The reasons <\/strong>that<\/strong> shaken the sovereign State’s progress towards its final formatting <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In our previous analysis we highlighted the way in which the state, which\nis the best form of social organization, managed to overcome all the other\nuntil then forms of social organization, by binding morally with a strong bond\nto its citizens. In some cases, this moral and mental bond for some citizens\nhas reached the limits of fanaticism which today this kind of fanaticism is\nregarded as nationalism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But the then initially formed models of States did not create strong\nadministrative services that give great sufficiency and efficiency to the\nstate. We should reach first the 17th century to show these strong state\ncapabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that they should mediate from 1300-1400 A.D. to 1700 A.D., three\nand four centuries respectively to show strong State structures is due to\nspecific events-disasters that regressed the state’s progress towards its final\nformatting. The gradual growth of the population in Europe has exerted great\npressure on agriculture, trade, crafts etc. The non-capability to appear new\ndeveloping techniques that would improve production in all types of economic\nand social sector is the main reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Nature always knows by itself to correct any imbalance that occurs in any\narea. The famines, communicable diseases and the plague in general have limited\nall these pressures that were exercised during the Middle Ages. Then these\n“corrections” of nature created insecurity as to the survival of the\npeople who evolved into resolutions, civil conflicts and wars which are the\nmain reasons that weaken the state in general.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But wars, if we remove the moral part that concerns the loss of human life\nand the material disasters that they cause, are that action of human nature,\nwhere during the course of them takes place the rallying of all the energies\nand techniques of a State (economic, administrative, technological, military,\netc.) and a nation in general as to achieve the common goal that is none other\nthan to win the war. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Through this process of achieving the common goal there are new\ndiscoveries-inventions that improve life and find application in political life\nafter the end of the war. As an example, we can mention that during the WWII,\napart from all the others was invented the so-called Tupperware that kept the\nfood of the American soldiers hot. It is that which next conquered with its use\nall the households on the planet. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The<\/strong> <\/strong>sovereignty<\/strong> <\/strong>of<\/strong> <\/strong>a<\/strong> <\/strong>State<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The sovereignty of a ruler is defined as the full control he acquires over the lands and nationals of his kingdom. The sovereignty of a State is defined as the complete independence that it\nhas from any type of foreign-external power with the simultaneous possession of\nthe highest authority held by all its citizens who live within its\ninternationally recognized borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 1300 A.D. the geographical landscape about the stability of the borders\nof the European States was not occur due to the wars and civil wars that took\nplace in Europe, with the result that the institution and the concept of the\nsovereign State to present a high degree of fluctuations. Such sovereign states\nin Europe were only deemed to be the state of Florence (Tuscany) in Italy and the\nSoutheastern German State (Habsburg).<\/p>\n\n\n\n The French state delayed the implementation and the compact configuration\nof its existing institutions but at the same time avoided the creation of new\ninstitutions that would accelerate the final formatting and all because of the\nCentennial War with England (1337-1453). The liquidity as it concerns the change of the borders of the French state\nwas due to the aggressive strategy of the English Kings who wanted to expand\ntheir sovereignty by conquering new territories and at the same time to break\nthe Kingdom of France.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The development of the state potential that appears in a war, and as we\nmentioned in a previous paragraph, namely structural reforms, efficiency, new\nservices, etc. in this case of the Centennial War had no effect due to the enormous time duration of the war. Both France and\nEngland were unable to develop their institutions while the \u201cbleeding\u201d in\neconomic terms and human and natural resources was enormous for both sides. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The development of groups of common interests in\npolitical parties and the institution of representative “democracy”<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The fact that a large proportion of people who had common interests\nmarshaled among themselves to gain political power in order to influence the\ndecisions of the State institutions has been a growing phenomenon in society\nsince the citizens and in general the social and professional classes\nunderstood how they should defend their interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n To represent their interests, each of these groups of common interests used to choose some people for their representation. This was not an unprecedented phenomenon, given that the system of courts\nthat developed the newer models of the state of Europe was used as part of the\njustice process for few people to speak in the courts. Either as witnesses or\nas representatives of a group of common interests, such as a body type, or a\ncommunity or city that negotiated, for example, the acceptance of new imposed\ntaxes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n These representatives gradually had gained a strong power and prestige in\nthe eyes of citizens and society in general. Therefore, they have always been\ninvited to the wide-ranging meetings of higher courts in court decisions\nconcerning a large part of society, in special-type meetings and assemblies on\nissues of both general and local interest. The consent of the representative of\neach representative group of common interests was based either on his mere\npresence in the assembly or through the institution of voting.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This type of assembly presented many “benefits” for both the\nruler and his subjects. More specifically:<\/p>\n\n\n\n For Nationals-citizens of the state,<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.<\/strong> They were satisfied by the fact that their opinion was considered by the central Government and\/or the ruler.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> That customs should not be changed as they see fit without the prior consent of the citizens,<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3.<\/strong> They expressed their grievances and made counter-proposals regarding the proposals of the central government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4.<\/strong> Important decisions relating to the Community and to which the representatives of these groups of common interests participated should be shared throughout society through their obligatory publication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5.<\/strong> That the consent of the representatives of these groups to any type of reinforcement of the state or the ruler was necessary to be approved and given.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 6.<\/strong> The representatives of these groups of common interests were selected by the group they represented without them having the necessary knowledge in a legal handbook.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For the central government and the rulers<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.<\/strong> They facilitated the rulers as to the unhindered implementation of their policy throughout the territory of their kingdom.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> The consent of the delegates to these assemblies has engaged all groups of common interests by postponing their attempts to not implement the adopted policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3.<\/strong> The decisions of these assemblies have always offered, in one way or another, the necessary support to the ruler, whether political or economic in the implementation of any of his policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4.<\/strong> These representative assemblies constituted a means of exercising effective governance as well as the system of courts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Ways of delaying the implementation of State policy<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n As we have seen in our previous analyses, the different models of states\nthat appeared in Europe with the prominent English and French states\nrespectively were based on the power and application of laws, the development\nof the system of courts, but also safeguarding the property rights of their\ncitizens.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Local revolutions and warfare between neighboring rulers had been replaced by rallying into groups that shared interests and were struggling to gain political prestige and strength to influence the decisions of State institutions for them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.<\/strong> The procedure applied for the acquisition and registration or non-property rights (e.g. permission and consent of nationals in court rulings) was a way of delaying the implementation of any State policy. At the same time, this proves that the state institutions were not so\npowerful so that the state to impose “unpopular” measures on social\ngroups that had political power and prestige (e.g. local rulers, local\ncouncils, landowners, etc.).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In fact, for the implementation of each State policy, all those political groups that had political power should agree and cooperate with central authority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> The local rulers and other social groups in order to protect their interests they did everything. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Their main concern was the avoidance of payment and\/or reduction of the tax imposed on them. Their other concern\nwas to gain state privileges that would increase their income without, however,\nincreasing their obligations to the State accordingly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They used these state privileges to enrich themselves at the expense of the community, ignoring the “common good” and the interests of the many. Essentially, what\ninterested social classes and groups of common interests in their participation\nin the political game was the obstruction of the implementation of central\ngovernment policy, the non-development of new State institutions, the\nnon-empowerment of existing state institutions at the cost of increasing the\nacquisition of control of a part of the existing State and its use in order to\nserve its interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, however, these groups of common interests knew that the state was the big “cow” that fed them and in no way wanted to be destroyed-“die” because through it were produced the incomes that were claimed by all these political and social groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3.<\/strong> All these political groups or groups of common interests knew that it would be suicidal for them and their existence and interests to come into direct conflict with the state using and violence against him to defend their interests. By accepting slowly and gradually participating in the political game and resolving any differences in the courts rather than through armed violence, they learned how to hinder the decisions of central authority and generally state policy through the Judicial system and by making use of the legal procedure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More specifically, given the long distances (e.g. France) and the\ndifficulty in communications and movements, these groups of common interests\nknew that in order to truly justice the courts had to operate very slowly. So, they knew that to decide on a dispute at the local level, it would take many years for this final decision to come out. <\/p>\n\n\n\n And when this Court decision was taken place, they knew these political\ngroups that they could re-claim from the outset the same claim by modifying\nslightly with legal manner (Court Action) their conflict. In this case the\ndelays have been very long hampering the implementation of central government\npolicy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n This was since the states then did not have the financial strength or the\ntime to recruit all the necessary manpower required to carry out the many\nlitigation. For the central\nadministration to accelerate the time of the administration of justice, the\ncentral government was in fact forced to come to some type of compromise with\nthese political groups either by granting them privileges or by reducing tax\nrequirements from them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The only alternative of the central government to the solution of the compromises to achieve an acceleration of the justice process was the one made by England in which it handed over the local courts and local administration to the local Lords (Justices of the Peace) where in this case they had every interest in speeding up procedures to collect fines and manage part of that money. However, in this case the implementation of the central government policy was applied by non-administrators who were of course the government not controlling them. <\/p>\n\n\n\n 4.<\/strong> In the same way that groups of common interests and citizens in general have learnt to use the system of courts to procrastinate the politics of the central government,\nthey learned to use the informal institution of the assemblies to achieve the\nsame goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During these meetings, representatives of the common interest groups were\nable to delay the implementation of any policy if they achieve to persuade them\nand appoint a committee of inquiry which Its purpose would be to examine any\nmatter which was entrusted to it in depth giving a final opinion. The time\nperiod of the committee of inquiry could have been from three months to more\nthan a year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, these assemblies have never fully accepted the proposals of the\ncentral government. They did not deny the reasons of the sovereign’s proposals,\nbut essentially in these assemblies there was a kind of bazaar as to what they\nwould apply (mainly in matters of taxation). In fact, a kind of political\npressure was exerted on the central government. Through this kind of haggling\nthey used to renew their conversations by setting up new future assemblies each\ntime, continuously gaining time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Anywhere, groups of common interests achieved to pay low taxes to the\nstate, state revenues were reduced resulting in a delay in further\nstrengthening of existing institutions and the development of new state\ninstitutions. The privileged ranks of societies achieved to pay less taxes\nwhile tax collectors were delving poor citizens. <\/p>\n\n\n\n When the assembly system was abolished and a better allocation of tax\ncollection was implemented, the State and its institutions began to develop,\nand economic growth would take place. The groups of common interests began to\nchange and like more with professional guilds and gradually become political\nparties claiming their entry into the parliaments.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The <\/strong>Bureaucracy and its role in delaying the development of State institutions<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The bureaucracy as necessary for the development of the first State institutions, which we described in our previous analyses, so hampered the operation of existing State institutions and functioned as a brake for their smooth operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In general, the bureaucrat in any country-state he works, he has a common work mentality that distinguishes him and independently of his nationality. He loves the routine\nand the stability in the content of his work and the tasks and at the same time\nhates that it upsets this routine (i.e. not predictable changes) and any type\nof uncertainty. This applies to all periods of bureaucratic history. Let alone\nthose times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Any bureaucrat who kept data-files for any reason (court rulings, land\nrights, annuities, assets, etc.) would not want to enter into proceedings to\nrenew these files with new changes each year. The changes he would like to make\nshould be foreseen and within management limits. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The great agitation and difficulty in the routine of bureaucrats occurred\nwhen the rulers and generally the states began to rely on the collection of\ntaxes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A new tax or a tax originally introduced on a trial basis causes\nfluctuation in the performance of taxes and the price of the property. Moreover, when a tax was first introduced, an assessment had to be made from the beginning to the total property. Because this process was time-consuming and there were no\nnecessary staff to support it, they began to use conventionally defined\nvaluations and to accept conventionally defined sums of money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On the other hand, the permanence of salaried employees and bureaucrats created in every State department a kind of “fief” which resemble in a professional guild. The staffing of the service was limited to relatives and generally to the protection of people who staffed these services. In addition, the head of each state agency was appointed by his sovereign or advisers. Because the positions of the heads of these agencies had prestige were in high demand. <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the appointed heads of these services were irrelevant to the operation of their service, leading either to hinder their work or not to render each service the expected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In more general terms it can be said that bureaucracy is the intermediate\n“layer” that divides government power with the people and does not\nallow direct communication of government with the people. On the other hand, it\nprotects governance in the fact that there is no responsibility to politicians\nif anything goes wrong in terms of the policy applied because the\nimplementation of the policy was a task of the bureaucracy. <\/p>\n\n\n\n No one will ask for responsibility from politicians who design policies.\nThe creation of many services (e.g. France) whose competences are related or\nidentified create a ‘ labyrinth ‘ of competences by not allowing it to be shown\nwho is responsible at bureaucratic level if something goes wrong.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In then England, bureaucracy was extended but not to the extent that it was\nextended to France, and much less government spending was needed to serve it\nbecause the British government was asking for the unpaid local rulers and their\ncouncils to offer unpaid services through the institution of the Peace Court.\nSo, these eminent aristocrats of the province applied the law and decrees of\ncentral authority at the local level. Some of them had the role of the local collector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The main problems faced by States in the Middle Ages<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.<\/strong> The gap that existed between the political designers (King, his council and the government agencies) and the bureaucracy that had the duty to implement these policies. A gap that over time widened.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> Not shaping pioneering techniques to accelerate applied crisis management policies and whenever they appear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These two problems were rooted in the fact that there was insufficient\ninformation from the lower bureaucratic services to the highest government\nlevels for adequate and efficient policy planning. There was no authority in\nany government agency to collect and then distribute this much needed\ninformation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, the people who took the political decisions-the council\nleaders-were ignorant and selfish and their decisions were painted by their\npersonal ambitions. On more general lines they tended to overestimate economic\nand human resources and underestimate the need for internal reforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The aristocracy saw internal reforms with hostility because he believed\nthey would limit their powers and incomes respectively. The privileges of the aristocracy continued to be a rival of administrative efficiency. Eminent men disliked\nthe institutional and professional character of these government activities and\nthe resistance of the late explains the developed specialized and effective\nservices for military matters and foreign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Foreign policy and military policy were planned and controlled at all\nstages by the King and his council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Thanos S. Chonthrogiannis<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The law of intellectual property is prohibited in any way\nunlawful use\/appropriation of this article, with heavy civil and criminal\npenalties for the infringer.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" In our previous analysis, we presented the different models of the state that emerged in Europe during the period 1100-1400 A.D. Moreover, we highlighted…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":673,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[988,7],"tags":[652,649,650,653,647,648,598,651],"class_list":["post-696","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-political-science","category-research","tag-bureaucracy","tag-the-groups-of-common-interests","tag-the-institutions-of-representative-assembly","tag-the-problems-faced-the-states","tag-the-reasons-that-shaken-the-states-progress","tag-the-sovereignty-of-state","tag-the-state-evolution-in-europe-its-institutions-and-eu","tag-ways-to-delay-the-applied-state-policy"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/696","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=696"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/696\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1001,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/696\/revisions\/1001"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/673"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=696"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=696"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=696"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/London_customs_house_18th_century.jpg\")
Author: Bowles and Carver (18th century), licensed public domain
Source: Original publication (1776-1800), Immediate source: http:\/\/www.museumoflondonprints.com\/image\/142861\/bowles-and-carver-a-view-of-the-custom-house-18th-century
<\/figcaption><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\n