{"id":30360,"date":"2026-09-17T21:32:47","date_gmt":"2026-09-17T18:32:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=30360"},"modified":"2026-09-17T21:32:47","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T18:32:47","slug":"the-houthi-victory-and-saudi-arabias-military-isolation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=30360","title":{"rendered":"The Houthi victory and Saudi Arabia’s military isolation"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The fall of the city of Mocha in western Yemen on September 10, 2026, and the Houthis’ establishment of a presence on Mayun Island\u2014also known as Perim\u2014one day later, represent their most significant territorial gain since the 2022 truce. Mocha is the main Red Sea port of Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Mayun is located in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, at the southern end of the Red Sea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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Territories captured by the Houthis during September 2026 are shown in dark red. Territories already under their control in northwestern Yemen are shown in pink.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

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The recent picture of developments is further shaped by the September 8th attack in southern Saudi Arabia. Authorities there reported 73 injuries, fires, and temporary facility shutdowns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was drastically curtailed by the war with Iran, the Red Sea became the primary alternative outlet for Saudi hydrocarbon exports. Now, however, the Houthis have linked a land-based breakthrough in Yemen to direct pressure on Saudi territory and the Kingdom’s maritime outlet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The recent picture of unfolding events is rounded out by the September 8th attack in southern Saudi Arabia. Authorities there reported 73 injuries, fires, and temporary facility shutdowns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As shipping through the Strait of Hormuz was drastically curtailed by the war with Iran, the Red Sea became the primary alternative outlet for Saudi hydrocarbon exports. Now, however, the Houthis have linked a land-based breakthrough in Yemen to direct pressure on Saudi territory and the Kingdom’s maritime outlet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Victory through the adversary’s self-collapse<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Houthis massed forces, employed missile fire and drones, descended from the highlands toward the region’s coastal plain, and threatened government units with a flanking maneuver. A Reuters report, citing Yemeni, Iranian, and regional sources, indicates direct guidance from officials of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. Iranian assistance boosts the Houthis’ combat capabilities without, however, negating their own autonomy and initiative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The other half of the victory was written within the opposing camp. The units loyal to the recognized government\u2014those of Tariq Saleh\u2014and local Islamist groups operated under separate chains of command, harboring deep, long-standing animosity toward one another. Saleh had been requesting Saudi air cover for weeks, while the funding promised by Riyadh was slow to arrive. By the time the main offensive began, the front line had already lost its cohesion and its reserves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The root cause lies in the rift between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Riyadh seeks a unified anti-Houthi administration in Yemen under Saudi guidance, without ruling out a future, mutually agreed-upon secession of the South. Abu Dhabi, for its part, invested in separatists in southern Yemen and other local forces. In late 2025, the advance of the pro-Emirati Southern Transitional Council (STC) triggered a Saudi counter-offensive and the withdrawal of Emirati military personnel.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Following the Emirati withdrawal, Riyadh became the primary state financier and military guarantor of the anti-Houthi camp. Saudi spending on salaries, energy, and development support in Yemen could exceed four billion dollars in 2026.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, this Saudi “solo path” concerns political stewardship of the country and falls short of true military autonomy. More than a hundred American advisors operate within a joint command center, providing geospatial intelligence and targeting support. Ultimately, though, Riyadh remains dependent on Yemeni forces on the ground, as well as on American intelligence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Stranglehold on the Red Sea<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, the Houthis control the Red Sea coast, yet the opposite African coast and the western exit channel remain outside their dominion. Consequently, while they have acquired capabilities for surveillance, coercion, and local area denial, they do not possess actual control over the maritime region itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For commercial shipping, however, this distinction may prove academic, as a credible threat suffices to divert merchant vessels via the Cape of Good Hope.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Houthis already possess anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) capable of striking across the entire width of the Red Sea strait.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The significant shift now concerns much smaller systems. On August 11, a fiber-optic FPV drone was recovered in Marib; government sources attributed it to the Houthis. On August 13, fiber-optic spools and electronic components were seized in Al-Wadiah and Aden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

These findings indicate the potential deployment of fiber-optic drones in the area. Thus, through these smaller systems, the Houthis could intensify pressure on this vital maritime route. Of course, a small FPV drone would struggle to immobilize a large tanker while it is underway.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Saudi Military Power and Its Challenges<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Saudi Arabia possesses significant firepower. SIPRI estimates its defense spending for 2025 at $83.2 billion, ranking the country eighth globally. Its air force operates F-15s, Eurofighter Typhoons, early-warning aircraft, and aerial refueling tankers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Its air defense systems include Patriot and THAAD, while the navy is acquiring Avante-class corvettes. This force is capable of defending critical areas and striking stationary or promptly identified targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the nature of Houthi operations demands different capabilities. The movement employs numerous mobile missile launchers, tunnel networks, militias embedded in populated areas, and small drones; countering this requires persistent surveillance, rapid targeting, joint command structures, and reliable ground troops. Consequently, while Saudi Arabia\u2019s air superiority can inflict punishment and stall an advance, it does not win wars.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

From the Emirati perspective, their greatest advantage in Yemen was operational. Abu Dhabi possessed local intelligence networks, access to ports, local commanders, special forces, and NATO-certified Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). Consequently, the UAE’s withdrawal from the region deprived Riyadh of a proven system of personnel and local relationships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Mecca Pact and the Egyptian Option<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Furthermore, the Joint Defense Pact of Mecca, signed on August 7th by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan, failed to trigger joint action against the Houthis. Following the fall of Mocha, Pakistan favored dialogue, citing a lack of prior relevant discussions. Its stance is reminiscent of 2015, when it also declined to participate in Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey can provide drones, munitions, advisors, intelligence, electronic warfare capabilities, and potentially air defense systems. However, a local conflict requires access to bases, aerial refueling, maritime logistics, a significant ground force, and a tolerance for casualties.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Should Ankara shoulder the burden of such an intervention against the Houthis, it will demand a strategic quid pro quo. Bases, access to ports, defense contracts, and the protection of a friendly Yemeni faction would be reasonable Turkish demands. However, such a zone of Turkish influence in Yemen would clash with Saudi Arabia\u2019s pursuit of dominance there.<\/p>\n\n\n

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The Egyptian Mistral-class helicopter carrier Gamal Abdel Nasser and the frigate Al-Galala in formation with the USS Delbert D. Black. Photo by Jeremy R. Boan, U.S. Navy.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Among the other major players in the region, Egypt has the most direct interest. The IMF estimated a loss of six billion dollars in foreign currency inflows from the Suez Canal in 2024 alone, due to the Red Sea crisis.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Cairo possesses the Berenice base, two Mistral-class helicopter carriers, FREMM and MEKO frigates, Gowind-class corvettes, submarines, and a powerful air force. It can provide escort services, surveillance, air defense, and mine warfare capabilities. It also maintains limited amphibious capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, even in this case, an Egyptian ground campaign in Houthi-controlled territory remains costly and politically risky. There is also a historical precedent: Egyptian forces withdrew from the region in late 1967, having participated in the North Yemen Civil War between 1962 and 1970.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That expeditionary campaign cost the lives of approximately 26,000 Egyptians and left a lasting historical trauma. Consequently, while Egypt could serve as a necessary catalyst, it is unlikely to become a conqueror or occupier of western Yemen. A realistic solution for militarily curbing the Houthi expansion would need to combine Saudi funding, Egyptian and Western air and naval support, and local forces. Above all, it requires a modus vivendi<\/em> between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, a unified command structure for the anti-Houthi factions, and a political agreement regarding the country’s future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, Saudi Arabia faces a difficult choice: either pay the political price of reaching an understanding with the UAE and Abu Dhabi\u2019s local allies in Yemen, or fund a protracted war in which aircraft, missiles, and foreign advisors merely buy time while the Houthis retain the initiative.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The fall of the city of Mocha in western Yemen on September 10, 2026, and the Houthis’ establishment of a presence on Mayun Island\u2014also…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":30363,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[3,834],"tags":[8397,1108,1224,1107,4633,2424],"class_list":["post-30360","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-geopolitical","category-middle-east-geopolitical","tag-bab-el-mandeb-strait","tag-houthi","tag-red-sea","tag-saudi-arabia","tag-strait-of-hormuz","tag-yemen"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30360","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=30360"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30360\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":30364,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/30360\/revisions\/30364"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/30363"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=30360"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=30360"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=30360"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}