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- The value of political and military intelligence at the strategic level<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
The initial phase of the Russian military operation was clearly based on miscalculations stemming from misinformation regarding the likely attitude of the Ukrainian leadership in the event of an invasion. The Russians expected that with the first strike the Ukrainian leadership would collapse and flee abroad, while substantial resistance was expected only from the Ukrainian “nationalist” forces. The course of business has belied these early estimates. The Ukrainian leadership neither weakened, nor was it possible to be “beheaded”, while the Ukrainian army and people as a whole stubbornly resisted the Russian forces. The result of the first phase was therefore disappointing for the Russian forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The initial objectives of the operation were not achieved and the responsibility for this lies with the military (GRU) and mainly the political (FSB) intelligence services which failed to accurately perceive both the attitude of the Ukrainian leadership and the militant spirit of the Ukrainian people and army as well as the capacity of the latter.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Command and Control \u2013 Tactical Situational Awareness<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
One of the main reasons that the Ukrainian Armed Forces defend strongly and successfully many times is the correct diagnosis of enemy threats due to the incoming information from a multitude of modern means such as satellite systems and UAVs that track and record the movements of Russian armored and motorized forces . Early diagnosis of Russian actions and intentions leads to the optimal distribution of Ukrainian forces during the defensive struggle, to maneuvers and to the correct planning of the defensive layout.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Strategic planning requirement<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
If the course of business in Ukraine has shown anything, it is the value of strategic planning at all levels, military, political, economic, energy. In essence, this does not only concern the army but the entire potential of the country and the state apparatus. Requirements for a sufficient stock of ammunition, fuel, medicines, clothing of all kinds, weapons and other systems, human resources, to ensure the smooth and orderly operation of the state apparatus are prerequisites for the conduct of prolonged military operations.<\/p>\n\n\n
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The lessons learned from the operations so far are that in the management of a war situation, the proper functioning of the armed forces is not enough, but the nationwide mobilization of the entire mechanism of the state and the body of society is required. This concerns the security forces, the emergency services, the narrow and wider public sector, the energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructures and above all the wholehearted and single-minded conscription of the people to face the enemy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unfortunately for Western societies, the situation does not bode well. And this because in addition to the unrestrained “outsourcing” that they have advanced, especially in the years that followed the end of the Cold War, privatizing every aspect of economic activity and not only, they have lost the fighting spirit and the vigor and willingness required to get involved in prolonged scale military operations of high intensity and extent on homeland against equivalent (peer-to-peer) adversaries. Dealing with this unpleasant situation essentially requires a reversal of the political, economic and social trends followed by the West over the last 30 years, which does not seem particularly likely in the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Breaking down the unbridled “technocracy”<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
In the time that has passed since the end of the Cold War and even before, completely wrong perceptions prevailed, not only in the ordinary world, but also in scholars and analysts specialized in the art and science of war, and even military professionals, about war in the present and in the future. From the philologies of “pressing buttons” and conducting future operations exclusively with ultra-high-tech means operated from air-conditioned cages, to the complete discrediting of the foot soldier-fighter, they created in society a complacency and cultivated indifference to the development of martial virtues her.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Military operations development in Ukraine dispels all these mythologies. In defiance of the world’s extreme technocrats and smokeless “armchair generals”, the war reveals once again its true nature, which requires soldiers on the field or otherwise “boots on the ground” for its conduct. War never stops evolving and of course technology is at the forefront of the process. But this should not lead to the fanatical belief that wars can only be waged with it, without the significant involvement of the human factor, which leads as a result to the complete demilitarization of society and the assignment of war to a few paid for this purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n
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Although advanced weapon systems made their appearance in the war in Ukraine, and indeed with sometimes impressive results, they were not able to catalyze operations or eliminate the need to deploy large numbers of manpower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Without exaggeration it can be said that the muddy, dusty and snowy landscapes of Ukraine are the arena where all the postulates of the “war yapies” are demolished.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- The bankruptcy of the professional army<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Directly connected to the above is the belief that the future of the army lies in its complete professionalization, as it is assumed that a few thousand or at most tens of thousands of professional soldiers, operating ultra-high-tech systems, can easily prevail against many times more numerically conscript armies , based on the recruitment of the country’s manpower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Both the Russians and the Ukrainians initially relied on professional soldiers to conduct military operations. But they have a disadvantage: they are by definition small in number and are quickly “consumed” in an environment of ultra-high-intensity and large-scale combat operations against a peer or near-peer adversary. They must therefore be flanked by many draft soldiers with sufficient service time on the one hand and even more well-trained reservists on the other hand in order to “stand” in prolonged operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The era of “short” and “bloodless” (as bloodless as they were) campaign-wars seems to have come to an end and its place is being taken by the era where continuous (based on Israeli standards) engagement and attrition will be increasingly required of the (mainly male) population of a country with military objects. Unfortunately for Western societies, the future will demand for them constant sacrifices on an economic, social and individual level, a demand that it is not clear that they have the ability and above all the willingness to respond to. Israel is an example country of a Western-oriented society that responds with relative competence (?) to similar tasks, but it is rather the exception than the rule.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- The power of hybrid warfare<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Hybrid warfare aims to achieve strategic goals by targeting the national sensitivities and particularities of each people. It can take the form of disinformation and disseminating fake news, meddling in national election processes, or deploying special operations forces and special forces to conduct covert operations. All this happened in Ukraine in the last 9 years. First we had a Western-driven “Orange Revolution” that dethroned the Moscow elite and reduced Russian influence in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n
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Then the permanent communication and informational targeting of Russia with the aim of presenting it as a “rogue state”. Later we had the involvement of Western special forces (mainly American and British) in the training and guidance of the Ukrainian forces, while some sources even speak of the direct involvement of Western troops in the form of “mercenaries-volunteers” in the military operations. Of course, similar methods were followed by the Russian side, culminating in the annexation of Crimea, but the corresponding western ones are judged to have greater “depth”. According to experts, hybrid warfare in Europe is at its peak after the end of WWII.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Need for a stronger air force and greater anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic defense<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
The power of the air weapon and ballistic and cruise missiles redefines the need for greater anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic protection of critical installations as well as ground troops. Generally in the past decades, with the brilliance of the air weapon in the wars of the “New Order” dazzlingly blinding, the West had lagged behind in the development of modern air defense systems. The near-universal air superiority if not air dominance of the West removed the need to deploy A\/A assets, as friendly air ensured the protection of sensitive installations and military units in the field from any enemy threat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war in Ukraine seems to be redefining the value and importance of a well-structured Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) capable of providing comprehensive, multi-layered and overlapping defense against any aerial threat. The air war raging in the Ukrainian skies has as of this writing inflicted heavy losses on the Russians\u2014281 fighter jets, 264 helicopters, 1648 UAVs\/drones, 653 cruise missiles are the tally so far, according to Ukrainian sources. Even if we accept that the Ukrainians are exaggerating the losses of the Russians (which is very likely), the overall toll for the Russian side must still be high – and this from an air force and air defense that is relatively numerous, but generally technologically superior. And the degree of deterioration of the Ukrainian air force and air defense is correspondingly high, a result of Russian successes in air superiority, CAP and SEAD\/DEAD missions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Ukrainian air defense in recent weeks seems to be bending, as the attacks against it have intensified significantly. In general the situation for the Ukrainians resembles the German air defense from 1943 which had begun to gradually overwhelm the Germans.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
This underlines both the need to deploy a sufficient quantity of aircraft, even of an older generation, as well as the need to have a strong A\/A defense that will ensure anti-missile-anti-ballistic protection at the same time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Bold investments are also required in Electronic Warfare, ground cover and protection, deception and diversion of friendly assets, and timely, planned deployment of air power. Especially the latter is another lesson from Ukraine as the Ukrainian air force manages to remain active to this day, despite the blows it has received, precisely thanks to its ability to disperse within itself and support them successfully.<\/p>\n\n\n
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- Armoured Battle<\/strong> Tank: Far From “Finished”<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
The initial Russian failures and losses suffered by the Russian tank forces once again ignited the debate about the role of the tank on the current and future battlefield. These discussions are completely counterproductive because they seem to forget a basic rule: that there is no means of movement and maneuver on the battlefield with fire support and basic chest protection other than the tank! Those who stand one-sided against him, based on the losses suffered by the armored and motorized forces on both sides mainly by groups of tank hunters with modern and powerful Anti-Tanks must ask themselves what caused these losses.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Is this tank all that, or the flawed tactics they were used in the first place? And were these losses almost inevitable based on the volume of forces and weapon systems employed? And if we accept that heavy casualties were indeed caused in the ranks of the chariot forces, how many were avoided precisely because they were used? What would be the outcome of the battles if one of the two combatants did not use armored and motorized forces? Could the other person deal with him more or less easily? How many casualties did the tanks and other motorized maneuver elements (fire support vehicles) inflict on the enemy forces?<\/p>\n\n\n
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And after all, what is the alternative to using tanks on the battlefield? If tanks become the burden of destructive weapon systems, what fate awaits the other forces, of tanks and generally armored vehicles, if they are exposed to the same level of threat? We do not ignore or underestimate the value of Anti-Tank systems and the threat they pose to armored vehicles. However, they cannot decisively tilt the shield against the chest, even in the absence of a reliable alternative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We generally believe that a country threatened by invasion must maintain strong Armored and Mechanized forces, capable if used properly, of dealing a critical blow to the adversary. Contrary to many, the tank is not dead yet and will not die, at least for the foreseeable future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Artillery: from Combat Support Weapon to Shock-Impact Weapon<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
If anything proves its value beyond any doubt on the battlefields of Ukraine, it is most clearly the Battle Artillery. In this war we had, once again, the confirmation of the rule that in a war, most of the losses to the enemy are inflicted by Artillery. He is therefore not unfairly characterized as “The King of the battle”. The mere fact that the Russian forces manage to contain the Ukrainian forces, although they are disadvantaged in some cases by a ratio of 8:1, is largely due to their depressing superiority in Artillery. Accordingly, the supply of Ukrainians from the West with state-of-the-art systems such as MLRS and especially HIMARS, has given them the opportunity to deliver powerful and in some cases spectacular blows to the Russians, attacking command and supply centers, troop concentrations, barracks, lines resupply, advanced helipads, sensitive facilities, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Also despite its doomed death, towed artillery seems to play an important role in operations, especially when used correctly and with imagination (use from fortified or well-organized positions, combining it with drone systems to detect, uncover and target enemy positions, etc. ). Information was recently leaked about the excellent performance of the FH-70 tow truck provided as Western aid to Ukraine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
A big role seems to be played by other means of emitting fire, such as the Russian TOS, in essence multiple thermobaric rocket launchers. The latter, despite their limited range, have proven particularly effective in supporting Russian offensives, attacking fortified and organized Ukrainian positions with often devastating results. Of course, the specific means do not belong to the Russian artillery but to the chemical warfare troops, which is why they are mentioned separately.<\/p>\n\n\n
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In conclusion, a modern army must invest heavily in Battle Artillery, especially if they are outnumbered, because just by the devastating barrage of fire it can unleash, they can destroy entire enemy units.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Airborne Forces: Retain or Abolish?<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
The initial Russian action against Ukraine was marked by the widespread use of airborne\/airborne forces. These were used as “entry forces” to attack airfields near Kiev, so that heavier forces could follow. The Russian leadership apparently estimated that only with the appearance of the VDV at strategic points around the capital, i.e. the power center of the Ukrainian state, would the Ukrainian leadership panic and try to flee. When this did not happen, Russian airborne forces at airfields such as Khostomel came under strong Ukrainian counterattacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Although they fought bravely and skillfully, repelling a series of enemy counterattacks, the Russian forces were forced to either withdraw or surrender, having suffered heavy casualties. Although the initial raid on the airfields was successful, albeit with losses to enemy air defenses especially MANPADS, the Russian VDV forces subsequently failed to link up with the Russian 65 km Armored and Mechanized phalanx, which critically affected the likelihood of the venture’s success. In general, it was once again shown that airborne\/airborne forces, despite their elite nature and the obvious advantages they offer to friendly planning (exploitation of the “third dimension”), cannot “stand” by themselves on the battlefield , must be combined and replaced in a second time by other forces to ensure success.<\/p>\n\n\n
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On the contrary, airborne\/airborne forces are more effective when they are reinforced with heavy weapons (tanks, etc.) and used as elite infantry in the fight, which was already seen from WWII. In the Ukraine war both the Ukrainians and – mainly – the Russians skillfully and successfully used VDV forces in a similar manner in missions to slow down enemy energy, flank enemy forces, as “assault” troops in offensive operations, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Amphibious operations: in doubt<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
The war in Ukraine shows the relative impossibility of launching amphibious operations in conditions of uncertainty created by the entry into enemy areas “Anti-Access”\/Area Denial”, structured even in an incomplete form. The sinking of the cruiser “Moskva” is just the tip of the iceberg. The iceberg lies in the avoidance by the Russian side of the rumored planned landing in Odessa.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The reluctance of the Russians to proceed with an amphibious operation in the strategic city of Odessa for them demonstrates that modern A2AD means, in addition to being operational, also have a psychological effect on the enemy, as they exponentially increase the degree of doubt about the threat to which he is subject. It is no coincidence that the USMC is drastically changing its doctrine in order to deal with the threat of China in the Pacific and is being transformed from a “Combat Corps” to a “Naval Operations Support Corps”. Ambitions for Amphibious Assault are abandoned and attention is given to small, autonomous and agile battlegroups, with high firepower, whose primary mission is to “dislodge” enemy A2AD infrastructure so that the Army’s heavy follow-on forces can be safely transported. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Airborne ammunition and Drones: the new equation<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Another factor that has entered the Ukraine war in a spectacular way is cluster munitions and drones. Of course the latter, at least in the form of (UAVs), are nothing new, as they have been used with varying degrees of success in past wars. What differentiates things is the use of “quadricopters +” drones even at the level of an infantry battle group, as well as the use of USV-KAMIKAZE in the role of attacking surface targets (ships, boats). More specifically, small drones are used in a particularly effective way in reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and even offensive roles with the use of grenades, grenades, mortar shells against enemy personnel and means, and even armored vehicles.<\/p>\n\n\n
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Orbital munitions, on the other hand, seem to play an ever-increasing role on the battlefield, as they offer unprecedented precision attack capabilities against even strategic targets such as airports, naval stations, military bases, water and energy plants, etc.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The investment that modern militaries must make in anti-drone\/counter-drone defense is significant and costly, which poses a significant challenge to the structure and “mix” of forces of the future.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Special Forces: in a support role for conventional operations<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
After the Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) war, the shift of special operations units and special forces to supporting conventional military operations is evident. This essentially reverses the trend of the War on Terror where Special Forces were used as the main means of carrying out the fight and they return to the role they have had for decades.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the Ukrainian war special forces and forces were widely used by both opponents. In the initial phase of the Russian operation, the Russians used mainly GRU Spetsnaz to decapitate the Ukrainian leadership and cause chaos and collapse of the rear. After some initial successes and although they were able to cause some confusion on the Ukrainian side, these groups were neutralized by not achieving their assigned ANSK. The Russian Spetsnaz were then used in more “conventional” operations with varying degrees of success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the Ukrainians also used special forces and special operations units, both in Direct Action missions, as well as Special Reccon and Unconventional Warfare. Their use is generally considered successful in Unorthodox Warfare missions, where they were able to mobilize and quickly train large numbers of Auxiliary Troops, with less success in Special Reconnaissance missions and with rather disappointing results in Direct Action missions. Of course, they must be given the mitigating factor that these missions were almost suicidal in nature, with a small success rate and were basically done for communication-political reasons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Fortifications: reinventing the wheel<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Another revelation of the war in Ukraine is the reappearance and re-use of fortifications and indeed in a modern and updated form. Especially the Ukrainian side made and makes extensive use of fortifications on the battlefield, mainly in the Donbas region but also to a lesser extent elsewhere. Generally, throughout the centuries, fortifications offered something to be used by the respective military organizations, before they began to be challenged by “armchair generals” around the world.<\/p>\n\n\n
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To those who continue to question the value of fortifications, repeating monotonous (convenient) examples from the past we reply that obviously the art of fortification has evolved and continues to evolve through the ages, it is wrong to develop an opinion about situations that are expected to be answered in tomorrow’s field of battle bearing in mind patterns from the past. Each military mechanism makes its own choices, depending on the particular challenges it is called upon to face.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In the Ukrainian case, fortifications offered and offer that economy of forces, in order to free up forces for other missions. These fortifications include a wide network of above-ground and underground works (support points, enclosed defense points, artillery, anti-tank positions, towers of retired tanks fixed on the ground). Especially the dense construction, even in the countryside, has given the Ukrainians the opportunity to treat each settlement as an “enclosed defense support point”, while the areas between the settlements often turn into “Selected Destruction Areas” of the enemy (“porcupine” method) )<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Russian separatists have made a similar investment in the fortifications, albeit on a smaller scale (after all, they had 8 whole years at their disposal), which allowed them to repel a series of Ukrainian attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
However, the way the Ukrainians are handling their fortifications in recent weeks looks problematic. More specifically, instead of being a means of slowing down the enemy forces and a method that ensures an economy of forces, they increasingly turn into a “magnet of forces” for the friendly staff, which sends them to defend the fortifications. After all, this is the biggest pitfall of fortifications, i.e. their transformation from a means of assisting the defense to an end in itself that “devours” friendly forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Communications: a vital need<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Another lesson from the conflicts in Ukraine is the need for secure and reliable communications, even at the Battlegroup level. In this particular area, the Ukrainians have really performed a “Herculean feat” since 2014, when they discovered that their communications were in a terrible state. To be more specific, with the generous support of the West, they have built a reliable communications network, which they are constantly improving, resulting in a sharp rise in the degree of coordination of their forces. One of the main reasons why they can and still hold their own against Russian forces is their superiority in command, control, communications and intelligence systems.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In fact, Western support for the Ukrainian war effort is not only expressed by state actors but also extends to private ones, with the most typical example being the disposition of Elon Musk’s Starlink vision network satellites on the Ukrainian side. The effectiveness of the services is such that it appeared that the Ukrainian defense collapsed, as soon as their supply was abruptly interrupted, probably due to malicious action on the part of the Russians (one of the first battles of the war in space).<\/p>\n\n\n
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On the other hand, although the Russians seem to have a superiority in the Electromagnetic spectrum, especially in the area of Electronic warfare, this has not been demonstrated in practice, perhaps due to a lack of proper training. However, the Russians’ performance in this area seems to have improved in recent weeks, which is reflected in the degree of coordination of their actions on the field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- The quality is good, but a sufficient quantity is also needed<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
In recent years, the phrase about “small and flexible” armies has become dominant. This phrase is often referred to by the entire political world in our country. But this is an illusion as the phrase about small and flexible armies refers to operations of a police and counter-terrorist nature and not to high-intensity conventional operations. As demonstrated by the operations in Ukraine, ground forces are required that will combine quantity as well as quality. That is, sufficient numbers of formations (motorized and armored) with a high manning of drawn lancers and reserves. The latter is of great importance for our country from two aspects: the quantitative and qualitative improvement of the term and above all the utilization of the reserve with regular calls of reservists so that the formations have the best possible manning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Tactical \u2013 Training<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Both tactics and training remain at the heart of combat power. Modern technology does not replace the need for realistic training, while the tactics of small leaders must be at the forefront of a properly prepared training program. The latest military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan created yet another illusion in addition to the above: that the war is being waged by small groups of special forces when in reality the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan involved completely different aspects of military operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Logistics-(Administrative Care)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
Logistics (Administrative Care) is one of the key success factors. By the term Administrative Care we refer to the entire mechanism that concerns the support of military operations with food, supplies and all kinds of necessary material in the appropriate quantities. At the same time, it is emphasized that from the point of view of Administrative Care, it is necessary to have the appropriate transport network for supplies and materials available.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- War is not just about press buttons – The role of the Infantry<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
It does not mean conquering or maintaining territories without the Infantry and the maneuver forces (infantry cooperation with Armored). The characteristic weakness of the Russian infantry is worth mentioning since the little progress has its roots in the inherent weaknesses of the Russian infantry and the Russian maneuver forces as a whole. Therefore the Infantry remains at the center as the main tool for conquering or maintaining territories always in cooperation with Armored and Artillery. The infantry tactic of fighting by fire and maneuver remains in the philosophy of modern operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- Rated firepower is not a criterion of combat power<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
It was surprising to many that such a powerful ship in terms of armament and firepower as the Moskva was hit and eventually sunk. Indeed the Russian Slava class cruiser has an impressive payload of short range missiles (OSA-MA) as well as long range missiles (S-300F). In addition, it has 6 anti-missile systems for its self-defense against anti-ship missile threats.<\/p>\n\n\n
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Ignoring the fact that the Russian navy, specifically the Moskva, was close to the Ukrainian coast given the threat posed by the coastal missile arrays, we must point out that the nominal firepower is not the only criterion for the combat power of a ship. Obviously, if the scenario that the ship was hit by R-360 Neptune missiles is true, the Ukrainian presence of coastal missile arrays was underestimated.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The cruiser Moskva was launched in 1976. The ship’s technological capabilities in terms of sensors, radar, tactical system and electronics are outdated and belong to the 1970s. The ship was supposed to be upgraded around 2018 but this does not seem to have happened probably due to a lack of financial resources. Consequently, the main systems that make up the “eyes” and “brains” of the ship were left with obsolete capabilities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The aforementioned antiquated means combined with the underestimation of the Ukrainian threat and the tactical error of the ship coming close to shore within range of the R-360 Neptune missiles spelled doom for the ship and most of the crew. In addition, since the ships are operating in battlegroups, errors also arise from the fact that the other Russian ships close to Moskva did not detect and intercept the R-360 Neptune threat in time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In any case, to come back to the main issue that we have to point out, we want to note again that the combat load to be effective must also be accompanied by modern means (radar) that locate, identify and assess air threats (missiles, UAVs, aircraft ) as well as a tactical system with a modern philosophy of managing and dealing with the above threats. Hence, the American admiral’s words and point of view remain as relevant as ever.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Months ago we published the recommendation of the Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy, Admiral Mike Gilday, who emphasized the importance of modern sensors, radar and electronics, commenting that the Ticonderoga can carry 122 missiles, but they have outdated radar and electronics that belong to past decades of the Cold War. He characteristically emphasized: “You have to see the threat in order to neutralize it. The SPY-1A and SP-1B radars are not sufficient given the targets they have to deal with,” said Mike Gilday. Already 7 “Ticonderoga” are in the phase of upgrading and extending their life limit in order to be combat-worthy against modern threats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
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- The pivotal role of Unmanned Aircraft<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
In both intelligence-gathering and targeting missions, UAVs in Ukraine have proven to be an excellent tool at every level: strategic, tactical, operational. From early detection of enemy activity operations to Artillery MLRS, UAVs are an indispensable asset in enhancing any Arm of the Army. Even civilian UAVs of limited capabilities provide useful services to the Ukrainian Army.<\/p>\n\n\n
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In this analysis we touched on only a few aspects and even briefly of the Ukrainian war. Certainly much more could be said in a more well-structured way. We await your comments and opinions as written. The only thing that is certain is that the war that is taking place is a turning point in world development, not only on a political level but also on a purely operational level, and will become the reason for the revision of many “fixed” aspects of military art and science that have been developed in recent years decades.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
“There is nothing more unpredictable than war.” This timeless saying was to be confirmed on the battlefields of Ukraine. The initial hopes of the…<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":11737,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[2362,2845,7,3830],"tags":[2358,3217,58,2821,1156,1976,3395],"class_list":["post-11736","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-military-science","category-military-strategy-doctrines","category-research","category-war-in-ukraine","tag-doctrine","tag-military-doctrine","tag-russia","tag-strategic-doctrine","tag-ukraine","tag-war","tag-war-in-ukraine"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11736","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=11736"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11736\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":11751,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11736\/revisions\/11751"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/11737"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=11736"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=11736"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.liberalglobe.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=11736"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
- The pivotal role of Unmanned Aircraft<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Rated firepower is not a criterion of combat power<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- War is not just about press buttons – The role of the Infantry<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Logistics-(Administrative Care)<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Tactical \u2013 Training<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- The quality is good, but a sufficient quantity is also needed<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Communications: a vital need<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Fortifications: reinventing the wheel<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Special Forces: in a support role for conventional operations<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Airborne ammunition and Drones: the new equation<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Amphibious operations: in doubt<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Airborne Forces: Retain or Abolish?<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Artillery: from Combat Support Weapon to Shock-Impact Weapon<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Armoured Battle<\/strong> Tank: Far From “Finished”<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Need for a stronger air force and greater anti-aircraft and anti-ballistic defense<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- The power of hybrid warfare<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- The bankruptcy of the professional army<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Breaking down the unbridled “technocracy”<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Strategic planning requirement<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n
- Command and Control \u2013 Tactical Situational Awareness<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n