This observation reflects the modern battlefield reality, as the war in Ukraine has brought the vital importance of fortifications back to the forefront, overturning earlier theories that deemed them obsolete in the era of high-precision weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Lessons from the War in Ukraine<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n This observation reflects the modern battlefield reality, as the war in Ukraine has brought the vital importance of fortifications back to the forefront, overturning earlier theories that deemed them obsolete in the era of high-precision weaponry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Experience from recent years has highlighted key conclusions regarding the value of fortifications. Extensive networks of trenches, minefields, and concrete fortifications (such as the well-known “Surovikin Line” or Ukrainian defensive lines in the Donbas) have proven capable of halting enemy advances, forcing the attacker into an extremely costly war of attrition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In an environment teeming with reconnaissance drones and FPV (First-Person View) kamikaze drones, the ability of soldiers to quickly take cover underground or in reinforced shelters is the primary factor for survival.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Well-prepared positions allow a smaller number of defenders to hold off much larger attacking forces, thereby freeing up troops for other fronts or for use as reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Russian approach (Surovikin Line and southern front)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n It was based on the classic Soviet doctrine of “defense in depth,” extending up to 30\u201350 kilometers. It comprised vast, continuous minefields, anti-tank ditches, and “dragon’s teeth.”<\/p>\n\n\n\n It proved highly effective during the 2023 Ukrainian counteroffensive, as the Russians had the time (nearly eight months) to dig in and reinforce positions with concrete, free from the pressure of immediate enemy attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Ukrainian approach (The Fortress Belt and new lines) On the Pokrovsk front and in the so-called “Fortress Belt” in the Donbas, these lines succeeded in dramatically slowing the Russian advance and inflicting massive casualties. Conversely, where failure occurred (e.g., at Toretsk or earlier north of Kharkiv), it was due to a lack of time to complete the fortifications and the pressure exerted by Russian glide bombs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Electronic Warfare (EW) as a “shield”<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n EW systems are deployed within or near the trenches to create a protective “umbrella,” blinding enemy FPV drones. Without EW, soldiers in the trenches become easy targets.<\/p>\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n However, the emergence of fiber-optic or AI-guided autonomous drones (2025\u20132026) began to diminish the effectiveness of electronic warfare (EW), reviving the need for physical cover (nets, armored canopies).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Minefields are designed not merely to destroy, but to funnel the enemy into specific “kill zones” already targeted by artillery and rear-based drone operators.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The use of ground robots for remote mine-laying and the deployment of electromagnetic detonation systems (such as the Ukrainian PIDRYV) have shifted the balance, transforming minefields into a dynamic, “living” threat.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Works to establish fortification and personnel protection facilities\u2014covering not only defense and dispersal positions but also support locations, facilities, and national infrastructure\u2014are absolutely essential….<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":30567,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2362,2845,7],"tags":[8446,3700,8444,8445,2863,4145],"class_list":["post-30566","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-military-science","category-military-strategy-doctrines","category-research","tag-deep-trenches","tag-drones","tag-land-warfare","tag-modern-warfare","tag-warfare","tag-world-war-i"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30566","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=30566"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30566\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30569,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30566\/revisions\/30569"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/30567"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=30566"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=30566"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=30566"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
Ukraine was late to begin the mass construction of strategic fortifications, but in 2024\u20132025, it launched a massive three-tiered program (1st line built by infantry, 2nd by combat engineers, and 3rd by civilian contractors around key cities).<\/p>\n\n\n\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/10\/image-14.png\")
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