{"id":13294,"date":"2023-04-13T21:27:33","date_gmt":"2023-04-13T18:27:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=13294"},"modified":"2023-04-13T21:27:37","modified_gmt":"2023-04-13T18:27:37","slug":"lessons-from-the-ukraine-russia-war-loitering-munitions-in-an-anti-artillery-role","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/?p=13294","title":{"rendered":"Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War: loitering munitions in an anti-artillery role"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In the war between Ukraine and Russia, artillery is prominent in the operations of both parties, maintaining its traditional position in the field. With a more careful approach, however, key differences in its use are observed, which improve the rate of fire, effectiveness and survivability of an artillery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1.<\/strong> The first difference compared to the past, is the utilization of smartphones by creating applications (apps) for targeting, transferring coordinates and sending fire to static, moving or even targets of opportunity. So any user with a smartphone with a camera and GPS, or having a drone in the air, can transmit real-time data to friendly artillery. The advantage is clearly the speed of reaction as no command and control systems intervene, while the disadvantage is the vulnerability to interference and eavesdropping.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2.<\/strong> A second difference is the fire unit itself. Modern rocket launchers and guns are no match for the older ones in rate of fire and accuracy, but mainly in the mission equipment they carry, which achieves rapid order, emission of fire and withdrawal to a new position, in a process known as as “shoot and scoot”.<\/p>\n\n\n

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U.S. Army Soldiers from the 18th Field Artillery Brigade fire a M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) during a HIMARS rapid infiltration mission for RED FLAG-Alaska 18-1 on May 4, 2018, at Fort Greely, Alaska. U.S. Navy, Army and Air Force coordinated during this mission to ensure success. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Isaac Johnson)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n

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3.<\/strong> In addition, as a third difference, it is the use of modern guided missiles and missiles, thus ensuring the attack of the target with almost pinpoint accuracy, which is also confirmed by the results of the Ukrainian HIMARS on Russian targets on railway lines, bridges, personnel concentrations, armament depots etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

New means of anti-artillery<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today an artillery unit relies on anti-aircraft radar, sound tracking systems, forward observers with optical aids carried on foot or on board, and drones to detect enemy artillery. A disadvantage in this organization is the even small time lag in the emission of fire, which several times allows the enemy unit (if it is mounted) to move and avoid the punitive fire. Even the above procedure creates a vicious circle, as each artillery unit is called upon to target enemy positions but also to “hunt” opposing artillery units, thus revealing its own position, receiving the enemy’s fire in turn, etc. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So if the targeting through mobile communication significantly helped to limit the reaction time, it had to be complemented by a different weapon system, which could not only attack enemy positions directly, but also monitor the battlefield, be immediate available for targets of opportunity, be able to achieve one shot one kill and ideally provide the ability to be serviced by one user. In other words, a system that would remove from the friendly artillery the role of “hunter” of opposing artillery.<\/p>\n\n\n

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As great as these demands are, they have been largely met by loitering munitions and the innovation they bring to the battlefield. Their different versions, from mini systems inside a backpack, to mounted or air-launched, cover a significant part of the required range of performance in range, time spent above the point of interest and, of course, warhead weight for attacking larger or “harder” targets.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Israelis should be considered the first teachers in their use, with the development of the Delilah and Harpy models, in the early 80s and as their main mission they had the suppression of air defense. More recently, the two wars between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have been testing grounds for the new technology. Azerbaijan, in particular, based much of its war effort on Israeli Harop type loitering munitions and Turkish drones, which led to victory over Armenia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Modern loitering munitions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the Russian invasion of Ukraine, both belligerents make extensive use of many systems (besides, of course, the many self-made ones). In particular, the Ukrainians use the American Switchblade and the domestic RAM II and ST-35 Silent Thunder.<\/p>\n\n\n

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As for Switchblades, the smallest \u201c300\u201d model weighs 5.5kg. It takes less than two minutes to prepare to fire, has a range of 10 kilometers and a flight time of 15 minutes, and is primarily used against “soft” targets, although the Block 20 version provides some chest-piercing capability. The heavier, but also portable \u201c600\u201d model weighs 25kg or 55kg with the control unit and takes about 10 minutes to set up to launch. It has a range of 40 km, a flight time of over 40 minutes and is recommended for use against armored targets as it can destroy a tank.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Regarding Ukrainian round-robin ammunition, the RAM II is catapult-launched, and has comparable performance to the Switchblade 600. It can carry an armor-piercing or thermobaric warhead, and the operator can set up the catapult and fire in less than 10 minutes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second type, ST-35 Silent Thunder, is launched vertically, can carry an armor-piercing or thermobaric warhead, and has an increased flight time of 60 minutes and a maximum range of 30 kilometers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Russians, after their failure to impose themselves on the battlefield with classic artillery tactics, also adopted the widespread use of loitering munitions, releasing hundreds of Shaheds and Lancets to date.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Shahed are Iranian-made and due to their size they can only be launched from mounted platforms such as trucks, while the range performance according to sources reaches 1,000 km and the warhead weight 50 kg, thus approaching the characteristics of the Israeli Harpy system, where it is considered a simplified copy of.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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ST-35 Silent Thunder disassembled, source athlonavia.com<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Lancets are Russian made. The Lancet-1 has a weight of 5 kg and a flight duration of 30 minutes, while the Lancet-3 has a weight of 12 kg and a flight duration of 40 minutes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Anti-artillery with loitering munitions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the scenario where enemy artillery is spotted, firing at it requires multiple times and correcting fire, possibly by leveraging an advanced artillery spotter\/drone, etc. Which implies both the consumption of ammunition and the difficulty of a successful strike against moving targets. Here the use of cruise munitions radically changes the process, with direct attack of high precision and at a lower cost. And even at the infantry level, which is done as a “unit”, manager of great firepower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So now, a group of Special Forces, National Guard, etc. it can come out of concealment, fire a number of rounds of munitions that will destroy any enemy gun, and withdraw or hide at great speed and without leaving a trace, something that an artillery in an anti-artillery role clearly cannot do.<\/p>\n\n\n

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It is also now possible for the operator to participate in the observation and targeting process (Man in the Loop) through image transfer from the loitering munitions to a portable control station or a smartphone. Thus, a specific section can be selected as a priority for attack, e.g. exposed ammunition, a rocket launcher, a radar, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This process creates economies of scale, as the cost of a loitering munition of the Switchblade-300 class reaches about 6,000 dollars, so its mass use is possible, which obviously cannot be done e.g. with the “smart” ammunition of 155 mm and the missiles for the HIMARS that have a multiple price. Also, Administration is almost negligible, as there is no need to move mountains of ammunition for the guns and the supply chain to maintain them with spares, fuel, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n

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With the developments in Ukraine disproving those who believed that the wars of large formations belong to history, the utilization of technology and its new tools, gives new solutions to known defense problems. With the main characteristic being the reduction of costs, the immediacy of action and above all the promotion of the common soldier, who can carry light weight but highly effective systems. That is to say, the new war, although it remains complex and “large” systems and forces, gives its base, the infantry, new possibilities. But of course it also requires similar know-how, initiative, autonomy of action and special equipment.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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