![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/image-28.png\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The existence of a steel Spartan sword is not disputed. But the question that arises is whether the sword played the role attributed to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And the answer is clearly no. The Spartans could not have performed this military miracle with the sword.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First, Herodotus clearly informs us that they performed it with the spear, having the sword as an auxiliary weapon, and especially on the last day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Second, it would be simply impossible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Many researchers are confused with other eras, in which the sword, thanks to the flexibility it allows the warrior, could be the instrument of mass slaughter (e.g. in Roman victories).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But this presupposes an opponent who fights relatively openly, and tries to escape.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The sword is extremely inconvenient in dense formations, and with a short range.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And it is certain that at Thermopylae the Spartans, and all the Greeks, fought in extremely dense formation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Not only because it was a narrow space. But also because a tight coalition was required to repel the Persian arrows and deal with the numerous opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Any opening allows the one who has the numerical superiority to attack one of the opponent’s men with two of his own, which leads with mathematical precision to the extermination of one of them, especially if both are armed precisely for such individual and chaotic combat, as the Persians were.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition to confronting the numerical superiority of the enemy, the monolithic nature of the Greek formations also provided a synergistic advantage: the endurance and effectiveness of a united phalanx against light infantry attacking frontally is much greater than the sum of the effectiveness of its men in a sparser formation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
At Thermopylae, therefore, the Spartans not only did not fight openly, so as to use swords (Herodotus tells us), but they could not have done so either.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
When they were forced to do so, at the end of the third day, they were defeated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is emphasized that Herodotus mentions, precisely to show the necessity of dense and impeccable formation on the part of the Greeks, that only the Spartans did something different, breaking up the phalanx into small groups that retreated in disorder, in order to attract the Persians.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is very clear: Individual flight and flight in groups took place, but, when the Persians fell into the trap, the small groups and units formed a dense and unbroken phalanx in order to make an offensive return and strike the less \u201csolid\u201d, pursuing and surprising enemies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
So we know that the secret in the battle of Thermopylae was not the sword, not only because it was not used extensively for the battle \u2013 as far as we know \u2013 but because it could not even be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But could it have been the spear? Could this impressive performance (which was partially repeated at Plataea) be attributed to a certain extent to steel metallurgy not for Spartan swords, but for Spartan steel spears?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
According to many researchers (e.g. Snodgrass, “Offensive and Defensive Weapons of the Ancient Greeks”) but also with archaeological findings, the spear (i.e. its tip) was the second weapon in the manufacture of which copper was replaced by iron in Greece.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The first was the sword. It is very logical that steel would also replace iron in the spear, because the importance of the spear had increased compared to the sword at the time of the transition to steel, and was greater than during the transition from copper to simple iron.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Therefore, since the main offensive weapon of the Spartans was the spear, it is expected that it had a steel tip, if not before the conversion of the sword to steel, at least simultaneously or, at least, immediately after.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The steel spearhead is quite easy to manufacture compared to other weapons and equipment (e.g. swords) and requires less metal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It was the ideal solution for Sparta, and completely feasible. So if Sparta had steel, it would appear in absolute priority in swords and spears, and not necessarily in that order.<\/p>\n\n\n
![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/image-30.png\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But can a steel tip have such a big difference and be a tactical advantage of great importance compared to bronze or simple iron?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In swords, the steel composition is of enormous importance due to the impact and crushing blows during swordplay, since enemy swords are broken and enemy armor is cut or broken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In spears, with the piercing blow, can a steel tip have such a terrible impact?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is a given that a short-range weapon can achieve a deadly piercing blow on a human target, especially an unarmored one, having a clearly softer or more fragile tip than a steel one, especially if the weapon’s scabbard is of good quality.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Besides, for this reason, spears and javelins with a stone tip or even a shaped tip from the wood itself are perfectly useful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, a good, well-maintained tip made of hard and durable metal provides a number of extremely useful advantages, especially in conditions of high combat intensity and narrow space, as occurred in the battle at Thermopylae, but also at Plataea.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
First of all, the shaft of the tip, where the hilt enters, is much more resistant to attempts to break it by crushing weapons or by hand grips. At Plataea we know that both methods were used against Spartan spears by the Persians, with questionable results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Secondly, the high-hardness tip accelerates the penetration of armor and target for a given thrust force and hilt strength.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This has obvious consequences when the opponent is wearing armor, metal or otherwise, and many Persians had armor, either plated or linen, or even scaly armor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The harder point pierces the armor, while the softer one breaks or bends on it more easily, or, finally, dulls it (in the case of soft armor).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With these data, the importance of the steel point in the superiority of the Spartans over all other Greek armies of the time, with their capable armor and heavy hoplite shields, is obvious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
What is not obvious is what happens even without strong armor. The speed of penetration reduces the penetration time, resulting in minimizing the transverse oscillations that weaken the weapon (especially the bore and the hilt).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Thus, a weapon with a harder tip will withstand many more penetrations before breaking, compared to one with a softer tip, which returns part of the impact energy back to the weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Furthermore, for a shield-wielding opponent, the faster the penetration, the less transverse movement of the shield between the moment of its penetration and the blow to the torso of its bearer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
It is clear that if the spear slowly passes the shield, by moving it vertically the bearer can break it (even if it wounds him), disarming his opponent – the Iliad in the duel of Menelaus and Paris shows another side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The slow penetration gives the target time to shift relative to the trajectory of the weapon and escape, either by moving himself or by moving the shield perpendicular to the trajectory of the enemy spear. This advantage was the “key” to the Battle of Thermopylae.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With their steel tips, Spartan spears killed much more frequently per given number of thrusts than iron-tipped spears in the same hands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They also lasted for many more thrusts and were much more difficult to deflect or break from blows from impact and crushing weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Their thrusting power probably allowed them to deliver critical blows to hard anatomical points, such as the head, where softer weapons would be deflected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Head blows limited the usefulness of the Persian shield, exploited the lack and\/or inadequacy of Persian head protection, created panic in the opponent and were always fatal, in contrast to blows to the torso, in which clothing, shield, armor, the opponent’s persistence or other anatomical factors might render the blow ineffective and require a follow-up, a process that exposed the warrior and strained the weapon.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
With a good operator and against a dense formation of opponents with little or no armor, as were many Persians and other allies, Spartan spears could perhaps kill two opponents in a row with a single powerful thrust, as depicted in the comic series “300” by F. Miller.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The impact that the blows we have just mentioned had on the morale of the Persians and the Medes is self-evident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Instead of an epilogue, let us ask ourselves something: Up until Thermopylae, the Persians, having exactly the same armament and using exactly the same tactics, swept the Greeks in field battles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Marathon was an exception, with the tactical maneuver that ultimately exposed the Persian-Mede division to blows from Athenian spears in the rear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Could it be that the difference at Thermopylae and Plataea, in relation to other frontal conflicts, lies precisely in the greater durability, prolonged lethality and astonishing immediate effectiveness of the Spartan steel-tipped spears?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Do Herodotus and all those who attribute the victory at Plataea to the \u201cDorian (basically Spartan) spear\u201d know or sense something? We believe that, based on new data, Spartan steel, as a material for making spear tips and not swords \u2013 a secret stolen, according to Herodotus, and well guarded thanks to the practice of xenelia \u2013 played some, perhaps important, role (although perhaps not decisive) in the outcome of the Second Persian War, along with the Spartan war machine and the general Greek armed effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Spartans and Special Operations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Diodorus, writing half a millennium after Herodotus, describes the Spartan operation to assassinate Xerxes as a major nighttime tactical attack (Polyaenus speaks of a special operation, writing almost 1,000 years after the events).<\/p>\n\n\n\n In general, Diodorus is not very reliable, but in this particular matter his own account should be preferred.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Herodotus did indeed experience the events and spoke with protagonists, especially Spartans. He had been to Sparta (only in this way would he have known the names of the 300, from the monument there).<\/p>\n\n\n\n But in his time Sparta and Athens were at war, and it is a given that the Spartans, renowned for their secrecy, would not have given away sensitive information.<\/p>\n\n\n\n They would never tell the historian that they were accustomed to unconventional and special operations, and even on a scale of experts. They had such a reputation throughout Greece (Delphi advised the Argives to beware of machinations in 494 BC, while special operations are already attested from the first Messenian War, with a nighttime capture of a city before declaring war).<\/p>\n\n\n\n Based on this, we can look at Herodotus\u2019 descriptions with a different eye, which otherwise make no sense. For example, while the Battle of Thermopylae is taking place, and of course Thessaly is under Persian occupation, a Spartan (Pandite) loses the Battle of Thermopylae, because\u2026 he was going as a messenger to Thessaly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What kind of messenger exactly goes to enemy territory, behind enemy forces?<\/p>\n\n\n\n Only someone who carries out special warfare-espionage missions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Behind enemy lines he could never be accused of being late, so why was he treated so badly in Sparta that he committed suicide?<\/p>\n\n\n\n These suicides are a bit strange, as is the care with which the Spartans took to announce these incidents to the public.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is much more likely that the bad behavior was due to the failure of his mission, and that his murder (e.g. by Crypteia) was covered up as a suicide and was done to shut him up regarding issues that might have been “burning” influential people in Sparta.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The action behind enemy lines and the execution could perhaps be associated with the attempted assassination of Xerxes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Panditis probably had the mission of targeting Xerxes, going to Thessaly and infiltrating his camp as a Thessalian.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Possibly, the failure of the venture was attributed to him, in order to cover up some other fundamental incompetence or betrayal in the Spartan secret war mechanism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Another special mission could be considered the organization of a guerrilla (Artabazus in the battle of Plataea seems to be very afraid of it), and more generally the interruption of Xerxes’ supply, knowledge of the timing of the movements of his forces, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Athenian Critias, leader of the Thirty Tyrants, attempted, about 100 years later, to arm and incite the “Peneste” (equivalent to the Helots) against their masters.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would not be at all surprising if Panditis attempted something similar, in order to overthrow the Thessalian aristocracy that was losing its way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Such an operation was very delicate: the Spartans were openly pro-aristocratic and anti-mob, and would have created a precedent of rebellion among subject populations, with a possible result of helot war (it happened in 464 BC).<\/p>\n\n\n\n A second such case is Eurytus and Aristodemus, who, while the dominant theory wants them to be absent for health reasons, there is another that also considers them messengers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is very possible that one was killed because he rushed and caught the battle, while the other was delayed, but it is more likely that the survival of the second was a nuisance, because he had some knowledge of things that were communicated, even of the simple fact of the message\/communication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, no particular importance is given to the dispatch of three spies to Sardis before the crossing of the Hellespont, namely in the winter of 481 to 480 BC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Herodotus does not mention their names, a perfectly understandable practice that means that even then (while some years had passed since the event) the current principles of information and source security were in force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The silence is rather reminiscent of Sparta: in a corresponding Athenian operation we learn the names of the agents, although it was carried out much more recently in Herodotus’ time and should normally have been classified as Current Secret.<\/p>\n\n\n\n These spies successfully infiltrated, recorded the necessary information, but were captured before they returned, which is clearly reminiscent of Cold War espionage stories and refers to a regular war of secret services, and specifically military secret services, since Xerxes was notified after a feast about the trial and conviction of the spies \u2013 and, apparently, completely by chance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In conclusion, the Spartans certainly had a special inclination for secret operations, both special warfare and internal security, but also information gathering.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is easily deduced from Herodotus, while many points highlighted by later narratives may be due to the relaxation of current secrecy, in contrast to Herodotus’ time, when secrecy was in full force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is recalled that in 430 BC the Athenians believed, according to Thucydides, that the Peloponnesians were polluting their wells and that for this reason the plague broke out \u2013 and perhaps they were not wrong\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, they certainly considered the Spartans (and secondarily the rest of the Peloponnesians) capable of such ventures and operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Diodorus\u2019s reference to the attempted assassination of Xerxes, as well as Polyaenus\u2019s reference to the Spartans\u2019 raid to devastate the Malia plain, before Xerxes arrived, is rejected without any examination by new scholars, because \u201cthe Spartans had neither the education nor the logical and operational thinking of the (British) Long Range Desert Patrols\u201d!<\/p>\n\n\n\n And this is said without shame about the only city that had a secret police, an advanced secret intelligence gathering service, that conducted night operations for internal security, but also for attacking enemy target cities, that offered many years of destructive unorthodox training with the institution of theft to the members of its martial class and enjoyed a greater reputation for the mechanisms, skill and cunning of its men in war than for their legendary bravery, discipline and efficiency.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First, the Spartans had a glorious tradition of ventures, from special operations and night occupations of fortresses in the Messenian Wars (sometimes with one of the two Kings at the head of the special units) to the eponymous oracle of Delphi to the Argives in 494 BC. to watch out for the machines (which eventually crashed in the battle of Sepia).<\/p>\n\n\n\n They had a proud tradition of exceptional maneuvers, as evidenced by the amphibious invasion of Attica in 511 BC, the maneuver through a mountainous route in 510 BC again in Attica, the amphibious overcoming of an obstacle in Argolis in 494 BC. After the Medes, operations of this type continued (an attempt at a surprise amphibious raid against Piraeus and the burning of the Athenian fleet during the Peloponnesian War).<\/p>\n\n\n\n But even later, during the Sparta-Thebes conflict, there is, for example, the surprise capture of Cadmeia, the new attempt to capture Piraeus, but also the exceptional strategic bluffs in the campaign in Asia in 396 BC.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It is absolutely unacceptable for younger researchers, with the entire history of Sparta before them, to have doubts about the ability of the Spartans \u2013 trained for years in solitary outdoor living and assassinations, in invisible surveillance of space and the tracking of people, in the use of information networks and absolute discipline \u2013 to have fully functional secret war services and a sophisticated special operations doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Secondly, the Spartans in particular WERE also men for special missions, trained in special operations and not only because of Cryptia. They had a vast history of exploits, so the raid against Xerxes was feasible and likely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The two brothers of Xerxes who were killed at Thermopylae were not leaders of any division mentioned at the beginning of Herodotus’s History.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Furthermore, the leaders of Persian units were rarely killed, unless a tragic defeat occurred with the capture of their camp, as happened at Mycale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mardonius, who was killed fighting at Plataea (as was Masistius), was an exception. The death of two royal brothers who are not mentioned by Herodotus as commanders of any Persian unit in a battle in which the geometry was dictated by the Persians, combined with the otherwise state of Xerxes that led to the uncharacteristic behavior towards Leonidas’ corpse (something that Herodotus, who knew the customs of both sides, cannot explain) means that there was personal anger, and this is explained if he himself was in danger.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Perhaps Diodorus, who mentions a night attack, is not right (although the accession far out, on the plain, that Herodotus mentions for the last day at Thermopylae may conceal something like this) and Polyaenus, who mentions a night raid, is the one who is more right.<\/p>\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n The attack the next day was made late, at noon, against the defenders of the strait, not because Xerxes was waiting for Hydarnes (this would have entailed the risk that the last defenders would retreat and disengage if they learned of the maneuver), but in order to restore order from the raid of the previous night and the confusion it caused.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We must consider another issue: whether it is possible to consider, from the scant information we have, that the Greeks had such sophisticated and diversified tactical thinking and operational capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n P. Green clearly believes fully in the ability of the Greeks to clearly perceive the strategic conditions of the modern era and to act accordingly, as well as to conduct complex operations with a significant degree of difficulty and spatio-temporal continuity and correlation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Others believe that many of the events were matters of luck or miscalculation based on completely primitive parameters: Marathon happened because Miltiades made a mistake in deploying the phalanx, resulting in the wings being reinforced because\u2026 there were excess men or, at best, they were deeper in response to the threat of the Persian cavalry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The double overrun thus occurred as an accident in the breakdown of the center.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At Plataea, Pausanias “lost his compass” and his army, but once he found himself isolated he managed to react, because now he was “commanding a scale of forces similar to that to which he was accustomed, and not three times as large, as was the case before”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n First of all, however annoying it may be, the Spartans (and the Athenians) were not stupid and naive, because they did not have military schools and other luxuries of modern societies, especially that of the aristocrat-professional military and militarist of the 19th century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Incidentally, the Spartans may have foreseen the education of the young by the elders in these matters, and later the Athenians certainly did: Xenophon mentions teachers of \u201cTactics\u201d and Socrates is said to have known the other necessary subjects of knowledge of a general in addition to Tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So the knowledge existed and, to be taught at that time for hire and publicly, it would have existed from earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And if it existed, it was spread from the moment it was not considered a state or religious secret \u2013 in contrast to the Chinese writings on strategy. Herodotus estimates Persian losses at Thermopylae at around 20,000. Most importantly, no distinguished Greek peltasts are mentioned at Plataea, while the \u201cbarren Mardonius\u201d was…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":27489,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2362,7,2846],"tags":[7736,4702,7735,7737,7738,5722],"class_list":["post-27487","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-military-science","category-research","category-wars-battles","tag-480-bc","tag-ancient-greece","tag-battle-of-thermopylae","tag-secret-weapons","tag-special-operations","tag-special-operations-force"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27487","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=27487"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27487\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":27493,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/27487\/revisions\/27493"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/27489"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=27487"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=27487"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=27487"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/01\/image-32.png\")
<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
<\/p>\n\n\n\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"