The current convergence of Russia and China was not a foregone conclusion, especially considering that the two countries also have a history of confrontations between them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, in a situation marked by the Western and especially the American effort to maintain by any means a hegemonic position and a primacy, by any means even with an attempt to “preemptively” deal with other poles to challenge this hegemonic position, the two countries found themselves having an upgraded partnership.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This also referred to a peculiar “synergy” seen especially in the 2010s, where China would provide the economic basis for a Eurasian economic integration, through the “One Belt, One Road” strategy, and Russia the superpower characteristics it maintained.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Obviously, this also did not mean identification. For example, China at this stage sought to avoid confrontations that would jeopardize its position in the global economy, while Russia considered Western aggression centered primarily on Ukraine to be more immediate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But even if we assume that the Chinese side would have liked to have avoided the military conflict in Ukraine, it nevertheless recognized the reasons put forward by Russia and this is a permanent refrain of public positions on the issue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And of course, when the sanctions against Russia started on the occasion of the “special military operation”, China became a key customer of Russian energy products, reducing the pressure on Russia, while it also became a supplier of high-tech products, some with intended for military use, although Chinese companies in their dealings with Russia try to avoid moves that would make them vulnerable to US sanctions.<\/p>\n\n\n
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Above all, what brought about an increased convergence was a heightened awareness by Beijing that today the West chooses to see China as a potential adversary and seeks to limit its growth dynamics (e.g. with technological sanctions that attempt to limit the possibility of China to produce state-of-the-art products), while both the indirect support to Taiwan and the extensive presence of US military installations near China suggest a more direct version of US aggression and potentially “encirclement”.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Against this background, it has a special symbolism that on the eve of the visit, Xi Jinping published an article in Russian media and Putin in Chinese, where the common tone was that there is an important future in Sino-Russian cooperation, at all levels, while in particular the The Chinese emphasized that the visiting leader did not write, according to the diplomatic tradition, but also the welcoming leader. And of course, Xi Jinping did not fail to emphasize in his initial statements that he supports Putin himself, even discounting his re-election, while Putin welcomed the way China effectively combines the market mechanism with a fairly decisive political intervention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Chinese Peace Plan<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, it is interesting to see how Xi Jinping’s visit coincides with a very specific phase in the development of the war in Ukraine. Despite the enormous support that the Ukrainian side has received from the West, the possibility of a major reversal that could be described as “Russia’s defeat” does not appear in the short term. However, precisely because this defeat remains the basic strategy of the West, it is not easy for there to be a reversal and change of strategy and this sustains the war. At the same time, Russia seems to have no problems in terms of ammunition and may insist on current tactics, especially since as a proportion of the population, Ukrainian losses are higher while Russia has larger reserves. This creates more of a stalemate and conflict that continues as a cost and loss rather than a “win” possibility for Ukrainian forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At this point, it is of particular interest that China has come forward with an outline of a peace plan. Here we must underline that the plan mainly has significance as a gesture, since it moves at the level of general principles. However, even so it registers the horizon of a possible solution.<\/p>\n\n\n <\/p>\n\n\n\n It is no coincidence that the Chinese plan has been treated relatively positively by Ukraine itself, precisely because it saves an important part of Ukrainian sovereignty, while the possibility of China pushing Russia in this direction also counts. Hence the fact that the Ukrainian side expects the scheduled communication between Xi Jinping and Volodymyr Zelensky after the completion of the former’s visit to Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n And of course the very gesture of the Chinese plan, given the example of the reconciliation initiative between Saudi Arabia and Iran in which China mediated, also indicates an attempt by China to claim a more active and ultimately leading role in the international community.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In a way, in terms of the dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine itself, the Chinese plan could offer a way out for Ukraine itself, while of course it conflicts with the West’s insistence \u2013 at least in the short term \u2013 on keeping an open front.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The message to the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition to all this, there is of course also the clear message sent to the West. At a time when, regardless of attempts at “corrections” on a case-by-case basis, the tone on the part of Western governments is becoming more and more aggressive towards Russia and China and an attempt is being made to secure a peculiar Western primacy (and American hegemony), Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping send the message that there is a potential other pole. After all, they know that there is a large part of the planet quite ready to subscribe to a rhetoric for a de facto more multipolar world.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" While what is sometimes described as the “Collective West” was debating how to solve the problem of meeting Ukraine’s particularly large ammunition needs and…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[836,3],"tags":[58,1156,1166,184,2187],"class_list":["post-12988","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-asia-geopolitical","category-geopolitical","tag-russia","tag-ukraine","tag-vladimir-putin","tag-west","tag-xi-jinping"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12988","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=12988"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12988\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12992,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12988\/revisions\/12992"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=12988"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=12988"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=12988"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2023\/03\/image-54.png\")
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