The world may be consumed in the West, but in the East there seems to be an alliance that is off the radar. India, the world\u2019s fastest-growing economy, is also growing in its understanding of itself. And as it does so, its \u201cgrand strategy\u201d\u2014the way it sees its place in the world\u2014is being shaped in large part by China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
China looms ever larger in India\u2019s strategic consciousness, and it is China\u2019s rise that is likely the primary factor influencing India\u2019s grand strategy today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Five are the goals that have defined India\u2019s \u201cgrand strategy\u201d since 1947 (the year of its independence) until today:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. <\/strong>Strengthening India at home, militarily and economically, is the number one priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> The second is ensuring a stable neighborhood, which has been a major challenge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3.<\/strong> Maintaining a balance of power is India\u2019s third priority.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 4.<\/strong> The fourth is addressing legacy issues related to the partition of India, which led to the formation of Pakistan and created larger regional consequences.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 5.<\/strong> The fifth is to support India\u2019s adequate participation in global rule-making institutions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Today’s India has more opportunities and resources to achieve these goals than it has ever had before.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Articulating India’s Grand Strategy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Every great power has a grand strategy that sets its trajectory, looking 20 to 25 years ahead. Along with its planning for economic, technological, and military development, the grand strategy details a country’s national ethos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n How much of a nation’s strategy is revealed depends on the purpose attributed to it by that nation. For example,<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s grand strategy has rarely been explicitly articulated, and various writers have attempted to articulate the country\u2019s vision. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has termed India\u2019s strategy as \u201cViksit Bharat 2047.\u201d The phrase \u201cViksit Bharat,\u201d which means \u201cdeveloped India,\u201d conveys the Indian government\u2019s vision of transforming the country into a self-reliant and prosperous economy by 2047. \u03a4he areas identified in Viksit Bharat 2027 as \u201csoft areas of the grand strategy.\u201d Meanwhile, many of India\u2019s security-related issues are being kept under wraps and not disclosed, he said. Some of the unknown areas involve China. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The Biggest Obstacle – China<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Despite its potential, India faces many challenges in achieving its grand strategy. China looms large among them, which they define as a major challenge to India\u2019s rise on the world stage. Geography and history provide the context for the challenge from China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China challenges each of India\u2019s grand strategy goals. The biggest obstacle to each of these five goals today, arguably, is China. Thus, China is the biggest obstacle to India\u2019s defense procurement, its technology policy, its trade policy, its industrial policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Since 2009, India has seen China as a \u201clong-term threat\u201d to its strategic plans. He defined short-term threat as a threat within five years, medium-term as 15 years and long-term as a threat with a time frame of about 35 years. It was in 2009 that the Indian position shifted to a two-front war \u2013 meaning against Pakistan and China \u2013 \u201cbelow the nuclear threshold\u201d, because both are nuclear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But this is the strategy of the armed forces, rather than the national strategy given that India faces enormous challenges from China on all other fronts. In the context of India\u2019s grand strategy, the China factor is \u201cuncertain or even negative\u201d because of the territorial dispute with India. This dispute is long-term.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is not going to be resolved [in the short term]. So you have to factor China into the territorial dispute in grand strategy. At the same time, there is active competition in India’s neighborhood – in countries like Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Meanwhile, the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific has also been altered by China’s rise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The involvement of other countries<\/p>\n\n\n\n India is working with other countries to address this. Even in international institutions, China is trying to block India\u2019s rise. China is ultimately the major power most responsible for blocking, say, UN Security Council reform, India\u2019s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group on certain trade issues and things like that. There is a conflict of interest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But India\u2019s role in global institutions is growing. During its 2023 presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) international forum, it played a critical role in an expanded BRICS and other global governance platforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, China is using a two-pronged approach to challenge this growing influence. India\u2019s democracy and its inclusive model of global governance make it attractive, he said.<\/p>\n\n\n\n However, China\u2019s sheer economic size and influence pose a challenge for New Delhi to navigate global institutions. China\u2019s grand strategy is to be number one: to replace the United States, in particular. Beijing also wants to be number one in Asia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But there are powers in Asia\u2014India, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam\u2014that can compete for that influence and do not want China to reduce their footprint.<\/p>\n\n\n\n China\u2019s role in South Asia, Southeast Asia, where it wants to marginalize India, is not acceptable to India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s grand strategy will therefore involve countering Chinese grand strategy in terms of territorial issues and competition in Asia. There are many elements to the strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Looking Towards a Multipolar World<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n With its rapid economic growth, India is projected to be the world\u2019s third-largest economy by 2030, behind the United States and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity describe three systems of geopolitical power distribution for the three likely leading global economies of the next two decades: the United States, China, and India.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A unipolar world is dominated by one power, a bipolar world is dominated by two great powers, and in a multipolar world, power is distributed among many states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s grand strategy must be understood in the context of its expectations that it will join the list of leading global powers in the near future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The United States \u201cis number one.\u201d In an ideal world, the United States wants a unipolar world. But it has a clear competitor in China today. Meanwhile, China\u2014despite its long-term ambition for a unipolar world in which it is number one\u2014recognizes the bipolarity of today\u2019s world. Its ambition to be the leading global power does not contradict this recognition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n When China says it wants a new type of great-power relationship, or talks to avoid the Thucydides Trap, it is in fact acknowledging a bipolar world, but asking the United States not to challenge it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Thucydides Trap is the theory\u2014made popular by Harvard scholar Graham Allison\u2014that when a rising world power threatens a dominant one, war often results.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Moreover, India, being number three, wants a multipolar world. \u201cSo essentially that part of it just depends on where they sit. While China supports multilateralism on some issues and forums, its support is aimed at mitigating American influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India, on the other hand, aims to create a more inclusive global order. India wants to create an externally favorable security environment for its economic rise, and its support for a multipolar world order recognizes the interdependence of economies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Broadening its basket of economic partners, without compromising its core security interests, is at the heart of India\u2019s support for effective multilateralism in a multipolar world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Rise<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n With India\u2019s imminent rise as the world\u2019s third-largest economy, a new global economic paradigm will evolve.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The US economy is currently worth over $30 trillion. The Chinese economy is worth over $19 trillion. India is currently the world\u2019s fifth-largest economy. It is expected to overtake Japan\u2019s fourth-largest in the next year or so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And, according to a report by S&P Global Ratings, by 2030, India is expected to surpass $7 trillion and become the world\u2019s third-largest economy. However, there will be a wide gap between the US and China, on the one hand, and between China and India, on the other. There will also be a wide gap between India and everyone else on this list. But precisely because of this gap, India will play a leading role in a multipolar world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The situation will secure a unique position for India. India will guard this place to prevent its interests from being marginalized in decision-making by the United States and China. India will fight for a more multipolar world, meaning a world where everything is not decided simply by the United States and China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n How India will secure and advance its interests in a multipolar world order will be the \u201croads of fire\u201d for India\u2019s grand strategy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s role in the global order<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s role in the quest for a multipolar world would include: <\/p>\n\n\n\n Going further, India\u2019s approach to multilateral forums is guided by its interests. Both India and China are part of various multilateral forums. They are not supposed to be there to discuss bilateral issues or sovereignty issues. Instead, their engagement implies that problems can be resolved through confidence-building measures and peaceful strategies. Multilateral forums can be useful for advancing bilateral issues.<\/p>\n\n\n\n One example is the meeting between Modi and China\u2019s Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan last year. The two leaders decided to let their national security advisers discuss their territorial dispute.<\/p>\n\n\n\n India\u2019s thoughtful leadership in a multipolar world would include working with countervailing powers, such as the United States, Japan, Australia, the EU and others, to \u201cdiversify and strengthen\u201d supply chains.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It would also mean confronting China by diversifying India\u2019s strategic interests. Having multiple strategic or economic partners would ensure that if China threatened to disrupt supply chains or investment, it would not unduly affect India.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The world may be consumed in the West, but in the East there seems to be an alliance that is off the radar. 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