{"id":18844,"date":"2024-06-06T21:31:26","date_gmt":"2024-06-06T18:31:26","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=18844"},"modified":"2024-06-10T23:56:06","modified_gmt":"2024-06-10T20:56:06","slug":"d-day-the-normandy-landings-and-the-beginning-of-the-end","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=18844","title":{"rendered":"D-Day: The Normandy Landings and the Beginning of the End"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">\u201c<em>You will enter Europe and in conjunction with the other United Nations will undertake operations directed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date of entry into Europe is set for May 1944<\/em>&#8220;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This was the order given to the Supreme Commander of the Allied Landing Corps on February 12, 1944. With this order the opening of the second front in Europe became definitive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The plan for Operation Overlord had been approved by Roosevelt and Churchill at the Quebec Conference in August 1943. Broadly speaking, the plan called for a landing on the northern coast of France between the towns of Grandcam and Caen with three infantry divisions and two airborne divisions with two other divisions in reserve. A total of 29 divisions would be available which would be moved as quickly as possible after a safe bridging was achieved.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The date was set for May 1, 1944. This plan was modified quite a bit by the time it was implemented, but its basic principles remained the same. The most important modifications concerned the extent of the landing and the size of the forces of the first phase of the operation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Supreme Commander from December 1943 was the American General Eisenhower.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>British General Montgomery was appointed commander of the 21st Army Group, which included all British and Canadian forces. The 21st also included Dutch, French, Czech, Polish and Belgian forces.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>British admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay was appointed head of the naval force and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Air Force Chief British Air Marshal Sir Trafford Lee Mallory.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>US General Omar Badley would command the 12th Army Group, which immediately after the landing would include the US 1st and 3rd Armies.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"976\" height=\"549\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-55.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18846\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-55.png 976w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-55-300x169.png 300w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-55-768x432.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 976px) 100vw, 976px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Military problems<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em><strong>The first issue<\/strong><\/em> to be addressed during the design phase was the selection of the appropriate location for the first stroke. The area would have to be of such a size that approximately 30 divisions could be landed in the first phase, and also be of such a configuration that the support forces could be deployed, which would follow the first wave of the landing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The site of Pas-de-Calais combined these qualities but was also the closest point of the French coast to England. Therefore, it had the strongest fortifications of the Atlantic wall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The area of \u200b\u200bCaen, on the other hand, was more lightly fortified and suitable for the creation of bridgeheads and airfields. Also, on either side of Caen from Cherbourg to Havre there were considerable port facilities. But there was the problem of the extent of the area, so it was decided to extend the landing east to the mouth of the River Orne (coast code &#8220;Sword&#8221;) and west to Vareville Bay on the Cotentin Peninsula (coast code &#8220;Utah&#8221;).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>The next issue<\/em><\/strong> was increasing the amount of downforce. The Allies estimated that the Germans would have six motorized divisions in the area, so the first attack wave would have to consist of at least five divisions, followed immediately by two more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It was also decided to drop two parachute divisions on the Cotentin Peninsula to support the forces on the &#8220;Utah&#8221; coast and another parachute division northeast of Caen to capture vital bridges on the Orne and Div rivers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The increase in the volume of landing forces created new problems for the allies. The ships which would have been available in England on 1 May were not enough to transport the men. Also, there were not enough trained crews, while at the same time the overcrowding of ships on the south coast of England was increasing and the need was created to open more channels in the minefields which the Germans had created on the French coast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In order to deal with the problem of available ships, it was decided to postpone the landing operation in the south of France and to transfer the ships that would take part in it to the western front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>German preparations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It was obvious to the Germans that the &#8220;Atlantic Wall&#8221; could not be at a level of effectiveness capable of making it impregnable. The disposition of the bulk and size of the German army on the Eastern Front meant that the French shores were undermanned. Also, the materials to strengthen the defensive barriers along the length of the French coast were lacking. Thus the Germans were forced to content themselves with reinforcing the points where they expected the enemy attack to occur or where they judged that they needed more reinforcement, such as around the ports on the French coast.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The form that the &#8220;Atlantic Wall&#8221; took in the winter of 1944 was as follows. A series of strong points (fortresses) connected to each other by a series of fortifications. These fortresses Hitler demanded be held to the last drop of blood of their defenders. Their location was around the ports of Dunkirk, Calais, Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, La Rochelle and Toulon. Built with thousands of tons of reinforced concrete, armed with heavy cannons, these fortresses seemed to be truly impregnable. But the intervals between these forts did not give the same picture.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"692\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-56-1024x692.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18847\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-56-1024x692.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-56-300x203.png 300w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-56-768x519.png 768w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-56.png 1200w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Marshal Rommel, who was called to take command of the forces on the northern French coast, when he inspected the fortifications in March 1944, dispelled the myth of impregnability, immediately giving urgent orders to strengthen the fortifications along the French coast. von Rudstedt, commander-in-chief of the Western Front for the Germans, was more pessimistic. Despite Rommel&#8217;s efforts, he believed that the &#8220;Wall&#8221; would not be able to hold out in a large-scale attack for more than 24 hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By late spring 1944 the Germans theoretically had 60 divisions in the area, which would soon become the theater of operations on the Western Front. But less than ten were 100% battle worthy. Only the tank and paratrooper divisions were properly equipped with weapons and personnel. Most of the infantry divisions were remnants of units from the Eastern Front, made up of men with low morale and fighting spirit.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These 60 divisions were concentrated in four army commands. The two northerns (7th and 15th) made up Army Group B under Rommel and were responsible for the defense of the Channel coast. Rudstead himself was based at Pas-de-Calais, which was closest to England and where the V1 and V2 missile launch sites were located.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of course, administration was also exercised by Hitler and his staff, with the result that there is a frequent overlap of powers and confusion in the tactical movements of the German army. The Germans were at first anxious about the place where the landing would take place. Hitler himself, despite the contrary opinions of his staff, believed that it would be Normandy. The timing of the Allied operation was also a serious problem for the German command. The German spies in Britain were never able to provide clear information and this is of course a great success for the Allies. However, the beginning of June was excluded due to the weather forecasts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus, after the end of May, the German administration was convinced that the landing would not be attempted before August, a fact which had a negative effect on the readiness of the men of the German army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In terms of planning their defensive tactics the Germans faced a serious problem from the early stages. Rommel, drawing on his experience from North Africa and Sicily, argued that any enemy action should be crushed on the coast. But this he estimated could only be achieved with a massive concentration of personnel and fire. Thus the infantry units were ordered to occupy positions at a distance of five kilometers from the coast, while at the same time efforts to erect obstacles and forts on the coasts continued until the last moment. Rommel, however, also requested the presence of Roodstedt&#8217;s armored divisions near the coast, so that his plan could have a chance of success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the German commander-in-chief had a different opinion. He believed that his armor should not be committed before the bulk of the Allied landing had taken place. He therefore wished to keep his forces at a distance of 50-60 kilometers from the coast and their involvement in the impending conflict in the form of a strong counter-attack. The result of this clear difference of opinion of the two German commanders was finally the adoption of a compromise solution which ultimately did not have happy results for the Germans, since this solution consisted in the separation of the German tanks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Three tank formations were deployed alongside Rommel&#8217;s infantry units, while Rudstedt&#8217;s units remained further back. Thus, when the landing took place, the motorized divisions near the coast were numerically too weak to intercept the Allies, and their heavy losses on the first day of the landing made it impossible for Rudsted to assemble a strong force in time. , which he would use for his counterattack.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"782\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-58-1024x782.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18849\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-58-1024x782.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-58-300x229.png 300w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-58-768x586.png 768w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-58.png 1200w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The allied arrangement<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The final plan of Operation &#8220;Overlord&#8221; as submitted on May 15 provided for the following. The initial landings would be made by the US 1st Army with two divisions on either side of the mouth of the Weir River (Omaha and Utah) and the British 2nd Army with three divisions west of the Orne (&#8220;Sword&#8221;) River.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Two US Parachute Divisions (82nd and 101st) would be dropped in the St. Mer Eglise area to support the US 4th Division, which would land on the Utah coast. The 6th British Parachute Division would drop east of Caen to seize vital bridges behind the Caen Canal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After securing positions on the coast the 1st Army would head west to cut off the Cotentin Peninsula and then move north to capture Cherbourg. At the same time it was envisaged that British and Canadian troops would occupy the area west and south-west of Caen. But the main role of the 2nd Army would be to cover the left flank of the bridgehead and absorb the expected German counterattack. Twenty days after \u201cD Day\u201d the Allied troops should have reached the line Avrance \u2013 Vir \u2013 Falaise.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It was then envisaged that, since the German resistance positions would be outflanked, the front would have to be on the line Angers \u2013 Le Mans 35 days after the landing. From there the Allied front would advance east to reach the banks of the Seine 90 days after the landing. Thus by early September the Allies estimated that they would be ready to capture Paris and advance northeast to the Rhine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Strategically the plan made Caen a central point of reference for the whole enterprise. Because the area was closer to Paris, the Allies expected the Germans to put up the strongest resistance there. Therefore the left flank of the Allied line (British and Canadian) would face a large volume of German forces, which would necessarily move from the eastern part of the front, where the Americans would have to face weaker enemy reaction and therefore believed they could advance more quickly. and in various directions. Of course things did not go exactly as planned but in general the plan was implemented and the movements of the allied troops were successful.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"527\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-60.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18851\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-60.png 800w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-60-300x198.png 300w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-60-768x506.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The attempt to mislead the Germans<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The volume of preparation for the landing was such that complete concealment of the operation was impossible. The Allies therefore tried and succeeded &#8211; as we have already seen &#8211; in deceiving German intelligence sources. Assuming that the Germans were expecting the landing at Pas-de-Calais, the disinformation plan was to convince the Germans that the landing would actually take place there. For this purpose, many fake landing ships and a large number of men were gathered in ports in the south-east of England.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Also, fake radio messages spoke of an attack at a time much later than actually planned. On the eve of the landing, a bodyguard of Montgomery was sent to Gibraltar, a fact which he estimated would &#8220;reassure&#8221; the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the day of the landings dummy paratroopers were dropped in various areas while airborne diversionary forces moved into Dover waters giving the wrong impression to the Germans. Even after the attack the Allies continued to give the Germans the impression that Normandy was a precursor or distraction for the main operation that would unfold at Pas-de-Calais.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of course, for the success of the operation to deceive the Germans from February 1944 in Britain, measures were taken in this direction. Civilian communication between Britain and Southern Ireland was thus prohibited since it was known that a significant network of German spies and collaborators was operating in Southern Ireland under the auspices of the Irish government. The Irish&#8217;s centuries-old hatred of the English made many of them wish for a Hitler victory, since the British Empire would be in the vanquished&#8217;s place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Britain, since April 1, the presence of citizens on the coast within a distance of ten kilometers from the sea has been prohibited. Even diplomatic privileges were suspended, while the movement of foreign nationals to and from Britain was severely restricted. Post, including diplomatic, was subject to censorship and artificial delay beyond normal. Of course there were leaks, but the German command obviously did not have sufficient information and cross-checking capabilities, so the evaluation of this information was not appropriate.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"620\" height=\"417\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-61.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18852\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-61.png 620w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-61-300x202.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 620px) 100vw, 620px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The final preparations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">176,000 men and 20,000 vehicles were concentrated in southern England and Wales. The preparations were indeed completed to the best of their ability. The vehicles were sufficiently waterproofed to cope with the harsh conditions of the landing and the men were properly trained on each side. Finally, everything was ready and all that remained was for Eisenhower to decide on the final day of the landing. But this day depended a lot on the weather. And the weather didn&#8217;t help.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the day of the landing the ebb had to come in late enough in the morning to allow for an hour&#8217;s daily bombardment of the embankment fortifications and early enough for the second wave of the landing to land at the second ebb before dark. There had to be a moon, which had risen slowly, to facilitate the drops of the paratroopers. Finally, the sea had to be calm to avoid straining the men in the battleships and then in the small landing craft until they reached the enemy shore. These conditions were met by 4, 5, 6 June.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, if the weather conditions were unfavorable, a postponement of four weeks would be necessary. The original decision was for June 5th, but the forecasters correctly predicted that on that day there would be a storm, which ended up being the worst storm in twenty years at the time. The operation was postponed for 24 hours but the weather conditions did not improve. In theory, a new 24-hour postponement would have been imposed, but the mobilization of the naval forces had already begun, while for the men it would be extremely negative to remain confined to the ships, which would take them to the shores of Normandy. Finally, the forecasters offered some hope. From the evening of the 5th to the morning of the 6th of June there would be a temporary improvement. Their prediction was ultimately not successful but the course of history could not be reversed now back.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Already on the morning of June 5, after a council of the supreme commanders of the allied forces, Eisenhower, with Montgomery&#8217;s agreement but with reservations from the other leaders, had given the green light.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The landing<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As we said above, the Germans did not expect the enemy invasion at the beginning of June. This is shown by the complete lack of preparation of the defense lines and most of all we can see it from the fact of Rommel&#8217;s visit to his family in Stuttgart on June 5th. Eventually, the unusually high activity of the French resistance radios alarmed Rudstedt who ordered the 15th Army east of the Seine to be on the alert. Shortly after midnight, as June 6, 1944 began, the first reports began to arrive of parachute drops on the Cotentin Peninsula and east of the Orne River.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The defending troops were taken by surprise and the first waves of paratroopers met little resistance. The 6th Parachute Division successfully dropped east of the Orne River and quickly succeeded in capturing the Benouville bridges over the Orne and the Caen Canal. On the western flank the US 101st and 82nd Parachute Divisions encountered difficulties. Bad weather conditions and the inexperience of the operators of the transport aircraft resulted in the<br>dispersal of the paratroopers over an area of \u200b\u200bapproximately 375 square miles with the consequent lack of coordination in the first difficult hours and the loss of a significant portion of the paratroopers&#8217; heavy armament.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, the Americans overcame these difficulties and occupied the intended positions on the &#8220;Utah&#8221; coast, west of the Vir River and held them despite heavy German fire, which developed after dawn. 2,395 planes and 867 gliders were used for this operation. Also, 1,100 planes were used for aerial bombardment of German positions in the early hours of June 6. A little later, the first Allied ships would begin to be seen off the coast of Normandy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed aligncenter is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"D-Day in Colour | Full HQ\" width=\"640\" height=\"360\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/fhsYY7SY55Q?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Main Over-Surface Battle-Bombardment Ships <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Britain<\/strong><br><em>Battleships<\/em><br>Warspite, Ramilles, Rodney, Nelson.<br><em>Cruisers<\/em><br>Black Prince, Glascow, Orion, Arethusa, Hawkins, Argonaut, Belfast, Danae, Enterprise, Emerald, Mauritius, Scylla.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>USA<\/strong><br><em>Battleships<\/em><br>Nevada, Texas, Arkansas.<br><em>Cruisers<\/em><br>Augusta, Tuscalosa, Quincy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The ships of all shapes and sizes that gathered off the British coast and crossed the raging English Channel on that fateful summer morning in 1944 were the largest gathering of ships in history. For the first landing wave alone, 1,213 battleships and 4,126 transport\/landing ships of 23 different types were used.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The arrangement of the naval strike forces was as follows<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Western Strike Force under US Rear Admiral Kirk was responsible for landing and supporting the US 1st Army at Utah and Omaha Beaches. The Eastern Strike Force under British Vice-Admiral Vian was responsible for landing and supporting the British 2nd Army on the Gold, Juneau and Sword coasts. The five landing formations therefore started on the night of 5\/6 June from various points in southern England and Wales and, after assembling at the pre-arranged point, turned southwards following the mine-free channels which had been opened by the Allied minesweepers. The time of arrival on the coast of the first amphibious formations depended on the tide, which had the effect of revealing the anti-amphibious obstacles that the Germans had created.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">These first formations would be groups of specially trained men, who were tasked with neutralizing these obstacles. So this time was 06:30 for the American sector and 07:30 for the British sector. From 05:30, however, the bombardment from the sea had already begun.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In addition to the battleships, which are mentioned in the context, other cruisers and destroyers from allied countries, which were still suffering under the Nazi boot &#8211; and Greek among them &#8211; also took part. Despite this storm, however, several of the German fortresses remained fully battleable.<br>As the first men of the landing force reached the shore the awful weather began to take its toll.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Many landing craft, hitting the underwater obstacles or due to the large waves, capsized and several men, weakened by nausea, drowned. Others, who managed to get ashore, were easy victims for the German fire, but constantly more amphibious ships reached the shore.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-embed aligncenter is-type-video is-provider-youtube wp-block-embed-youtube wp-embed-aspect-16-9 wp-has-aspect-ratio\"><div class=\"wp-block-embed__wrapper\">\n<iframe loading=\"lazy\" title=\"Archive Video Of The D-Day Normandy Landings\" width=\"640\" height=\"360\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/0wg5x5WaZPo?feature=oembed\" frameborder=\"0\" allow=\"accelerometer; autoplay; clipboard-write; encrypted-media; gyroscope; picture-in-picture; web-share\" referrerpolicy=\"strict-origin-when-cross-origin\" allowfullscreen><\/iframe>\n<\/div><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the eastern flank the 3rd and 50th British and 3rd Canadian Divisions did not meet the expected resistance. Only in the afternoon did German tanks appear, but again in small numbers. Even these tanks, however, combined with the resistance of individual German fortresses, prevented the British and Canadians from reaching Caen. In the rest of the eastern sector, however, the attack progressed as predicted. By nightfall, an important bridgehead had already been secured with lower losses than anticipated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the western sector, however, the Americans on the &#8220;Omaha&#8221; coast faced great problems. The bad weather conditions especially in this area caused many losses to the small landing craft as their starting point from the battleships was too far from the shores. Also, the state of the sea caused a lot of damage to the amphibious vehicles with the consequent loss of life. Finally, the strongest German positions in the area had not suffered much damage from the Allied bombardment and even in this area the 352nd German Infantry Division had been unexpectedly transferred. All these factors contributed to the Americans suffering heavy losses in this sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It took truly heroic efforts to create a footbridge only a mile deep. On the Utah coast things were better for the Americans. The landing was made by mistake, about a kilometer west of the chosen point and there the German positions were weaker. So this mistake had positive consequences and the losses were small. Thus by the evening a significant bridgehead had been created in the area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>After the first day<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As an account of the first day of the landing we can say that the allied plan had been implemented for the most part. But the cities of Caen and Bayeux had not been taken and there were still pockets of German resistance behind the front that had been established on the first day. Even between the five descending formations there continued to be gaps with the largest one between Omaha and Utah being over 10 miles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the German side things were worse than the Allies could have hoped. The tactic of compromise solutions and division of administrative responsibility was beginning to have its consequences. The closest tank formation to the landing area was the 21st Panzer Division with about 170 tanks east of the river Orne, close to the coast. Since the night the commander of the formation had reported the dropping of paratroopers, but it was not until 10 the next morning that he received the order for action.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Initially the 21st supported the German defensive effort around Caen and then deployed ashore at Lyon-sur-Mer. There she was successfully countered by the allied anti-tanks and after losing 25% of her tanks she was forced to withdraw. This was also the only involvement of German tanks in the conflict during the first day. The delay or non-existence of German tank movements is solely due to the labyrinthine chain of command of the Germans. In addition to the different estimates of Rommel and Rudstedt, which we have already mentioned, it is noted that Rudstedt&#8217;s tanks, which were considered to play an important role in the outcome of the battle, would only be moved after Hitler&#8217;s approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So the delay in taking offensive action was also reasonable, and as was reasonable only on June 7th the Germans were able to organize an armored counter-attack. In addition to the 21st, the 12th SS-Panzer Division and the Panzer Division Ler should be available for this operation. The latter, however, was stationed 90 miles south of Caen and did not reach the front line area until June 8, receiving continuous Allied air raids en route, which of course resulted in significant losses of tanks and men.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the German attempt of June 7 had already failed. Insufficient fuel, poor coordination of operations and heavy enemy fire made the Germans realize that the invasion could not be met by hasty and isolated counter-attacks. The only gain was the preservation of Caen.<br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The allied support effort<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Normandy landings would not have been possible without the massive support effort that was prepared alongside the landings. The flow of supplies to the fighting men could only be realized to the extent required if the Allies had extensive port facilities in the area. Since such a thing was impossible, it was decided at the meeting of Quebec in 1943 to build technical ports which were named Mulberry. Mulberry A would be in the American sector in the St. Laurent area and Mulberry B would be in the Aromance area in the British sector.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As an example, we mention that for B the requirements for receiving supplies were for the first days of the invasion approximately 1,200 tons per day and after the 9th day approximately 4,000 tons of supplies and 1,250 vehicles. After the 14th day incoming supplies should reach 7,000 tons. Absolute secrecy was achieved for the construction of the artificial harbor sections and, as we mentioned above, the Germans could not even have any clues on this matter either. But an important part of these amazing constructions would be old ships, mainly trucks, which manned in most cases with their normal crews would sink themselves to a depth of 15 feet from the shore, to form the bases for the construction of port structures.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-large\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"1024\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-1024x1024.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18854\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-1024x1024.png 1024w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-300x300.png 300w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-150x150.png 150w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-768x768.png 768w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-1536x1536.png 1536w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63-800x800.png 800w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-63.png 1601w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of course, among these old cargo ships (60 in total) many carried the Greek flag or were of Greek ownership. The two artificial harbors suffered greatly from bad weather, which prevailed throughout June 1944. Eventually A was damaged beyond repair and what remained of it was used to reinforce B at Aromance, which had suffered less disasters. The B was eventually used for a long time even after many French ports were captured by the Allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another major achievement of Allied support was the fuel pipeline, which supplied Allied forces in Normandy. From a petrol station in Avonmouth an underground pipeline had been laid down to the coast. There they were connected to the underwater pipeline &#8220;Plutons&#8221;, which crossed the English Channel. This underground conduit was installed using a giant spool-like structure, from which the flexible conduit was unwound as it was towed by special trailers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the completion of operations in Normandy the same pipeline was used for operations in Belgium and the Netherlands. It is remarkable that the Germans failed for weeks after the landing to appreciate the size and importance of the Mulberry ports. Of course attempts were made from the very early stages of their construction, either by the Luftwaffe or by surface ships and submarines, but with little success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Human torpedoes (torpedoes guided to their target by a rider) posed a greater threat. These torpedoes were launched from submarines and needed good visibility to be effective. But they had a small radius of action and still needed a favorable current and smooth weather conditions to be effective. However, in several cases allied ships around and inside the two artificial harbors were hit by such torpedoes, without of course significantly affecting the efforts of the allies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Another threat to Allied shipping off the coast of Normandy came from remote-controlled speedboats packed with explosives. But the remote guidance systems were prone to failure and the boats did not cause problems. It is rather unlikely that &#8211; even with modern technical means &#8211; anything like the Mulberry Harbors will ever be built again. It therefore remains a unique achievement, the result of many factors and the work of many people, to erect these amazing structures, through which an army of a million men was continuously supplied with provisions for a long time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Difficulties in the advance of the allies<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By June 8 the Allies had reestablished contact west of Bayeux and the Americans had advanced to within ten miles of Saint-Lo. On the Cotentin peninsula the Americans advanced towards Cherbourg but met severe resistance at Montebourg. The Germans also tried to prevent the joining of the two bridgeheads on either side of the mouth of the river Vir but without success. With the capture of Caredan on June 12, the allied bridgehead was stabilized.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The initial phase of the landing had been executed according to plan. But the continuation was not the same. The cities of Avrans and Fallaz were captured only after 60 days, while the forecasts were for 20 days. For this delay, Montgomery was held responsible by many sides. But as it turned out, this was a temporary delay, because the Allied troops reached the Seine in 82 days, that is, 8 days earlier than predicted, and three weeks later the Americans were crossing the German border at Aachen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is also noted that the allied losses were lower than predicted, a sample of the unexpected German resistance. The weather played an important role in the delay immediately after landing. According to Eisenhower, storms that continued after June 6 continued to hamper Allied efforts, culminating in the major storm from June 19 to 22 that jeopardized the entire operation. During this storm the artificial harbor at Saint Laurent was destroyed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The extension of the bridgehead was vital so that both the US 3rd and Canadian 1st Armies could enter the battle. The acquisition of more space was essential, if we consider that in the first 6 days 326,547 men, 57,186 vehicles of various types and 104,428 tons of supplies had been landed in Normandy. To gain this ground, Montgomery ordered the capture of Cherbourg and Caen to be hastened. Both goals proved more difficult than anticipated. The Americans began by clearing the northern part of the Cotentin peninsula and by 18 June had cut off 40,000 Germans, who were slowly but steadily pushed back towards the Herburg fortresses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On 22 June the final assault on the city began and on 26 June the German commander, General von Schlieben, surrendered. On July 1st, the last pockets of resistance on the peninsula were captured. The port facilities of Cherbourg, however, were impossible to use before the end of August due to the extensive damage they had suffered.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The British failure at Caen<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the eastern flank, the British 2nd Army encountered strong resistance from the German armored divisions and the SS. Rudstedt correctly assessed that the split of the front at Caen would put the German forces in the west at great risk and therefore allocated the cream of his forces to this sector. Besides, as we have already mentioned, the allies expected the greatest resistance in this area. For most of June the British and Canadian forces were unable to advance beyond the ground they had gained in the first days of the conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This delay was particularly troublesome for the RAF, which relied on the rapid capture of the airfields, which were located southwest of Caen. The failure of the rapid capture of Caen did not prevent the Allied air force from operating from French soil. By 9 June engineers had completed construction of the first airfield and within three weeks 31 Allied squadrons were operating from bridgehead bases.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The supremacy of the Allied air forces was absolute in the skies over France, and according to Rudstedt not a single German soldier was safe from attack. Air superiority allowed the Allies to continue isolating the battlefield in Germany, which was carried out with great effectiveness by destroying most of the Seine and Loire bridges. This is perhaps the second most important event of those which played an important part in the great Allied victory west of the Seine. Rudstedt could not count on serious reinforcements, since the east remained the main front for the Germans, but whatever reinforcements he could gather had great difficulty reaching the front line due to the lack of roads.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"275\" height=\"183\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-64.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18855\"\/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>German failures<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After the first failure of the German tanks, Rudsted threw all available infantry and armored divisions into the battle. But soon it was realized that the formations, which were located between the Seine and the Loire, could not alone stop the advance of the opponents. Due to the destruction of bridges, roads and railway lines, German infantry forces were moving on bicycles and carts resulting in long delays in reaching the front line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is worth noting that a division which started from Bayonne on 12 June covered the distance of 400 miles to the front line in 22 days. Here, too, it is worth emphasizing again the irrational disposition of the German forces, which inexplicably to a common mind were stationed so far from the French shores. So since the infantry units of the Germans did not arrive in time, all that remained were the armored units.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So the 2nd Panzer Division was rushed on 9 June from Abbeville, where it had been stationed. Traveling the 300 miles of the front by rail, it was subjected to constant air attacks, and when it finally arrived after ten days at Common, only 80 of the 120 tanks of its original force were serviceable. As we said before, the tanks that reached the front line took part in group battles due to limited space and the general dysfunction of the German command. In this way, of course, their effectiveness was limited. For Rudsted, all that remained was a last-ditch effort at a massive counter-attack capable of splitting the Allied forces. He requested that 15 to 20 infantry divisions, stationed in southern France or on the Atlantic coast, be sent north of the Loire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">With these he hoped to supplement his armored divisions on the front line and hold a defensive line along the Loire and the Orne. He would then attempt a tank attack against the American positions at Saint-Lo. It was an ambitious and daring plan, which might have put Germany in an advantageous position, if only temporarily. But it presupposed the abandonment of all France south of the Loire, and Berlin did not accept it. Another source of infantry for Roodstedt was the 19 divisions of the 15th Army in northern France and the Low Countries. For two weeks after the invasion the German commander-in-chief did not decide to move these forces, because he still believed that a second, larger Allied landing at Pas-de-Calais would follow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Allied deception effort continued with movements of aeronautical forces, and Rommel and Hitler shared Rudstedt&#8217;s point of view. Gradually, however, German leaders began to realize that the Allied advance in Normandy had been so successful that a second landing seemed unlikely. Fifteen days<br>after D Day Rudstedt recommended that the Pas de Calais zone forces be sent to Normandy. Hitler rejected this proposal as well, now believing that the Allies would attempt a second landing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When it was decided to move parts of the 15th army to the south it was already early August and of course too late for the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The 7th Army in Normandy was now a jumble of remnants of units, which for eight weeks had been pounded constantly, knowing that reinforcements which might relieve their position were inexplicably still.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The last desperate efforts of the Germans<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The lack of infantry forces forced Rudsted to use his armor to cover the gaps in his line, while he would have preferred to use them for organized counter-attacks. With Rommel&#8217;s concurrence, he proposed to Hitler in the middle of June, when the latter was visiting Normandy, that they retreat to the Seine and there organize their line of defense in conjunction with the proposals we mentioned earlier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hitler thankfully did not accept talk of tactical retreats and maneuvers, and perhaps the Allies were lucky that his inability to think straight had reached uncontrollable levels. On June 29, it was decided to make another attempt with the armored vehicles. 250 SS tanks would also participate in it. This effort aimed at the Germans reaching the Caen &#8211; Bayeux road after an attack in the Evresi region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">British naval and artillery fire destroyed many of the tanks in this formation before they even started. Anti-tanks completed this task. The German counterattack did not take place. Thus, at the end of June, seven of the nine German tank formations had suffered serious losses, amounting to 150 tanks and approximately 25% of the manpower of these units. The failure of this effort combined with the capture of Herburg by the Americans on June 26 seriously soured the relations between Rudstedt and the high command in Berlin.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The German commander-in-chief was disturbed by Hitler&#8217;s illogical interventions and did not hesitate to declare after the war: &#8220;As commander-in-chief of the West my only responsibility was to change the guard at the entrance to my accommodation&#8221;. Rudstedt even dared on July 1 to suggest to Field Marshal Keitel of Hitler&#8217;s staff that they seek peace with the Allies before it was too late. On 2 July, as expected, Rudsted was replaced by Marshal von Kluge whose scrolls related to defensive successes on the Eastern front.<br>Hitler&#8217;s insistence on not willingly giving up even an inch of land from Normandy ultimately resulted in the destruction of the Wehrmacht. But it also caused significant obstacles to the advance of the allies and significant delays during June. In the Caen area the 2nd Army had to fight fiercely against the better German units there. In the hills around the towns of Villers-Bocage and Tigy-sur-Chel south of Caen, losses on both sides were significant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Particularly important were the losses of the civilian population as many small villages changed hands within a few hours, and of course this was done after a heavy exchange of artillery fire. On June 20, allied losses had reached 5,287 dead, 23,079 wounded and 12,183 missing. On June 25, the second serious attempt to capture Caen began. The initial attack by four British divisions in the Evresy area was intended to cut off Caen from the southwest and then from the north other British and Canadian forces would attempt to encircle the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After four days of hard fighting the Wehrmacht lines showed no signs of weakening. A bridgehead across the Odon River was held with difficulty but Caen remained in German hands. On 1 July Allied offensive activity ceased, but already for the Germans the retention of Caen meant the commitment of seven of their best divisions and a considerable number of tanks, which, as we have seen, Rudstedt would have wished to use for counter-attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-image\">\n<figure class=\"aligncenter size-full\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"710\" height=\"499\" src=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-65.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-18856\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-65.png 710w, https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/image-65-300x211.png 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 710px) 100vw, 710px\" \/><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In Caen, during the last conflicts, the Germans had gathered 23 divisions of which 12 armored (6 SS) and 2 paratroopers and the allies 27. Correlation of forces, which combined with the terrain configuration clearly favored the defenders , who lagged behind only in the absence of air cover. Therefore the criticism against Montgomery for delaying the capture of this city was more a result of public opinion and perhaps the fact that the British had committed 3\/4 of their available forces to the battle while the Americans still had 35 divisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The British therefore saw that they would soon be reduced to a secondary role while the Americans, always with the advantage of large volume, seemed to be disturbed by the demands of their allies for equal initiatives. Of course, these differences did not particularly damage the relations of the two allies. With the bulk of the German armor around Caen Montgomery intended to hold them there. He ordered the 2nd Army to continue its push while American forces would turn south and then east towards Le Mans and Alen\u00e7on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On July 8, the last attempt to capture Caen was made. The Germans couldn&#8217;t hold out any longer. By 9 July this great transport hub and port was in British hands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The stabilization of allied positions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For most of July the Allied front in Normandy remained confined to the northern side of the peninsula. The Americans with the 1st Army under Bradley extended 70 kilometers from Comon, a point of contact with the British, who held the left wing, and then their line moved northwest north of Saint-Lo and through the marshes of Cotentin to the west Normandy coast. The British area of \u200b\u200bthe front also extended to approximately 70 kilometers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It started from Comonne, passed through Caen and ended towards the sea. Lined up at the front were 11 American (2 armored) and 16 British\/Canadian (5 armored) divisions. Within 25 days they had landed in the small area, which the Allies held with over 1,000,000 troops, and unloaded 560,000 tons of supplies, enough to fill a 200-mile train. But this enormous force had great difficulty in maneuvering. The western half of the American front was marshland and almost the entire front passed through hedgerows, ditches in the thickly wooded fields of Normandy. Visibility rarely exceeded 300 meters. So necessarily the advance was much slower than the Allies would have liked.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Also, this terrain configuration was very favorable for the use of snipers and this tactic was used massively by the Germans, causing significant losses to the allies. As July progressed Rommel tried to persuade Hitler to approve offensive initiatives in the American sector, where there were 11 divisions instead of 16 in the British sector. But Hitler insisted that he could throw the Allies into the sea in the Caen area and did not accept Rommel&#8217;s views.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A little later the German marshal was thought to have been involved in the July 20 attempt on Hitler and paid with his life for the bloodthirsty madman&#8217;s fury. While the British attempted to capture Caen in early July the Americans continued their slow but steady advance south. It was a difficult endeavor due to the terrain and weather difficulties. The American positions in the Cotentin were surrounded by zones of swamps and valleys flooded by water from the rivers of the area, which the Germans had channeled towards the enemy positions. The Americans found better terrain when they reached north of the Saint-Lo-Coutan line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On July 5th, the Americans captured the town of Ai-di-Pony from where they retreated the next day but recaptured it on July 9th. From there they began intense offensive activity advancing towards Saint-Lo which they captured on 19 July. So while the allies were advancing slowly but steadily, essentially clearing the lands they occupied, they were placing large units in the positions from which the second phase would begin for the complete breakdown of the German line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Much has been written about the Normandy landings, and of course we do not aspire to discover the gunpowder in this historical narrative. However, studying the movements of the two opposing formations, we first stand at the excellent security organization of the allies, who managed to completely surprise the Germans. As a second point we observe the truly criminal insistence of the German administration (Hitler) to keep important units away from the battle.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And of course we dare to say that blind discipline and obedience to superiors is not always the best option. Blind Prussian discipline contrasted with the discipline of intelligent swords (discipline des epees intelligentes) in a classic example. We also observe the complete air superiority of the allies and the infinitely better ability to support and reinforce the fighting forces and finally the inability of the German command, combined with the non-movement of units, to make bold maneuvers when the circumstances demanded it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\u201cYou will enter Europe and in conjunction with the other United Nations will undertake operations directed at the heart of Germany and the destruction&#8230;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":18845,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2362,7,2846],"tags":[403,5521,5520,3758,5534,215,70,3394],"class_list":["post-18844","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-military-science","category-research","category-wars-battles","tag-canada","tag-d-day","tag-german","tag-nazi","tag-operation-overlord","tag-us","tag-usa","tag-wwii"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18844","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=18844"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18844\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":18857,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/18844\/revisions\/18857"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/18845"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=18844"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=18844"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=18844"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}