{"id":14992,"date":"2023-08-24T20:37:24","date_gmt":"2023-08-24T17:37:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=14992"},"modified":"2023-08-24T20:37:32","modified_gmt":"2023-08-24T17:37:32","slug":"the-strategic-deficit-of-the-luftwaffe-in-world-war-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=14992","title":{"rendered":"The Strategic Deficit of the Luftwaffe in World War II"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

At the outbreak of World War II, the Luftwaffe was the most powerful air force in the world. Applying the successful strategy of “lightning war (Blitzkrieg)” it left no room for reaction to any of its original opponents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Central Europe succumbed within a few months. The successes of the first season were not repeated when the RAF entered the “game”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It was there that a great deficiency of the Luftwaffe became visible for the first time: realistic and correct strategic thinking and command with the data of the new era and developments in aviation technology, and not with the experiences of the First World War, with which they had been matured and imbued militarily the two great heads of the Third Reich, Hitler and G\u00f6ring. The Blitzkrieg strategy was perfectly adequate for countries close to Germany.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But the sea that separated Germany from England was decisive and set a new parameter, the long radius of action of the aircraft. The British were fighting over their bases, so they had no such problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The German Bf109 fighters accompanying the bombers did not have the necessary range to stay long enough over the target to comfortably engage before running out of fuel. This resulted in heavy German casualties, leading to defeat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Someone will reasonably ask: “When Operation Sea Lion was being planned, did no one think that the destroyers would not have the necessary range and would therefore suffer heavy losses”? The only reasonable answer that can be given is “even if they had thought of it it was too late”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The developments were rapid and the war is not waiting for you to acquire the right weapons for the job you want them!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The longer range of the Fw190 and Me262 was not available during the Battle of Britain. However, let’s not forget that the Fw190, the ‘successor to the Bf109’, had been in design since 1937 and was clearly a much better aircraft with a much longer range, while the Me262 only started being designed a year later!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If it wasn’t for the Bf109 obsession, the British might have been up against Me262s in 1940, which would have had no problem with range or shooting down any enemy aircraft!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course let’s not forget the turbo engine development problems, which took time to resolve, but history has shown that if the final decision is made to produce an aircraft, the problems are quickly resolved with continued testing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So it is realistic to say that both the Fw190 and the Me262 could have been available in the Battle of Britain had it not been for the leadership’s clear preference for the Bf109 but also its illusion that the war would be too short and they would not need to evolve new aircraft while they had the technological background.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But when the problem of the inability of existing aircraft to achieve the strategic objective arose, it was now too late to provide a solution. Strategic thinking also requires a correct prediction of future conditions, alternative solutions and foresight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the contrary, the German leadership believed that if, while the war progressed, an order was given for the development of new aircraft, the production of those already in use would be reduced, which they did not want because after the Battle of Britain the losses of the Luftwaffe were very high, about 1,700 aircraft from June to October 1940.<\/p>\n\n\n

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The Strategic mistakes<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. <\/strong> The first major strategic mistake came on 4 September 1940, when Hitler, annoyed and angered by the RAF’s first aerial bombardment of Berlin on 25 August, ordered Goering to abandon the bombing of British airfields and concentrate on bombing of London! This he did just as the RAF had reached the point where it was about to buckle! The constant air battles had deprived her of valuable, experienced pilots as well as many aircraft. Spitfires were not yet available in large quantities. On 31 August alone the RAF lost 40 aircraft and by that day had already lost around 200 of its most experienced pilots. If hostilities had continued for a few more weeks, the Luftwaffe would have gained dominion over England, and the landing German fleet, awaiting the signal, would have been able to sail and arrive unscathed\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Just then the shift in the focus of the battle to London and the civilian population gave the RAF precious time to regroup, produce the Spitfires and counterattack by shooting down many more German aircraft. On September 15th the Luftwaffe alone lost 60 aircraft and two days later Hitler ordered the postponement of Operation Sea Lion\u2026indefinitely\u2026 It is worth noting that, as far as the Battle of Britain was concerned, the Luftwaffe did not need any long-range four-engined bombers to win. The problem was Hitler’s personal intervention and changing the original plan, which was correct! One could say that the meager bombing of Berlin on August 25 was a brilliant British strategic move: by angering Hitler, they made him turn on the wrong target and give them time to strike back when they were already on their knees\u2026 Of course, the Germans did not know this then!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.<\/strong> Another big mistake of the Luftwaffe was the very poor organization and utilization of photo recognition and assessment of the real damage or capabilities of the opponent. Without sufficient information it is impossible to make correct decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

G\u00f6ring a few days before Hitler made the fatal decision to change the plan was in a very difficult position. After two months and many losses of German aircraft he seemed to have accomplished almost nothing! Hitler believed that the bombing of London would bend the minds of the British and at the same time get him out of a difficult position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

If Goering had been properly informed about the situation the RAF had found itself in, things might have been different\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3. <\/strong> The same mistake was made in the next operation, against Russia. The rapid successes at first did not place great demands on the Luftwaffe. But when things got difficult and von Paulus’s army had to be supported from the air, then the inability of the air force to support the ground forces became apparent. In practice, here too we have a very significant deficit of correct information and regular assessment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russian forces were much larger – about three times as many – than the Germans had estimated or located. Russia is a very big country. Without a strategic air arm it is practically impossible to control her reserves and her ability to produce new weapons in the rear unmolested. Only a very capable photoreconnaissance force and then a well-organized strategic air attack could intercept the Russian divisions that suddenly appeared encircling the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the Russian front for the first time the Luftwaffe was unable even to function as a supporting weapon for the army. The vast expanse of the country, the adverse weather conditions, but above all the room for regrouping of the Russians in the rear were decisive. As in the Battle of Britain, time was running against the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The involvement with the daily life of dealing with current problems did not leave room for the Germans to plan strategic moves, which would get them out of the difficult position.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4.<\/strong> The Luftwaffe could play a decisive role if it had the means to bomb strategic targets, which were then used to bring it to its knees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The problem was not the defense against the constant attacks of the Allies, who were closing in on the cordon from all directions. The point was that the Luftwaffe with a different targeting priority could bomb exactly the targets it needed to. On June 6, 1944, the Allies landed almost unmolested by German aircraft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia had played its part, as had Allied strategic air bombing of German soil, drawing most German aircraft there. Prior to the landing the Allies had ensured air superiority in the landing area, having effectively blocked it, destroying all access within a radius of several kilometers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The landing showed just how wrong it was to abort Operation Sea Lion four years ago\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n

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5. <\/strong> At Stalingrad the Luftwaffe made the same mistake as the Battle of Britain. While it had 2,500 aircraft on the Russian front alone (about half of its total strength), all it succeeded in doing was flattening the city and turning it into ruins! When Paulus was surrounded, she was unable, certainly in the midst of a terrible winter, both to carry him supplies and to break the Russian line.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The severe winter seemed to take a particular liking to the Germans, while it did not seem to affect the preparations, movements or attitude of the Russians. Another important factor was that the German aircraft, as well as the tanks, due to the prevailing polar cold, were unable to take off in the morning because the oil in the engines froze.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To deal with this problem, the ground staff would light fires next to the aircraft and periodically start the engines from the night before! A few kilometers further on, the Russians didn’t seem to be having similar problems. Every loss was immediately made up and time worked in their favor\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It should be noted that on almost all fronts the Luftwaffe was subject to unpleasant fluctuations in strength due to different needs on each front per period of time. While it appeared, then, to have air superiority, the sudden bleeding of aircraft, which had to be urgently presented to another front, drastically changed the picture of the front, which showed a shortage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The head of the aircraft procurement and supply service Ernst Udet committed suicide in November 1941, two months before the defeat at Stalingrad, when it became apparent on the Russian front that he should have foreseen and ordered many more aircraft!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The difficult winter and the great strategic depth of Russia were negatively combined with the tactics of “lightning war – Blitzkrieg” and the supporting role of the Luftwaffe to the ground forces, while the Russians took full advantage of these conditions, retreating and gaining valuable time to regroup, even if and with heavy losses, knowing that the Luftwaffe would not be able to support the troops over such a large area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The very large strength of 800 German reconnaissance aircraft on the Russian front was not properly utilized. Instead of discovering hidden tanks and guns, they should locate the Russians’ production and transport\/communication lines in the rear, taking away their ability to counterattack by shelling factories and large concentrations of forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Certainly the existence of four-engine strategic bombers of very long range would very quickly bring the desired result before the problems of winter set in.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

To do this, however, the Luftwaffe would have to support the ground forces with a sufficient number of strategic aircraft, which would not be affected either by the severe winter (operating from bases in the rear with a milder climate) or by the vastness of Russia\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It should also be noted here the negative aspect of Hitler’s intervention, who, with the mistaken assessment that the Russians had already weakened enough, suddenly decided on December 5, 1941 to move his armies to the South (Volga, Stalingrad, with the ultimate destination of rich oil sources of the Caucasus) and while these were already a few kilometers outside of Moscow, but without having the strength to occupy it due to exhaustion from weather conditions!<\/p>\n\n\n

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Significant mistakes were made in the Mediterranean Plain<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But important mistakes were also made in the Mediterranean, which terribly affected the outcome of the war. The Luftwaffe could have played a decisive role here as well, but it did not. Of course, opening a multi-front war, the importance of the initial strategic choices is decisive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The entry of American air force into Europe did not seem to worry the Germans. However, its action, especially in the Mediterranean, was decisive. Defeat in North Africa and the loss of the all-important oil refineries in Romania would deprive the German machine of valuable resources. Practically the heavy emphasis on the Russian front put everything else in second place.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Mediterranean and on the African front the Luftwaffe did not properly exploit the possibility of using islands such as Crete as a strategic base in the same way that the British successfully used Malta. Essentially, the German leadership never gave due importance to the African and SE Mediterranean front in view of the problems on the Russian front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is also notable that while there were no plans at all for Europe to employ a fleet of strategic bombers, there were corresponding plans for US strategic bombing long before they entered the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The construction efforts of the Luftwaffe\u2026<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The German Air Ministry had requested specific proposals from aeronautical companies for the four-engined Me264 (also known as the “America Bomber”), the Fw300 (based on the Fw200 Kondor but with more powerful Jumo222 engines), the twin-engine Focke Wulf Ta400 and also the Ju390 ‘New York Bomber’ engine (based on Ju290).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Other more advanced proposals were Eugen Sanger’s futuristic Silverbird intercontinental rocket-powered bomber and the Horten HoXVIII flying wing with 6 jet engines (similar to the Arado E.555).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, in January 1944 one of the original Junkers Ju390s with a range of 10,000 km carried out a successful reconnaissance mission flying from the Bay of Biscay in France (below Brittany) to the coast of New York and back again to its base!<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Also, in addition to the aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin (the construction of which was never completed) there were plans to build three other large such vessels, the Peter Strasser\/Deutschland Carrier, the Europa Carrier and the Potsdam Carrier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the leadership of the navy was never able to work harmoniously on this issue with the Luftwaffe and especially Goering, who saw this new potential of the Kriegsmarine with half an eye and thus another important strategic option was left unexploited for the Germans\u2026<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, the Luftwaffe proved to have far more capabilities than it actually used. Its strategic branch essentially remained untapped and only on paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The use of strategic bombers on key targets would certainly have changed many of the negative developments for the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Without technological flourishes and futuristic designs, the Allies implemented exactly this with their four-engine bombers and thanks to them opened the way for the ground forces to the “heart” of Germany\u2026<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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