The economic historian Carlo M. Cipolla, examining the entire period from the 11th century onwards, concluded that, except for specific times and regions, the public power of European peoples, in terms of imposed taxation and corresponding collections, never exceeded a percentage of the order of 5-8 percent of national income.\u00b9 <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Even at the start of World War I in 1914, with voting rights already extended across the continent, total government spending in most Western European countries had not exceeded 10 percent of GDP and only rarely\u2014as in Germany\u2014did it exceed 15 percent.\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the 1920s and 1930s, the corresponding figure rose to 20 to 30 percent. By the mid-1970s, it was around 50 percent.\u00b3<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Public sector employment followed the same curve. Until the late 19th century, it rarely exceeded 3 percent of the workforce. Royal ministers and members of parliament were not paid from the public purse\u2014they were supported by private income. By the mid-1970s, public sector employment across Western Europe had reached about 15 percent\u2014a figure that systematically excludes military personnel, hospital staff, employees of social welfare institutions, social security agencies, and nationalized industries.\u2074<\/p>\n\n\n\n
These figures are not disputed. They come from Peter Flora\u2019s State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815\u20131975, the standard reference dataset for European fiscal and administrative history.\u2075<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The question is what changed. The traditional answer is:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, in his book “Democracy \u2013 The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order (Perspectives on Democratic Practice)(2001)<\/em>“, offers a structurally different explanation. What changed was the form of government itself \u2014 and the transition from monarchy to democracy removed the restrictions on state power that had been in place for centuries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Distinction for the First Time of the Duties of the Owner and the Administrator, respectively, that lead to specific policy predictions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoppe applies the economists\u2019 distinction between private and public property to the institution of government itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A monarch owns the government in the same way that a landowner owns property. He can pass it on to his heirs. He benefits from its long-term capital value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A \u201crepresentatively elected democratic\u201d leader is a temporary administrator. He holds office for a fixed term, cannot sell government assets, cannot pocket the revenues, and cannot bequeath his position to his children. He owns the current use of the government\u2019s resources, but not their capital value.<\/p>\n\n\n\n From this single distinction follows a series of policy predictions\u2014each of which is inferred from the structure of incentives, not from historical observation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Policy Predictions<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Policy Prediction 1 <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Policy Prediction 2 <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Policy Prediction 3<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Policy Prediction 4<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Historic Turning Point<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The significance of World War I in Hoppe\u2019s context is that it marks a moment of transition. Before 1914, the world had been overwhelmingly monarchical. Only France and Switzerland were democracies. Only Britain could be described as a parliamentary monarchy, where real power lay with Parliament rather than the Crown. \u2079<\/p>\n\n\n\n The war\u2014driven largely by Woodrow Wilson\u2019s ideological conviction that the world must be made safe for democracy\u2014destroyed the old order within four years.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Even where monarchies survived in name, as in Britain, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries, all governmental power was transferred to parliaments and elected officials. Universal adult suffrage, male and female, became the norm almost everywhere.\u00b9\u2070<\/p>\n\n\n\n A new political form became universal, historically speaking, overnight. What followed can be measured.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Financial and Monetary Empire<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Under the monarchical order,<\/strong><\/em> the world operated with commodities as currency \u2014 usually gold or silver. Kings attempted to devalue their currencies by minting coins, and periodically attempted to introduce paper money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n No monarch has ever managed to establish a permanent monopoly on non-redeemable paper money. No individual, not even a king, was reliable for such a monopoly.\u00b9\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n Only under modern democratic republicanism<\/strong><\/em>\u2014under anonymous, impersonal government\u2014has pure fiat currency become possible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n During World War I, belligerent governments abandoned the gold standard, as they had done during previous wars. Unlike all previous wars, this one did not end with a return to gold.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Instead, from the mid-1920s until 1971, a pseudo-gold standard operated: only the United States redeemed dollars for gold (and from 1933, only at foreign central banks). Britain redeemed pounds for dollars. Everyone else redeemed their currencies for dollars or pounds. This arrangement continued to function with difficulty through a series of currency crises until 1971, when the last link connecting money to gold was severed.\u00b9\u00b3 For the first time in recorded history, the entire world operated exclusively on government paper money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under the British gold standard<\/em>, prices fell continuously:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Money became more valuable over time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under the Democratic-Republican monetary regime,<\/em> the wholesale price index of goods in the United States was:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The money supply tells the same story from behind the scenes.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n From 1845 to 1918\u2014more than seventy years under the commodity standard\u2014the British money supply increased about sixfold.\u00b9\u2076<\/p>\n\n\n\n From 1918 to 1991\u2014seventy-three years under democratic monetary management\u2014the American money supply increased more than sixty-fourfold.\u00b9\u2077<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoppe points out an irony that accurately captures this change. John Law died in disgrace because of his monetary experiments. John Maynard Keynes, who bore comparable responsibility for the collapse of the classical gold standard in the 20th century and whose Bretton Woods system collapsed in 1971, was honored throughout his lifetime and continues to be honored as one of the greatest economists in history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Keynes’s personal philosophy \u2014 summed up in his famous dictum that “in the long run, we’re all dead” \u2014 encapsulates the spirit of the democratic age.\u00b9\u2078<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Public Debt<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Under monarchical rule,<\/strong><\/em> national debts were war debts. They accumulated during conflicts and decreased during peace. The British example is representative: the national debt increased during the wars<\/p>\n\n\n\n But between each war, the total debt actually decreased. From 1815 to 1914 \u2014 a whole century \u2014 the British public debt fell from 900 million to under 700 million pounds.\u00b9\u2079<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under modern \u201crepresentative democratic\u201d government,<\/strong><\/em> the debt increases in wartime as well as in peacetime. There is no period when it does not increase. The British debt amounted to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n The US federal debt was: <\/p>\n\n\n\n This increase was accompanied by a structural reversal. Kings paid higher interest rates on their loans than private commercial borrowers. Lenders understood the risk of lending to a ruler who might default.\u00b2\u00b9<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a democratic government, the relationship is reversed. Government bonds are available at below-market prices because democratic governments can monetize their debts\u2014they create new money to pay their creditors, turning deficit financing into what Hoppe calls a mere banking technicality.\u00b2\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n Interest Rates and Time Preference<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Interest rates reveal something deeper than fiscal policy. They measure what economists call time preference \u2014 the degree to which a society values \u200b\u200bpresent consumption over future provision.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The long-term trend in interest rates<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n The long-term trend in interest rates throughout recorded history has been downward. Since Classical Greece, when interest rates ranged from 16 to 18 percent, they have fallen erratically but steadily. By 1900, minimum long-term interest rates in all European countries had fallen well below 3 percent.\u00b2\u00b3 This was the visible sign of civilization\u2019s progress: an ever-widening horizon of welfare and care.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This trend reversed in the twentieth century. Despite dramatically higher real incomes\u2014which, all else being equal, should have pushed interest rates down\u2014twentieth-century interest rates consistently exceeded nineteenth-century interest rates. Even after adjusting for the inflation premium built into nominal interest rates since the 1970s, real interest rates appear to be hovering around 4 to 5 percent\u2014about the level of fifteenth-century Europe.\u00b2\u2074<\/p>\n\n\n\n Savings rates <\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n Savings rates in the United States, at around 5 percent of disposable income, are comparable to those in seventeenth-century England, when people were incomparably poorer.\u00b2\u2075 The wealth is there. But the future orientation is missing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Use of War under the Two Different Political Systems<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoppe’s analysis of war is where the argument becomes most difficult to dismiss, because the contrast is so stark and so well-documented.<\/p>\n\n\n\n War under the monarchical order was limited by structure. Wars arose from disputes over succession\u2014dynasties would disappear, rival claimants would arise, and conflicts over specific territories would ensue. Because they were disputes over property, they had definite goals and end points. The civilian population was largely uninvolved. Armies were small, professional, expensive to train, and therefore too valuable to lose. Generals avoided hand-to-hand combat whenever possible. A campaign won through maneuver, without significant casualties, was considered the pinnacle of military art.\u00b2\u2076<\/p>\n\n\n\n Military historian Michael Howard noted that in the 18th century, trade, travel, and cultural exchange continued almost unhindered in times of war. Wars were the king’s wars. The citizen’s role was to pay his taxes, and sound political economy dictated that he should be left alone to earn the money with which to pay them. \u00b2\u2077<\/p>\n\n\n\n Guglielmo Ferrero described 18th-century warfare as a system governed by precise rules, in which war was seen as a form of duel between two armies, with the civilian population merely as spectators. Plunder and violence against civilians were forbidden\u2014both in their own country and that of the enemy. Because soldiers were scarce and expensive, commanders tried to avoid combat altogether. War became a game between rulers, with its own rules and its own stakes\u2014a territory, an inheritance, a throne, a treaty.\u00b2\u2078<\/p>\n\n\n\n J.F.C. Fuller attributed this transformation to the French Revolution. When armies became instruments of the people rather than the king, they grew in size and ferocity. National armies fight nations; royal armies fight their own kind. The former obey a mob, always insane; the latter, a king, generally sane. Conscription, introduced by the French Republic in 1793, completely changed the basis of war. Soldiers had been expensive; now they were cheap. Battles were avoided; now they were sought. Within 150 years, Fuller observed, conscription had led the world back to racial barbarity. \u00b2\u2079<\/p>\n\n\n\n William Orton summed up what the twentieth century had destroyed: nineteenth-century wars were limited by the tradition, recognized in international law, that civilian property and business were outside the sphere of combat. Twentieth-century practice abolished all this. The concept of neutrality was denounced. Every kind of commercial activity was jeopardized. Total war became a situation from which no political community could hope to escape. \u00b3\u2070<\/p>\n\n\n\n Welfare and the Destruction of the Family<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The welfare state is the internal expression of the same underlying dynamic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under monarchies,<\/em> <\/strong>more than 50 percent of government spending\u2014which constituted only about 5 percent of the national product\u2014went to the military. The rest covered the administration of the government. Social welfare spending played almost no role. Insurance was a matter of individual responsibility. Poverty relief was left to voluntary charity.\u00b3\u00b9<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under modern \u201crepresentative democratic\u201d government,<\/strong><\/em> military spending has risen to 5\u201310 percent of the national product. But with the government now consuming half of the national product, military spending accounts for only 10\u201320 percent of total government spending. The bulk\u2014usually over 50 percent of all government spending, or about 25 percent of the gross national product\u2014goes to social welfare: compulsory state insurance for sickness, injury, old age, unemployment, and an ever-longer list of conditions. \u00b3\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n The effects spill over into the institutions that previously performed these functions. When the state assumes responsibility for health, aging, and misfortune, the value of marriage, family, and children\u2014the oldest system of mutual insurance\u2014is correspondingly diminished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n For centuries, birth rates in Europe hovered between 30 and 40 per thousand inhabitants, slightly higher in Catholic countries and slightly lower in Protestant ones. During the twentieth century, birth rates across Europe and the United States fell to 15 to 20 per thousand\u2014about half. At the same time, divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births, single-parent families, single people, and abortions have increased. Savings rates have stagnated or declined despite rising incomes. \u00b3\u00b3<\/p>\n\n\n\n These are not just cultural changes. They are predictable reactions to an incentive structure that systematically devalues \u200b\u200bthe family as an institution of long-term welfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Crime<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Throughout the 19th century, crime rates in Western countries were steadily declining. An initial increase in the early decades of urbanization was absorbed and reversed\u2014and the downward trend continued even as rapid urbanization continued for another century. When crime rates began their systematic upward trajectory in the mid-20th century, urbanization had actually slowed.\u00b3\u2074<\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoppe attributes this reversal to two features of modern \u201crepresentative democratic\u201d governance:<\/p>\n\n\n\n A high preference for the present does not equate to criminality\u2014it is also expressed in recklessness, unreliability, laziness, and hedonism. However, there is a structural relationship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Earning income from the market requires patience, planning, and delaying gratification. Most serious criminal activities\u2014murder, assault, robbery, theft\u2014require none of these.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Reward is immediate; punishment is future and uncertain. When the general orientation of a society shifts toward the present, the frequency of these crimes increases accordingly. \u00b3\u2075<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Vanishing Discrimination<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n There is an obvious objection to all this. Much has changed between the 19th and 20th centuries\u2014industrialization, urbanization, technology, two world wars. Any of these could explain the trends Hoppe identifies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His framework addresses the objection in two ways.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1.<\/strong> The first is theoretical. It does not simply observe correlations and guess at causes. It draws specific predictions from the incentive structures inherent in private versus public ownership of government<\/p>\n\n\n\n and then tests each prediction against historical data. All are confirmed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. <\/strong>The second is a mechanism that explains why modern \u201crepresentative democratic\u201d government specifically weakens resistance to state growth.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under monarchy,<\/em><\/strong> the distinction between rulers and ruled is sharp. Everyone knows who is king and who is not. A clear class consciousness develops among the ruled\u2014an instinctive solidarity against the expansion of state power. Bertrand de Jouvenel made the same observation: under the old regime, those who had no hope of participating in power were quick to denounce the slightest violation of their rights. \u00b3\u2076<\/p>\n\n\n\n Modern \u201crepresentative democracy\u201d<\/strong><\/em> dissolves this resistance. When anyone can become president, the line between ruler and ruled blurs. The illusion is created that no one is governed\u2014that everyone governs himself. No one is interested in limiting a position to which he may one day aspire, or in putting sand in a machine that he hopes to operate when his turn comes. Taxation and regulation that once seemed clearly oppressive seem much less oppressive when anyone can, in theory, join the ranks of those who impose the tax. \u00b3\u2077<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is the mechanism. Not a conspiracy. Not coordinated malice. A structural property of the institution, operating independently of the intentions of any individual politician.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Dissolution of Law<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A further dimension deserves attention, because it concerns the way in which property rights \u2014 the foundation of civilization in Hoppe\u2019s framework \u2014 have been systematically eroded.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Under the monarchical order,<\/strong><\/em> law was seen as something to be discovered and applied, not invented. Kings functioned as judges, not legislators. They accepted the pre-existing body of private property law and bound themselves by it. Even in the early twentieth century, the British jurist Albert V. Dicey could argue that in Great Britain public or administrative law \u2014 as opposed to private law \u2014 did not exist. State officials were considered bound by the same rules and subject to the same laws as any private individual. \u00b3\u2078<\/p>\n\n\n\n After World War I, under the modern \u201crepresentative democratic republicanism,\u201d<\/strong><\/em> public officials gained immunity from the provisions of private law. The socialist legal theorist Gustav Radbruch formulated the new view: private law was to be regarded simply as a temporary and ever-diminishing field of private initiative, temporarily excluded from the overall sphere of public law. \u00b3\u2079 The reversal was complete. Law was a limitation on power. Now law was an instrument of power. What had been a set of universal, immutable principles was transformed into a flood of legislation\u2014tens of thousands of new rules every year, creating what Hoppe describes as a legal inflationary tendency corresponding to monetary law.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Jouvenel captured the final point precisely: today it is understood that our subjective rights are precarious and depend on the goodwill of power.\u2074\u2070<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Proposed Solution<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Hoppe is clear that a return to monarchy is neither possible nor desirable. The legitimacy of monarchical rule has been irretrievably lost, and monarchy itself was never the solution \u2014 it was simply a form of government whose structural incentives happened to lead to more moderate outcomes than the form it replaced. And monarchies exploit. They just exploit less.<\/p>\n\n\n\n His proposal is more radical than restoration. The idea of \u200b\u200bmodern \u201crepresentative democratic-republican\u201d government must be rendered intellectually untenable \u2014 as ridiculous as the idea of \u200b\u200bmonarchical government is today. Not by replacing it with another form of government, but by recognizing that government itself, in any form, is not the source of human civilization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Government, whether monarchical or modern \u201crepresentative democratic,\u201d draws parasitically on the wealth created by private property. Modern \u201crepresentative democratic\u201d government draws from it more quickly, more aggressively, and with less resistance than any previous form.\u2074\u00b9<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the other extreme \u2014 a world with tens of thousands of independent territories, regions, cantons, city-states, and free cities, such as the current peculiarities of Monaco, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Hong Kong, and Singapore \u2014 competitive pressure would impose a discipline that no single large government can replicate.\u2074\u00b2<\/p>\n\n\n\n Only in small communities, Hoppe argues, can natural elites emerge: individuals whose economic independence, professional achievement, and moral conduct secure voluntary authority\u2014recognized authority, freely accepted, the kind that can support a system of competing judges and overlapping jurisdictions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A private law society. Not a monarchy. Not a modern \u201crepresentative democracy.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n Something that has never fully existed, but elements of which can be observed in the remnants of decentralized order that persist even today, in the realm of international trade and travel, where private arbitration and voluntary cooperation operate outside the reach of the state.\u2074\u00b3<\/p>\n\n\n\n Whether this is utopian or practical is one question. Whether the diagnosis is accurate is another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The traditional narrative of the twentieth century is that democracy liberated humanity from the tyranny of kings and ushered in an era of progress. Hoppe does not question liberation. He questions progress.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n References-Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9 Carlo M. Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution: European Society and Economy, 1000\u20131700 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1980), p. 48.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2 Peter Flora, State, Economy, and Society in Western Europe 1815\u20131975: A Data Handbook (London: Macmillan, 1983), vol. 1, chap. 8. See also Flora, pp. 258\u201359 on the introduction of income tax: the United Kingdom from 1843, France from 1873, Italy 1877, Norway 1892, the Netherlands 1894, Austria 1898, Sweden 1903, the U.S. 1913, Switzerland 1916, Germany 1924.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3 Flora, State, Economy, and Society, chap. 8.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2074 Flora, State, Economy, and Society, chap. 5. Government employment figures by country: Austria rose from less than 3 percent of the labor force in 1900 to almost 15 percent by the mid-1970s; France from 3 percent to about 15 percent; Germany from 5 percent to close to 15 percent? the United Kingdom from less than 3 percent to close to 15 percent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2075 Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2076 Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy \u2013 The God That Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order (Perspectives on Democratic Practice) (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2001), chap. 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2077 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1. On the impossibility of economic calculation under public ownership, see Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s Edition (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2078 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2079 Ibid., Introduction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2070 Ibid. The successor states created after World War I: Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia all adopted democratic-republican constitutions, with Yugoslavia the sole exception.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u00b9 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u00b2 Ibid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u00b3 Ibid. See also Murray N. Rothbard, What Has Government Done to Our Money? (Auburn, Ala.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1990); Henry Hazlitt, From Bretton Woods to World Inflation (Chicago: Regnery, 1984).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2074 B.R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 468ff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2075 Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992). 1930 = 100 for pre-WWII figures? 1983 = 100 for later figures. See also Ron Paul and Lewis Lehrman, The Case for Gold: A Minority Report to the U.S. Gold Commission (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1982), p. 165f.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2076 Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, p. 444f.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2077 Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867\u20131960 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 704\u201322; and Economic Report of the President, 1992.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2078 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1, footnotes. See also Joseph T. Salerno, “Two Traditions in Modern Monetary Theory: John Law and A.R.J. Turgot,” Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines 2, no. 2\/3 (1991).<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b9\u2079 Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1991), pp. 188 and 437.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2070 Jonathan Hughes, American Economic History (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1990), pp. 432, 498, and 589. See also Homer and Sylla, A History of Interest Rates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u00b9 Douglass C. North and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), p. 96. See also Homer and Sylla, pp. 5, 99, 106, 113f.<\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u00b2 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1. See also Murray N. Rothbard, The Mystery of Banking (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1983), chap. 11.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u00b3 Homer and Sylla, A History of Interest Rates, pp. 553\u201358.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2074 Ibid., pp. 554\u201355.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2075 Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, p. 39. Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2076 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2077 Michael Howard, War in European History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), chap. 4.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2078 Guglielmo Ferrero, Peace and War (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), pp. 5\u20137. See also J.F.C. Fuller, The Conduct of War (New York: Da Capo Press, 1992), pp. 20\u201325.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b2\u2079 J.F.C. Fuller, War and Western Civilization (London: Duckworth, 1932), pp. 26\u201327; The Conduct of War, pp. 33, 35.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2070 William A. Orton, The Liberal Tradition: A Study of the Social and Spiritual Conditions of Freedom (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1969), pp. 251\u201352.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u00b9 Cipolla, Before the Industrial Revolution, pp. 54\u201355. Flora, State, Economy, and Society, chap. 8.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u00b2 Flora, State, Economy, and Society, chap. 8, p. 454.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u00b3 B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics 1750\u20131970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 16ff. See also Allan C. Carlson, Family Questions: Reflections on the American Social Crises (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1988).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2074 James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime and Human Nature (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2075 Hoppe, Democracy, chap. 1.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2076 Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power: The Natural History of its Growth (New York: Viking, 1949), pp. 9\u201310.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2077 Ibid.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2078 Albert V. Dicey, Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth Century (London: Macmillan, 1903). See also Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), vol. 1, chaps. 4 and 6; Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1961).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u00b3\u2079 Gustav Radbruch, Der Mensch im Recht (G\u00f6ttingen: Vandenhoeck, 1957), p. 40.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n \u2074\u2070 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry into the Political Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 189.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n
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