But does Bakhmut have such a special value to justify its almost ten-month siege from the beginning of August 2022? The answer is no. Today the front line between Russian and Ukrainian forces is some 700 kilometers, but the 270 or so kilometers from the south, starting at the mouth of the Dnieper River in the Black Sea and following its course to about the height of Zaporizhia, are virtually inactive militarily. And this is because the wide river separates the two warring sides and neither – for the time being – has the ability to make a large landing action, to cross it and try to build a bridgehead across. So the really active front has shrunk and is from Zaporizhia to the north, reaching the Ukrainian-Russian border.<\/p>\n\n\n
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In this line, Russia is exerting offensive pressure in several places, in Bakhmut most strongly, but also further south, in Avdivka and Mariinka. Let us emphasize here an important geopolitical and military element, that the capital of the administrative district (of the Oblast as it is called) of Donetsk, the city of the same name, is right on the front line, and is a permanent concern of the Russians, lest any Ukrainian advance be attempted there.<\/p>\n\n\n
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The – very small of course – possibility that one of the two regional capitals of the Russian-speaking regions will be captured by Ukrainian troops is simply unacceptable, so the Russians have taken the initiative to exert great pressure elsewhere to engage the Ukrainian forces there and not allow them to accumulate where Kiev would like. And of course to achieve an “exit” to the rest of Donbas.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We repeat, however, that in such a long front line, the small and medium-sized city of Bakhmut does not justify the pressure it has received. It is most likely that the well-known phenomenon of “inertia of war” has occurred there, that is, one side chooses a point to attack, its opponent brings reinforcements there, the original attacker rushes in with new forces and so on. Thus it can be created without any original intention, a “black hole” in a long front line, a point of bloody confrontation, just because of an overconcentration of forces. Where, of course, no one dares to retreat, fearing that the accumulation of the opponent will allow him to advance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Apart from the war deadlock, when we have such a scene of continuous battle, the claimed point also takes on a symbolic meaning (“we will never leave Bakhmut” declared Zelensky), it is deified as a zone of “sacrifice” by both sides and accordingly the necessity is self-sustaining to be won\/defended.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The real result? We know for sure, with admission from both sides, that the “meat machine” of war has been in full operation in Bakhmut for months. No one gives numbers of losses, no one dares to admit the slaughterhouse what area it has, what flesh it absorbs and what materials. The Ukrainians are silent about theirs, saying only that “there are many”, from the Russian side we have the well-known theatrics of the head of the Wagner group, Prigozhin, who said about 100 dead in one day in an attack, he has spoken about “thousands dead’ and so on while the two sides cumulatively (Russia and Ukraine) have announced – for each other – more than 50,000 casualties, dead and wounded. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Siege actually has the sad privilege of combining two of the worst forms of combat:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1. <\/strong>From one conflict to an urban environment, house-to-house, with each house being able to become a small island of resistance that can withstand days. Urban battles are not only “carnivorous” but also require specially trained troops, as well as abundant war material, e.g. in explosives, in mortars, in tanks with heavy liftable guns, while mass beast bombardment is usually the most standard solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2.<\/strong> The second also carnivorous method of battle is that of the trenches, as on the outskirts of the city both sides were fortified in a series of deep and multi-daedal ditches and trenches, as the level of the ground offered no cover. And here we had hand-to-hand fighting to capture even for a few hours some enemy fortified positions, while the situation was made worse by the use of drones: which either dropped grenades and mortars with free fall, or precisely directed the artillery barrage against them. In other words, removing from trench warfare the element of protection they offer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Today it seems that Bakhmut has now passed into Russian control, although the Ukrainians state that they still “own something”. The city is so completely destroyed that images and videos emerge, showing ruins, gutted buildings, smoke and desolation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The next day<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Let’s accept that Bakhmut has fallen into Russian hands, the question is what will happen the next day. The issue here is both tactical and political. Regularly it seems that both sides are in relative static balance, as the losses on both sides are very large. Having not allowed the Russians to make a major advance elsewhere on the front (having engaged large Ukrainian forces at Bakhmut), while the same is true of Ukraine, since the summer and its own major counter-offensive north and south, which brought her great repossessions of her territories, she has achieved nothing more.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This is also the main element of the confrontation for a long time: despite the drama of the siege of Bakhmut, despite serious fighting in 2-3 more places, despite the exchange of artillery barrages along the front and the raiding operations and skirmishes of the patrols, the line of contention hasn’t really moved in months. And if the Russians have gained a few tens of square kilometers, this is an infinitesimal amount in front of the vastness of Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n So the issue from a tactical point of view is what is left in the rear. We know that the Ukrainians are preparing some armored brigades, or at least some battle “groups” (because fully manned brigades are difficult to organize) for their own counterattack. Which has not yet manifested itself and is delayed for a variety of reasons: Lack of materials, lack of training, lack of war veterans who can man them, difficulties to build around the Western panspermia of weapons that have been given to them. But we know that thousands of Ukrainians are currently abroad and are being trained, in tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, telecommunications, special operations, so there is a human reserve in preparation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n