{"id":23580,"date":"2025-04-03T23:28:37","date_gmt":"2025-04-03T20:28:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=23580"},"modified":"2025-04-03T23:28:37","modified_gmt":"2025-04-03T20:28:37","slug":"why-cant-russia-score-a-decisive-victory-in-ukraine-and-end-the-war","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=23580","title":{"rendered":"Why can&#8217;t Russia score a decisive victory in Ukraine and end the &#8220;war&#8221;?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>After three years of war and especially in the last 22 months, Russia may have an operational initiative on the 1200 km long front, but it is common knowledge that it cannot achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine and end the \u201cgame\u201d? Why?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Why \u201cdoes it take a year or two to capture a city when in World War II it did it in one or two weeks?\u201d<\/em> many wonder, citing the example of Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Chasiv Yar or Pokrovsk and many other areas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>And how is it possible to \u201cadvance\u201d when they have not even approached Kharkov, from which it left in March 2022, after a year of fighting that began again inside Ukraine?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Or when key cities Objectives, such as Slavyansk, Izium or Liman, are still in Ukrainian hands and at the rate the Russians are advancing it will take at least another three years to return them to Russian hands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The main reason for the slow Russian progress (when they do not accept invasions of Russian territory in Kursk or Belgorod, is that the Russian forces even today in absolute numbers are at a disadvantage compared to the Ukrainian ones or at most are on par.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They are unable to gain local superiority because, for example, they do not use airlift tactics, nor even vertical overrunning of the Ukrainian forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If we do not consider that they have a tactical inability to do so on a large scale, as happened, for example, in February 2022 in Kiev, with an incredible operation that should be taught in all military schools on the planet, it is clear that they are conserving their forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They prefer a war of attrition, rather than large operations. However, to break the front they need much more than the approximately 500,000 soldiers that alternate on the front line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As is known and as taught in military schools, the attacker must have a ratio of at least 3 to 1 against the defender and in many cases even 5 to 1. In the Ukrainian conflict the forces are approximately equal in numbers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><em>Why aren\u2019t they recruiting more than the 300,000 Russian soldiers who were drafted in late 2022 and early 2023?<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Theoretically, Russian President Vladimir Putin could recruit up to 1 million conscripts, but that would cause great upheaval in Russian society, which he has managed to keep calm so far.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>He is also seeking to keep the level of casualties to a tolerable level. According to reliable estimates, which the Russians themselves admit, there must be around 100,000 dead and clearly more wounded. That\u2019s not a small number.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In Vietnam, 55,000 deaths after ten years of war caused the greatest change since World War II in American society, with a population of 280,000,000 (at the time) people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Today, Russia&#8217;s population is exactly half that (142,000,000 plus 5 million Russian speakers in Novorossia) and the losses are certainly twice as high as those of Vietnam in 1\/3 of the year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>If there were no different treatment, let&#8217;s say a different mentality, of the inhabitants of Russia from that of the USA, the consequences would be particularly serious in Russian society and the political scene.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>This is not what Russian leader V. Putin wants at all. He prefers a war of attrition, rather than a large mobilization that would also lead to large losses. But the number of personnel and means on the battlefield today is not enough for quick victories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>As far as the battlefield is concerned, the value of the two opponents is considered to be approximately equivalent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Both are Slavs with the well-known characteristics of strength and endurance and use the same weapons. What do the Russians excel at? They excel in the industrial base as they produce more than they consume in drones and missile systems and in general in weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They also have absolute air superiority which they do not exploit for fear of fighter losses because these losses are irreparable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>They have open fighter production lines but their production is limited and in no way can it be compared to that of the USA or China<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The greatest success of the Russian armed forces and the Russian weapons production base was its adaptation to new operational conditions:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Mass production of FPV<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mass production of all types of classic drones, both attack and reconnaissance. At the beginning of the war, there was not a single type of combat drone in the Russian armed forces<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Mass utilization of FAB bombs with kits that convert the abundant, but old classic bombs into guided weapons<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Return to service and partial upgrade of about 2,000 main battle tanks from the T-54\/-55 to the T-80<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Training of units in the operational use (doctrine) of FPV something completely unknown to the Russian Army in 2022.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>The truth is that with the war in Ukraine the Russians saw their weaknesses and are now working to eliminate them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In any case, with today&#8217;s data, the Russians will need another two years to achieve a decisive victory. Only the conquer of Kharkov or Odessa is defined as such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The latter in particular would offer Russia its connection with Transnistria, which in such a case would be easily integrated into Russian territory.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>After three years of war and especially in the last 22 months, Russia may have an operational initiative on the 1200 km long front,&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2362,7,3830],"tags":[6763,58,2354,1156,3713,1976,3395],"class_list":["post-23580","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-military-science","category-research","category-war-in-ukraine","tag-fpv","tag-russia","tag-russian-army","tag-ukraine","tag-ukrainian-army","tag-war","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23580","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=23580"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23580\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":23582,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/23580\/revisions\/23582"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=23580"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=23580"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=23580"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}