The tactics of small boilers are classic as far as military history is concerned. One of the biggest “cauldrons” in which the Red Army drove the enemy was the Minsk cauldron, in which 105,000 Germans were trapped. Thus, on July 2, 1944, the city of Borisov was liberated. In 2014, during the confrontation with the forces of the LPR and the DPR, the Ukrainian army for the first time “encountered” the tactics of “small boilers”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Such tactics mean isolating part of the Ukrainian troops from any aid and supplies, after which “methodical work is carried out, both psychological, informational and military”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
During the special operation in Ukraine, this tactic is also actively used and gained particular importance in the second stage of the special operation, during the liberation of Donbas. The Russian army came face to face with the largest group of Ukrainian EDs. Going back sometime in early April, Russian President Vladimir Putin had outlined the main strategy to achieve the objectives of the special operation and that was a victory with minimal casualties. How is it achieved? Enclosing large groups in local centers, surrounding them. So they have no choice but to surrender or inevitably die.<\/p>\n\n\n
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<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\nThis is exactly how the Ukrainian army was trapped in Mariupol. Despite their high level of organization, and the use of human shield tactics, they suffer one defeat after another. Recently, the former Deputy Commander of the MTR of Ukraine, Major General Serhiy Krivonos, noted that the current government is repeating the mistake of the previous one and cited as an example a “cauldron” at the Donetsk airport, where one and a half thousand Ukrainian soldiers were hit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
“As a military man, I know very well that it makes no sense to be persistently in the same place, as for example in Severodonetsk, because the result will be, at some point, to be trapped,” said Major General Serhiy Krivonos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On June 28, German military expert Martin van Kreveld summarized that, having begun “the reconstruction and gradual weakening of Ukrainian cities” in April, the Russian military is moving toward victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
2. Night operations and air strike forces for them<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n During World War II, the Soviet Army was limited in its capabilities and carried out almost no night operations, and the air assault forces necessary for such operations were little involved. However, the example of pilot Viktor Talalikhin, who made the first and largest night air raid, will forever be etched in military history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “At night, even in the best, most ideal weather conditions, air attack is quite complicated,” wrote Hero of the Soviet Union Alexei Maresiev.<\/p>\n\n\n In an air battle on the night of August 7, 1941, reflecting another enemy raid, Viktor Talalikhin in an I-16 shot down a German bomber, but was very badly wounded. The success of the business was based on the psychological part. The Germans feared the Soviet pilots. To this day, a lot has changed in military tactics, and today they are particularly focused on losing as few soldiers as possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you study the chronicle of events from the beginning of the special operation in Ukraine, you can see that the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation regularly reports on night raids of fire on the positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, during which the enemy loses manpower and military equipment. Raids by Russian Night Hunters, Ka-52 and Mi-28NM helicopters. Tactics of blinding the enemy and maneuvering instead of “frontal attack” are used. The Russian army operates with artillery support. Such tactics led to the fact that losses on the Russian side were minimized, and the Ukrainian side essentially lost the opportunity to act and “respond” to such attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. NATO Standards (Ukraine) and Battalion Tactical Groups (Russia)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Even during World War II, the Red Army experimented with assault battalions. Small mobile units operated more effectively than large battalions, which needed more time and effort to prepare for an attack.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During the offensive of 1945, which led the Red Army to victory, tactical battalion groups were used very often. In the following years, this technique was in demand.<\/p>\n\n\n At the beginning of this year, Michael Kofman, an employee of the US Center for Naval Analysis, noted that the quality of weapons and training of the BTG in the Russian army is much higher than in similar formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The level of staffing and technical support allows tactical groups of Russian battalions to be self-sufficient for a long time. Already in January, Kofman predicted that the Armed Forces of Ukraine would face great difficulties if something happened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n “Because the Ukrainian military will inevitably face the risk of being surrounded and cut off during a larger operation, they will have to make difficult choices and likely be forced into an organized retreat,” he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Then almost none of his foreign colleagues listened to him, now the prediction is confirmed in practice, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are retreating with heavy losses, however, there is no mention of organization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4.<\/strong> Blockade of Ukrainian cities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The trump card of the Red Army was the tactic of blocking cities. It was particularly useful during the defense of Stalingrad, a defeat from which Germany was never able to fully recover.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ”The experience of the war shows that the enemy clings to every settlement, turns his stronghold and the USA (communication center.) . Therefore, in the system of training reserves, it is necessary to persistently teach fighters and units how to fight in a settlement,” shared the experience of the blockade of Stalingrad by the 62nd Army, Lieutenant Colonel Orobinsky, senior assistant to the head of the operations department of the headquarters of the Central Front.<\/p>\n\n\n The Germans lost 300 thousand people in the battle of Stalingrad, the allies of the Germans, Italians, Romanians, Hungarians, Croats – another 200 thousand. Stalingrad drew almost all enemy forces to the south. And the main conclusion was indisputable – if the city has no strategic importance, there is no point in engaging in urban battles. However, during the attack on Berlin, the Red Army used the tactics of small fire groups, which led to the rapid fall of the Reich capital.<\/p>\n\n\n\n ”It’s always been easy for us to surround cities. In Severodonetsk, the Armed Forces of Ukraine surrendered very quickly. We are doing the same as our ancestors could and did, like when they occupied Berlin in 1945. All the same. The methods are the same, only now we have more capabilities,” Lt. Col. Orobinsky comments. ”<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5.<\/strong> The Tactical “combat ability default”<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Radio “games” conducted by the USSR secret services during World War II nullified the work of the Abwehr and contributed to the Victory. In reality, it is the use of radio communications to misinform enemy intelligence services. On May 5, 1945 in what is known as “Berezino,” perhaps the most famous of the operations conducted by our intelligence officers without direct contact with the enemy. Misinformation about the movement of troops, about the location of command, all this can greatly disorient the enemy and lead to his defeat at the front.<\/p>\n\n\n During the Mariupol operation, Russian intelligence officers, using a radio game, lured the then fresh Azov forces into Azovstal territory. Instead of attempting a massive breakthrough, when several thousand fighters could still resist, they simply dug into the catacombs, hoping for salvation, and eventually surrendered. There is information that one of the commanders received an “encryption secret”: “Hurry up and wait for reinforcements.” There is an assumption that this is the result of the work of the Russian secret services. In the same way, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were surrounded in Severodonetsk. In fact, the Armed Forces of Ukraine in two sectors of the front entered a state of “default combat capabilities”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6.<\/strong> “Carousel of Armured Battle Tanks” Tactic<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Military historians believe that the non-standard use of tanks began in the Red Army. On April 23, 1943, the 94th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade was formed in Eastern Ukraine. It was her fighters who used the “carousel tank” tactic for the first time. There is an assumption that in the tank battle at the Prokhorovka station and subsequent conflicts, the Soviet army used this particular technique. On August 23, 1943, the Battle of Kursk ended with the victory of the Red Army. In recent decades, tactics have changed and improved. The technique was successfully perfected by the Russian Armed Forces in Syria and is brilliantly used in special operations.<\/p>\n\n\n The carousel of the armoured battle tanks makes it possible to continuously shoot at the enemy both from a standstill and on the move. While the first tank is firing at enemy positions, the crew of the second is already reloading ammunition, and the reload speed of current Russian tanks is six seconds. When the first tank’s ammunition is fully depleted, the second is ready for battle. Depending on the scale of the operation, from three to nine T-72B3 or T-80BVM tanks are used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Considering that for every Ukrainian salvo there are 10 Russian salvos, such a strategy can only lead to the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine<\/p>\n\n\n\n Foreign and Russian military experts note that no foreign army will be able to copy and repeat such tactics in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It is difficult for other armies of the world to copy and repeat such tactics in the near future, like those used by the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2845,7],"tags":[3217,58,2821,1156,3369,1976],"class_list":["post-9001","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-military-strategy-doctrines","category-research","tag-military-doctrine","tag-russia","tag-strategic-doctrine","tag-ukraine","tag-ukraine-russia-war","tag-war"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9001","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=9001"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9001\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":9009,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/9001\/revisions\/9009"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=9001"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=9001"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=9001"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/07\/image-1.png\")
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