{"id":29428,"date":"2026-06-18T21:41:54","date_gmt":"2026-06-18T18:41:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=29428"},"modified":"2026-06-18T21:41:54","modified_gmt":"2026-06-18T18:41:54","slug":"what-does-the-cancellation-of-the-6th-generation-fighter-fcas-mean-for-france-and-germany","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=29428","title":{"rendered":"What does the cancellation of the 6th generation fighter, FCAS, mean for France and Germany?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The cancellation of the Franco-German and Spanish 6th generation fighter program, FCAS, from the German side closes a cycle that had begun with great promise and ended with all too familiar European weaknesses. The program was initially presented as Europe\u2019s answer to American dominance in fifth and sixth generation fighters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In practice, the cancellation brought to the surface something much more basic. Europe may talk about strategic autonomy, but when it comes to sharing leadership, know-how, money and the industrial pie, big talk hardly turns into decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

FCAS was a program with enormous ambition from the beginning. It would deliver a new European fighter, escort drones, a combat system, networking, sensors, weapons and a new air operations architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was precisely its weakness. The more they loaded onto it, the harder it became for the main participants to agree on exactly what they wanted to build.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

France<\/strong> wanted an aircraft that would continue its own philosophy. A fighter capable of serving the Air Force, the Navy using an aircraft carrier, strategic deterrence and independent power policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany<\/strong> wanted a successor to the Eurofighter, with a strong German industrial role and full alignment with NATO requirements. Spain, as a third partner, wanted a place in the development and manufacturing program through Airbus (in which it is a shareholder) and its own industry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The end of the FCAS shows that large aircraft programs need clarity about who has the lead. Someone who will have the first and last word on design, software, systems integration and risk management. When each country wants an equal political role and each company wants the largest share of production, the program ceases to be a military tool and becomes an exercise in balancing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

France can continue, because it still produces fighter jets<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

France is coming out of this story wounded, but it is coming out with something that the rest of Europe has difficulty showing. It still has a living \u201cnational\u201d fighter school. Dassault is not a company that participates in joint ventures. It is the manufacturer of the Rafale, an aircraft in production, constantly upgraded and with a successful export track. So France can say that it is continuing alone and has the basis to do so. Of course, it will pay dearly for this choice.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It will need political continuity, large funds and technological risk. But it has the industrial giants Dassault, Safran, Thales and MBDA and a defense culture that considers air independence a national need. It also has nuclear deterrence and an aircraft carrier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So for Paris, the cancellation of the FCAS can also work liberatingly. France will not have to design its future fighter with the constant fear of losing control of the architecture.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Dassault had a clear position from the beginning. Whoever knows how to build a fighter should lead the new program. This sounded to many like French arrogance. But it was also a harsh industrial truth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The French have lived a similar story in the past. They left the joint European effort that led to the Eurofighter and went the lonely path of the Rafale. For years, the Rafale was considered expensive and export-limited. Today it is one of the most successful European fighters. India, Egypt, Qatar, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia and Croatia show that the aircraft has found its place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This does not mean that the next day will be easy for France. A sixth-generation fighter is much more demanding than the Rafale. Most likely, Paris will move in an intermediate way. It will continue the development of the Rafale F5, will proceed with the creation of escort drones, will keep alive the idea of \u200b\u200ba future fighter and will seek partners who will accept French leadership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In other words, not a new FCAS with a clash between Dassault and Airbus. More of a French program with selected participations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany is looking for a new path<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany is in a more awkward position. It has a huge industrial base. It has Airbus Defence, MTU, Hensoldt, Diehl, Rohde & Schwarz, MBDA Deutschland and a whole network of other companies that can offer sensors, engines, electronics, weapons, structures and subsystems. But this power alone is not enough to produce a fighter. Designing a fighter is another level.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It takes tradition, experience in integration and the ability to make decisions that will hurt. But in this particular sector, Germany has learned to operate through consortia. The Tornado was a consortium. The Eurofighter was a consortium. Post-war German defense aeronautics developed within European structures and divisions of labor. This gave Germany enormous industrial depth, but deprived it of something crucial.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The ability to say tomorrow morning that it is designing the next \u201cnational fighter\u201d on its own. Of course, it can attempt it. But it will take time, risk and a new political decision that will be more reminiscent of France than the well-known German method of sharing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So Germany’s first realistic option is to re-approach Britain. There, together with Italy and Japan, the second European effort for a 6th generation fighter is being developed, with the GCAP program. Which was already the rival of the FCAS. After the collapse of the Franco-German axis, it becomes almost the natural place to which Berlin will look.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But there, Germany will find a program with its own big players, who have already divided the “pie” among themselves. Britain with BAE Systems, Italy with Leonardo and Japan with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.<\/p>\n\n\n

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So, if Berlin wants to join this program, it will have to decide what exactly it wants. Real participation in an ongoing program, or a new negotiation for industrial primacy?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That is the point. Germany can cooperate with the British again, but it will have to pay a political price. It will have to accept that the program will not be rebuilt from scratch around its own requirements.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If it asks for something like this, it will simply transfer the FCAS problem into the GCAP of the British, Italians and Japanese. And then valuable time will be lost for the second time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second option is a deeper attachment to the American \u201ctank\u201d of weapons. Here Germany has already chosen the F-35A fighter for the role of nuclear bomb carrier, within NATO. This purchase was in itself an indication that Berlin trusts the American aircraft for the most critical missions. So after the cancellation of the FCAS, the logic of more F-35s becomes stronger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The F-35 is not German, nor European. But it exists. It is produced, upgraded and used by a large number of allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Germany can therefore increase its fleet of such fighters, strengthen interoperability with the US and fill the gap of the next twenty years. This makes operational sense. Industrially and politically, it is much heavier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

There is also the F-47. If the American sixth-generation program were ever opened to close allies for exports, Germany would consider it. Such an option would put it even deeper into the American architecture. It would get top technology but on American terms. For a country that has been talking for years about European strategic autonomy, this would be a difficult assumption.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

KAAN will knock on the door, KF-21 may make more sense<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is certain that Turkey will also try to step into the gap. The KAAN fighter under development is Ankara’s biggest aviation bet and will be presented as proof that Turkey is moving forward where Europe is confused.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Turks will sell political ambition along with industrial participation. They will tell the Germans that there is an alternative beyond France, Britain and the US.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the German market is tough. The Germans will ask for real data. Engine, sensors, track, software, production capacity, weapons certification, support and operational maturity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

KAAN<\/strong> can develop into a major program, but it still has to prove the most difficult things. Flying a prototype is a big step. Becoming a front-line fighter with mass production is another story.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turkey has every reason to push. It wants customers, partners, technology and political prestige. If it could bring Germany closer to the Turkish program, it would be a huge victory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But this scenario remains difficult. Germany will first move towards solutions with a proven technological basis. It will look to Britain, the US and possibly South Korea before giving weight to a Turkish proposal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This is where the KF-21<\/strong> comes in. South Korea isn\u2019t promising a sixth-generation fighter tomorrow morning. But it has a real aircraft that\u2019s flying, evolving, and in production.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The KF-21 is more of a 4.5-generation fighter with low-observability features and a modern architecture than a fully stealthy F-35-like aircraft. Still, it\u2019s something tangible. Seoul has proven in recent years that it knows how to deliver. Tanks, guns, trainers, missiles, ships, and air systems.<\/p>\n\n\n

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Korean industry moves with a speed, cost, and discipline that many European countries envy. For Germany, a deeper relationship with South Korea could provide an interim solution, industrial cooperation, and a basis for development.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The KF-21 is no substitute for a sixth-generation FCAS. But it can act as a bridge. And Germany needs bridges. If it waits for a new European miracle, it will lose time. If it buys the F-35, it will lose most of its industrial independence. If it enters the GCAP, it will need political humility. If it looks to Korea, it may find something more practical than European theory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Swedish Option<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, it should not be ruled out that Germany’s next moves, always through Airbus, will be oriented towards a partnership with Sweden (which manufactures the Gripen fighter jet) for the development of the new 6th generation fighter.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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