Probably yes, because it is already receiving significant help in organization and western business methodology. But it takes time, and clearly the adversary, the Russian war machine, has to experience a “memory gap” again, as it did in the summer when it received the counterattack in Kharkiv, and was unable to react. And this is difficult since the war has a bloody “teaching” phase that both opponents have come to know well. But for now, we are in a waiting phase, until all the promised ones arrive in Ukraine in the coming months. And of course what Russia, on its part, is preparing.
