A few years ago, the debate about geopolitical changes in Africa was not exactly about France and Russia per se. It mainly focused on China’s growing economic role and political partnerships on the African continent. For example, Beijing’s decision to establish its first military base in Djibouti in 2017 marked China’s major geopolitical move, turning its economic influence in the region into political influence backed by a military presence.
China remains committed to its Africa strategy. Beijing has been Africa’s largest trading partner for 12 consecutive years, with total bilateral trade between China and Africa reaching $254.3 billion in 2021, according to recent data released by China’s General Administration of Customs.
The US and its Western allies are aware and warning of China’s growing influence in Africa. The establishment of US AFRICOM in 2007 was rightly perceived as a measure to counter China’s influence. Since then, and arguably before, talk of a new ‘Scramble for Africa’ has abounded, with new players such as China, Russia and even Turkey entering the fray.
The Russia-Ukraine war, however, changed the geopolitical dynamic in Africa, as it highlighted the Russo-French rivalry on the continent, as opposed to the Chinese-American rivalry there.
The new dynamics
Although Russia has been present in African politics for years, the war – and thus the need for stable allies at the United Nations (UN) and elsewhere – accelerated Moscow’s charm offensive. In July, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda and the Republic of Congo, strengthening Russia’s diplomatic relations with African leaders.
“We know that African colleagues do not approve of the overt efforts of the US and its European satellites … to impose a unipolar world order on the international community,” Lavrov said. His words were received with agreement.
Russian efforts are paying dividends, as early as the first votes to condemn Moscow at the UN General Assembly in March and April. Many African nations either remained neutral or voted against measures targeting Russia at the UN.
South Africa’s position, in particular, was problematic from Washington’s perspective, not only because of the size of the country’s economy, but also because of Pretoria’s political influence and moral authority across Africa. Furthermore, South Africa is the only African member of the G20.
During his visit to the US in September, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa defended his country’s neutrality and voiced objections to a draft US law – the Countering Russian Malignant Activities in Africa Act – that would monitor and punish African governments that do not toe the American line in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
The West does not understand, however, that Africa’s slow but decisive turn towards Moscow is no accident. The history of the continent’s past and present struggle against Western colonialism and neo-colonialism is well known. While the West continues to define its relationship with Africa on the basis of exploitation, Russia constantly reminds African countries of the legacy of the Soviet Union on the continent.
This is not only evident in the official political discourse of Russian leaders and diplomats, but also in Russian media coverage, which prioritizes Africa and reminds African nations of their historic solidarity with Moscow.
What is the reason for the pro-Russian turn in West Africa?
However, the burning of French flags and the raising of Russian flags is not simply due to alleged Russian financial bribes, shrewd diplomacy or growing military influence. The turn of the African nations – Mali, the Central African Republic and now, possibly, Burkina Faso – has much more to do with distrust and resentment of France’s self-interested legacy in Africa, West Africa in particular.
France has military bases in many parts of Africa and remains an active participant in various military conflicts, which has earned it a reputation as the continent’s main destabilizing force. Equally important is Paris’s stronghold over the economies of 14 African countries, which are forced to use the French currency, the CFA franc.
Although many African countries remain neutral in the event of the Russia-Ukraine war, a huge geopolitical shift is underway, especially in militarily fragile, poor and politically unstable countries that are willing to seek alternatives to French and other Western powers. For a country like Mali, shifting allegiance from Paris to Moscow wasn’t exactly a big gamble. Bamako had very little to lose but a lot to gain. The same logic applies to other African countries battling extreme poverty, political instability and the threat of radicalisation, which are intrinsically linked.
Although China remains a powerful newcomer to Africa, a reality that continues to frustrate US policymakers, the most urgent battle, for now, is between Russia and France, with the latter experiencing a palpable retreat.
